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INTRODUCTION
Problem
A very eminent scholar of war and peace, Raymond
Aron, once said: "Relations between sovereign states may
be more or less bellicose; they are never essentially or
1ultimately peaceful." Although the remark can hardly be
contested, the curious questions of why conflicts (i.e.,
especially international conflicts between foreign nations)
2are so pervasive and what causal conditions bring such 
conflicts into being are questions which have not been 
adequately resolved, and for that matter may never be, 
"Conflict, of course, is inherent in the nature of man."^ 
But this does not necessarily negate our efforts in 
attempting to resolve such questions. History provides us 
with the raw material for analysis and study of conflict 
and conflict avoidance, but often times this analysis is
^Raymond Aron, On War (Garden City, N.Y.: Double­
day, 1959),'p. 18.
For a splendid discussion of "social causation" 
and the concept of causality, see R. M. Maclver, Social 
Causation (New York: Harper and Row, 1942)',
^Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Toward a Strategy of 
Peace (New York: Rand McNally, 1965), P« 47.
1
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lacking in perspective; and has to some degree been confused 
with the study of crisis behavior. A significant fact to \ 
realize concerning a crisis is that ” . . . it occurs as the) 
result of failure of decision-making at much earlier 
stages.”*1' The Cuban missile crisi^ was no exception.
This research project has been addressed to the 
problem of answering several questions concerning the 
crisis that, in this author's opinion, have remained wholly 
unresolved and inadequately answered. The Cuban missile 
crisis of 1962 has been described by one foreign policy 
strategist in the following manner?
Few will deny that the recent establishment of a 
Communist government in Cuba, coupled with the 
decision of the Soviet Union to invest almost a 
billion dollars in the creation of a strategic 
missile base for the first time beyond the borders 
of its contiguous satellites, produced the most 
serious crisis of the nuclear age.5 (Italics mine.)
Robert Osgood has described the crisis in a somewhat 
different perspective? ” . . .  the Cuban Crisis grew out of 
grossly erroneous estimates of national interests and 
behavior between states with years of hard experience in
^J, ¥. Burton, Systems. States, Diplomacy, and 
Rules (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968J,
P» 239.
^Robert D„ Crane, "The Cuban Crisis,” Orbis, VI 
(Winter 1963), 528, This view of the magnitude of the 
crisis is commonly held by many writers, most notable of 
these being Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, 
Arnold Horelick, and Herbert Dinerstein.
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confronting each o t h e r ( T h a t  this crisis brought the
7bipolar nuclear powers "eyeball-to-eyeball" in the first 
nuclear Cold War confrontation is a well-known facto What 
is not clearly understood is why Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev 
attempted such an adventurous and risky scheme*:
^Directly related to the reasons for Khrushchev’s 
placement of strategic, offensive missiles in Cuba are his 
calculations of the possibilities and probabilities that 
such an action, He,, deployment of missiles in Cuba, either 
would provoke a hostile and aggressive response from the 
United States involving great risks of retaliation, or that 
the act of implacing missiles in Cuba would involve only a 
marginal degree of risk, associated with maximum gains from
.............  ....  g ...... .
penetration of the U.S.'s core interest, and only a verbal 
show of force by the U,S, These calculations bring into 
question the state of American foreign policy and deterrence 
strategy^ It can be assumed that in any international
Robert F» Osgood, Force, Order, and Justice 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 19671, p« 156*
?This particular comment was attributed to McGeorge 
Bundy, who was a member of President Kennedy’s special 
"think tank" committee of the National Security Council 
during the actual crisis of October 1962, See for example 
Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days? A Memoir of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (New York: W . I ,  Norton, 1969). ~■ r" v
^Traditionally, a core interest has always involved 
a geographical area deemed so vital to the security of a 
given nation-state that it would consider a threat to that 
area as a threat to its own security. The Cuban missile 
crisis of 1962 bears out this relationship.
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conflict the respective aggressors and deterrers base their 
political maneuvers and military postures on certain 
definable strategies, calculations, and objectives to be 
achieved--be they political or military**^ ^oviet pre-crisis 
calculations of probable U 0S 0 behavior were based on some 
of the following criteria? informational signals, words and 
actions of executive leadership, past performance in inter­
national affairs, employment of force, images, and U 0S 0 
resolve!
"The international system,” according to Kenneth
Boulding, "consists of a group of interacting ’nations1
or ’countries*1 Since the international system is com-
11posed of a group of interacting nations involving recip­
rocal relations between political entities, where each 
nation bases its decisions and policies towards the others 
on certain value patterns, such as interpretation of 
images, actions and words of statesmen, and expectations, 
then(it is a truism to say that it is what nations’ leaders
^For the sake of brevity in my Introduction, I 
will define only those terms essential to the reader’s 
understanding* Chapter I will be devoted to a more elabo­
rate explanation of terms*
1 DKenneth E, Boulding, "National Images and the 
International System," in William C. Olson and Fred A,* 
Sondermann, The Theory and Practice of International Rela­
tions (2do ed„; Englewood Cliffs, N*J*: Prentice-Hall,
T966), p„ 52*
^ T h e  term "interacting nation" will be discussed 
in Chapter I (see infra, pp* 22-24)*
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think the world is like, not what it is really like, that
1 2determines their behavior,, "The image is always_in some 
sense a product of messages received in the pastpJJ^
{.The importance of national images can be clearly- 
understood when we attempt to provide a logical explana­
tion for Khrushchev’s deployment of missiles in Cuba in 
1962. A question often asked after the event and as often 
tentatively answered was: What was the Soviet purpose or
objective in putting in the missiles? Rarely asked, but 
more urgent for future policy guidance, is the question: 
What did we do to make them think we would let them get 
away with it? To this specific question, this research 
project is addressed
Hypothesis and Research Design 
pin a television interview not long after the Cuban 
missile crisis of 1962, President John F. Kennedy observed 
that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had made a serious 
miscalculation in the Cuban affair, ”1 don’t think we 
expected that he [Khrushchev] would put the missiles in 
Cuba,” he said, ”because it would have seemed such an
<4 ✓-
*Cf., Ross S'tagner, The Psychological Aspects of 
International Conflict (Belmont, Calif,: Brooks/Cole
Publishing Company, 1962), especially chapts, 1-6, Here 
he discusses such concepts as ’’projection, overloading and 
the self-fulfilling prophecy,”
^Boulding, ojc, cit, , p, 53®
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imprudent action for him to take, . „ „ He obviously
thought he could do it in secret and that the United States
1 h>would accept it.” Obviously Khrushchev did think that 
he could do it, and such calculations were based on certain 
assumptions he had formed concerning the behavior of the 
U.S. government, its nuclear deterrence strategy, its 
credibility, and its young President--John F. Kennedy^
That deterrence strategy did in fact fail to deter 
the Soviet Union from placing offensive missiles in Cuba, 
which has been traditionally and geographically a U.S. 
sphere of influence and a recognized core interest of the 
U.S., is well known. I think Bernard Brodie best described 
the ineffectiveness of American deterrence strategy when 
he said:
Actually, the greatest single challenge to the 
status quo, the greatest "failure of deterrence"-- 
though we must avoid confusing an occasionally 
necessary confrontation with failure of deterrence-- 
was precisely the Cuban Crisis of October 1962. . . . 5
Specifically, this thesis will attempt to answer
the following questions:
1 . Why did deterrence strategy fail?
2. What led Khrushchev to believe he could
successfully deploy missiles in Cuba?
^Washington Post. December 1S, 1962.
^Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966)
p. 52.
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Hypothesis Statement 
/ Since this thesis will attempt to demonstrate that
»A.vua-
the cause of the missile crisis can be attributed to rthe
"failure of deterrence," it is necessary to explain what 
16deterrence is, how it is used, and what its psychologi­
cal functions are .'"'j
This thesis will focus on American deterrence 
strategy as stated and implemented during the Kennedy 
Administration. This strategy will be evaluated for its
relevance to serve as a deterrent* To evaluate American
17deterrence strategy, a deterrence model will be con­
structed from the major deterrence theories that prevailed 
at the time of the crisis. This model will be a synthesis 
of the primary elements that comprise deterrence strategy.
1 Deterrence has been defined by many writers.
Glenn S’nyder's definition is highly descriptive and quali­
tative: "Deterrence is a species of political power. It
is the capacity to induce others to do things or not to do 
things which they would not otherwise do or refrain from 
doing; deterrence is simply its negative aspect. It is 
the power to dissuade another party from doing something 
which one believes to be against one's own interests, 
achieved by the threat of applying some sanction."' 
"Deterrence and Power," Journal of Conflict Resolution, IV 
(June 1960), 163.
1 7A model, as defined and used by this writer, is:
A structure embodying a set of variables having a specified 
set of interrelations, but which variables and relation­
ships need have only limited correspondence with the empiri­
cal phenomena and relations among the empirical phenomena 
to which they refer. See for example Robert T. Golembiewski, 
William A. Welsh, and William J. Crotty, A Methodological 
Primer for Political Scientists (Chicago: Rand McNally and
Company, 1969), pp. 427-446. A model is a theoretical
1 $Deterrence theories of several writers will be scruti­
nized, and the components of their strategies will be 
constructed into a representative model of deterrence 
strategy. By constructing a deterrence model, it will be 
possible to evaluate Ataerican deterrence strategy and, 
more specifically, determine why it failed. Such an 
examination may help explain Khrushchev’s actions in Cuba.
This thesis wjjll analyze and evaluate American 
deterrence strategy through the application of the deter­
rence model to determine whether it can serve as an 
explanation as to whgt led Khrushchev to believe that he 
could successfully deploy missiles in Cuba.
Q t  is the position of this thesis, and it will be
demonstrated through the analysis adopted, that a possible
answer to what led Khrushchev to believe that he could
successfully place missiles in Cuba can be found in the
examination of the following hypothesis:
Certain ftufa.jective factors of American foreign
policy toward the Soviet bloc convinced the 
„  -----------
construct of isomorphic design that describes, explains, 
and predicts Reality, and is a low-level theory by defini­
tion.
1 $The most notable among these so-called ’’war 
thinkers" aref Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, David 
Singer, Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, Albert Wohlstetter, 
Morton Halpe/in, George Lowe, Fred Green, and Glenn Snyder. 
It should be noted that this author has borrowed quite 
liberally from the work of Glenn Snyder. (See supra, 
p . 7 ,  n . 1 )
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Russians and Khrushchev that the U.S. would not 
respond with military force to the creation of 
an offensive Soviet missile base in Cuba.
Simply stated, the hypothesis is a repudiation 
of the ability of American deterrence strategy to deter 
aggressive acts by a potential enemy .(i.e. , the Soviet 
Union)„ Implicitly, the hypothesis states that certain 
behavior patterns of U.S, leaders in conducting foreign 
policy indicated to the Russians? irresolution, inaction, 
unwillingness to use force, vacillation, undefined poli­
cies and goals, willingness to negotiate, discrepancies 
between words and deeds, and an obsession with pursuing 
peace. The fact that the U.S. had just elected the 
youngest man in its history to fill the most powerful seat 
of government in the world--the presidency of the United 
States— also brought doubt on the U,S,'s determination and 
resolution to meet its commitments.)
The preceding subjective factors (i.e., irresolu­
tion, inaction, and vacillation) are perceptions held by 
an individual which are of a psychological dimension.
These perceptions are normally involved in the calculation 
of what is known in the deterrence language as mcredi- 
bility,” Snyder defines credibility as,
, . , the perception by the threatened party [in 
this thesis the Soviet Union] of the degree of 
probability that the power-wielder [in this thesis 
the U.S.] will actually carry out the threat if
10
its terms are not complied with or will keep a 
promise if its conditions are met,19
.To demonstrate the validity of the hypothesis 
statement, five international crises have been chosen 
which can be analyzed through the deterrence model to 
determine whether the subjective factors were present. 
These five crises can be considered as limited probes of 
American resolve: Russian-Cuban relations, the Bay of
Pigs, Laos, Vienna, and the Berlin Wall, If it can be 
shown that the subjective factors were present in each 
one of these crises, then we can logically conclude that 
what led Khrushchev to believe he could succeed in de­
ploying missiles in Cuba was in fact a "failure of deter­
rence" and the expectation that the U,S, would not act.
Method and Sources Used in Study
Such an analysis, as using the deterrence model,
20also includes the description of the "role" of the
%nyder, o£, cit, , p, 164, Throughout the re­
mainder of this paper, reference to deterrer will mean 
the U,S,, and reference to the aggressor will mean the 
Soviet Union,
20Role is defined as "the behavior expected of a 
leader, the predictable behavior which others adjust and 
respond to, the acts and functions of each leader that 
together create the structure of international society," 
See Burton, 0£, cit,, p„ 103, lor a more detailed discus­
sion of role and role systems, see Heinz Eulau, The 
Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random
House, 1963), especially pp, 13-79,
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Chief Executive in foreign affairs and the role of the 
Premier in Soviet foreign policy„ /The problem of estab­
lishing, with a relatively high degree of accuracy, 
foreign policy objectives for the U»S„ and the Soviet 
Union is a basic requirement to this study,, The method 
chosen for this investigation utilizes the concept of
"elite articulation,,"^ This concept is based on a single
22presumptions "foreign policy" objectives are what the 
foreign policy elite say they are „ )
Stated generally, decision-making elite consist of 
those individuals who perform the function of politi­
cal authorization in the foreign policy arena„ Poli­
tical authorization may be defined as authorization 
sanctioned by the conventions of the system023
( The foreign policy elite is normally composed of the head
of government, his executive secretaries, and his foreign
2lFor a discussion of "elite articulation" in 
foreign policy analysis, see Stanley Hoffman, Contemporary 
Theory in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N»J0; 
Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp„ 171-75ff®
po^ I n  this discussion "foreign policy"' means the 
courses of action and the decisions relating to them that 
a state undertakes in its relations with other states in 
order to attain national objectives and to advance the 
national interest„ See Charles Lerche, Foreign Policy of 
the American People (Englewood Cliffs, N„Jo? Prentice- 
Hall, 1962), pp„ 4-5ff; also John G„ Stoessinger, The 
Might of Nations (New York? Random House, 1962)!, 
pp,, 211-29® Stoessinger simplifies Lerche1 s definition 
by saying, "A nation’s foreign policy is the expression 
of its national interest vis-a-vis other nations" (p, 27)®
^Peter M 0 Meloy, "Soviet-American Military 
Strategy? What Price Security?" (unpublished Master’s 
thesis, University of Montana, 1969), P® 9®
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minister* In the U.S., the President is delegated the 
powers by the Constitution to conduct foreign affairs and 
represent the U.S'. The office of the President, the 
Secretaries of Defense and State are the American elite 
structure.for defining the national interests, objectives,
i
and policies. In the Soviet Union, the top foreign 
policy-making elite are members of the powerful party 
organization known as the Politburo
“Jhe foreign policy of every nation-state is at all 
times presumably designed to promote the ’’national 
interest.” The national interest is what the nation’s 
leaders say it is.J^ Interests are inescapably involved 
with security and well being; objectives are the specific 
applications of interests to meet particular international 
situations; and policies are means designed to attain
2^For a definitive discussion of Soviet party 
organization, foreign policy formulation, and organiza­
tion of government, see J. F. Triska and D. D. Finely,
Soviet Foreign Policy (New York? MacMillan and Co., 
1 9 6 8 ) 7 “ "
^ F o r  another conception of the ’’national interest,” 
see Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest 
(New York: Random House, 1951). Morgenthau advocates
that American foreign policy -should follow ’’one guiding 
light— the national interest.”- Morgenthau is thinking 
strictly of ’’national interest” defined in terms of power.
In his Politics Among Nations (4th ed,; New York: Knopf,
1967), Morgenthau stated his much-quoted theory of inter­
national politics” . . international politics is the
concept of interest defined in terms of power. . . . W e  
assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest 
defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that 
assumption out . . .” (p. 5)*
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objectives* >It will be an assumption of this thesis that 
the national interests and core interests of a particular 
nation-state (e,g„ the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.) are in 
specific cases the statements and actions of the national 
leaders* But it remains useful or even essential that 
policy-makers act as if there were such a thing as the 
national interest and endeavor to promote ity It is 
often apparent, because of bad policy, that policy-makers 
have not so acted. The failure of deterrence to dissuade 
Khrushchev from putting missiles in Cuba is a good case in 
point.
f' - ’
The conceptualization of the deterrence model will 
serve as a theoretical construct to analyze deterrence 
strategy in the five international crises mentioned 
earlier (see supra, p. 10)i This discussion will be 
developed in Chapter I
Chapter II is a discussion of President Kennedy's 
policy statements concerning national interests, objectives, 
and foreign policies. This chapter will examine deter­
rence strategy as applicable to Cuba, the Soviet Union, 
Western Europe, Laos, and Berlin.
Chapter III, which comprises a large portion of 
this thesis, will involve the application of the deter­
rence model to the five international crises. It will 
become apparent through this analysis that the ,,Tsubjective
14
factors” influencing Soviet behavior were present in 
these events0 Each case was a clear example of the 
weakening of deterrence strategy,, Stated policy interests 
and objectives were not backed by force* decisive firmness, 
or action,, American threats and verbal statements of 
policy were not credible because they were not buttressed 
by force and action„ r,A threat that is not credible is
p Ano deterrent." As Hans Morgenthau has so aptly stated:
nIn the nuclear age, the very purpose of threat and
counterthreat is to prevent the test of actual performance
27from taking place.'" The Cuban missile crisis was indeed
a reality, a crisis of such tenuous brinkmanship that one
wonders if Herman Kahn’s odd locution that nuclear war is
"unthinkable” may very well have been the case of ’"thinking
o $the unthinkableo” ; ”In our times," writes Kahn, "thermo-
y
nuclear war may seem unthinkable, immoral, insane, hideous,
26Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 113~
2?Hans Morgenthau, "Significance in History,"
New Leader, ILYI (December 1963), 6.
^Herman Kahn’s known detachment and cold calcu­
lations concerning the possibilities of nuclear war may 
be rather insensitive to human suffering, but his rational­
izations of the effects of war are strikingly clear to a 
point of disbelief. Similar thoughts are also expressed 
in Kahn’s other two significant contributions: On Thermo­
nuclear War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, i960)’ and On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios
(New York: Praeger^ 1965)» ~ ~
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or highly unlikely, but it is not impossible.”29 These 
are indeed very sobering words.
• Chapter IV is a discussion of Premier Khrushchev: 
his attitudes, his behavior, and his politics. This 
chapter will develop the proposition that Khrushchev, 
given his propensity towards opportunism, coupled with 
rational calculations, was not a ’’reckless, adventuresome, 
and highly irrational”? leader, as described by some 
scholars X
(This thesis will not discuss the political and 
military objectives behind placing missiles in Cuba.
These objectives have been described by several authors 
and this writer finds their calculations accurate.
(Chapter V is a discussion of Soviet pre-crisis 
calculations. This chapter will attempt to answer the 
question: What led Khrushchev to believe that he could
successfully deploy missiles in Cuba? The hypothesis 
statement will be tested in this chapter to determine 
whether it can serve as an explanation of Soviet behavior. 
Risk-taking of Soviet leaders will be examined and
^Herman Kahn, Thinking the Unthinkable (New York: 
Horizon Press, 1962), p. 19®
3^See for example Arnold L, Horelick, The Cuban 
Missile Crisis (S'anta Monica, Calif: Rand Corporation,
Mem. RM-3779-PR, September 1963), pp® 4-21; and Nathan 
Leites, Kremlin Thoughts: Yielding, Rebuffing, Provoking,
Retreating (Santa Monica, Calif: Rand Corporation, Mem.
RM-361 3-tISA, May 1963) , pp. 1-24; and also Crane, _op, cit. , 
pp. 523-563°
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interrelated to Soviet decision-making# And finally, the 
Soviet leaders' expectations regarding U.S # response will
'~s.vbe evaluated^#
At this point a possible critic may question
whether Soviet motives and behavior can be accurately
interpreted and described# This writer agrees to some
extent with the remarks of one Soviet scholar, Alexander
Dallin, concerning Soviet behavior, when he saids
To weigh the continuing changes in the Soviet situ­
ation-real and apparent, deliberate and unintended, 
lasting and transient— the observer must reach 
judgments based on uncertain data and frequently 
contradictory impressions#31
Unless Khrushchev and his colleagues choose to reveal the 
considerations and calculations that actually guided their 
decisions and actions in the crisis, as opposed to the 
superficial propagandized version of them as "saving the 
peace" that was announced by the Soviet Premier and his 
cohorts, the questions I have set out to answer will 
necessarily not be susceptible to definitive resolution. 
Fidel Castro reportedly told a friendly French correspon­
dent that Khrushchev's motives were unknown to him and 
were a complete mystery# They may not be known by his­
torians "in 20 or 30 years#"3^} Yet if we are to derive any
3lAlexander Dallin, et al., The Soviet Union and 
Disarmament (New Yorkr Praeger, 1964), pp. 3-4#
32Conversation with Claude Julien, Le Monde,
March 22, 1963#
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useful foreign policy and defense lessons from the Cuban 
missile crisis, we cannot wait for history.
As earlier stated, I discovered through my
initial research on this thesis many questions totally
unresolved and inadequately answered. The treatment of
President Kennedy1s behavior and role as a determinant
leading to the crisis has not been examined. This thesis
is as much a repudiation of the effectiveness of American
deterrence strategy as it is an incriminating indictment
of President Kennedy’s failure to exhibit leadership in
the White House. An Richard Neustadt has cogently writtens
He [the President] makes his personal power impact; 
by the things he says and does. Accordingly, his 
choices of what he should say and do, and how and 
when, are his means to conserve and tap his sources 
of power. Alternatively, choices are the means by 
which he dissipates his power. The outcome, case 
by case, will often turn on whether he perceives his 
task in power terms and takes account of what he 
sees before he makes his choice.33
,'The performance of the Kennedy Administration in foreign 
'affairs is of dubious quality. President Kennedy’s 
famous statement, "Let’s get moving again,” surely could 
not apply to foreign policy. The record is replete with for­
eign! policy. failures;: the Bay of!:Pigk,oLaos-^f>Lenna^ -Cuba 
policy, and the Berlin Wall. And the greatest one of them 
all was the Cuban missile crisisT")
-^Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Bower: The
Politics of Leadership (New Yorks John Wiley and Sons, 
Inc., 1960), p. 179o
id
Searching for the answers to the questions I have 
posed can be of great value, particularly when they are 
tested against Soviet behavior in the coming months and 
years-
Finally, a word should be said about the validity 
of my research design„ It does not purport to answer all 
the questions concerning the Cuban missile crisis- The
criteria used in evaluating models generally agreed upon
by theoreticians are: (1), validity, (2); flexibility,
(3) generality, (4) measurement of sophistication,
(5) significance, and (6)' internal logic,-^
The deterrence model on which this thesis bases 
much of its conclusions is a general, low-level theory- 
It is the belief of this writer that the deterrence model 
meets the requirements of being descriptive, explanatory, 
and predictive- A model is a central tool of political 
science and "fundamentally, all explanation proceeds in 
terms of models-"-^
The conclusion will include some general remarks 
the author has formed in light of the research done on 
this topic- These remarks might be collectively entitled
-^Golembiewski, Welsh, and Crotty, op- cit-, 
pp- 430-31ff» Definitions of terms are given on these 
pages and the following,
^ I v a n  D- London, "The Role of Model in Explana­
tion," Journal of Genetic Psychology, LXXIV (June 1949), 
165, as quoted in Golembiewski, Welsh, and Crotty, 
op — cit o , p o 42*7 o
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T,A Reaffirmation of Decisive Action in Achieving Foreign 
Policy Goals*" The conclusions of this thesis may be 
able to provide answers to the following questions?
1o How should a President administer foreign 
policy to best protect and guard his personal power?
2. How can a President make policy choices that 
build rather than dissipate his influence and power?
When attempting to conduct a study of this nature, 
it becomes somewhat of a problem to identify those written 
materials which most honestly reflect the assumptions, 
intentions, attitudes, and policies of national leaders 
("elite")* This researcher has found the following sources 
most useful? Public Papers of the President, the Depart­
ment of State Bulletin, the Department of Defense Bulletin, 
the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washing­
ton Post„ Foreign Affairs, the Rand Corporation, Committee 
Reports and Hearings; and the biographies of John F* 
Kennedy*
For sources of Soviet statements concerning 
policy, The Current Digfest of the Soviet Press was used,, 
Included are English translations of Pravda, Kommunist„ > 
and Izvestia*
PART I
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
1961-1962
CHAPTER I
AMERICAN DETERRENCE STRATEGY 1961-1962
"Deterrence through military power/" according to
Arnold Wolfers, "is as old as the multistate system it-
-  1 self: si vis pacem para helium was a classic commentary/’
tWith the advent of nuclear weapons after World War II,
deterrence assumed a much more commanding role in defense
policies, security objectives, and the attainment of
national i n t e r e s t s I f  self-preservation is the first
■■■"- 'y
law of nature, it is also the first law of foreign 
2policyo Deterrence is a means for providing for the 
security and well-being of a nation’s national interests 
and its citizens,,
( In its most fundamental sense deterrence is 
” o o o the discouragement of military aggression by the 
threat (implicit or explicit) of applying military force
1Wolfers, ojOo cit „, p 0 139«
2Co Vo Crabb, American Foreign Policy in the 
Nuclear Age (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 1ff«
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in response to the a g g r e s s i o n D e t e r r e n c e ,  similar to 
all forms of power, functions in an inducing capacity to 
dissuade individuals from doing things that they would 
not otherwise do or refrain from doingv^We speak of indi- 
viduals in this case for the simple reason that the inter­
national system is composed of ”actors” and "nations” 
interrelating and interacting with each other. Walter 
Clemens, Jr. has described it in the following manner;
The international political system is a product of 
both voluntarism and determinism. It is an arti­
fice that men make; and it is an organism that grows 
in unforeseen ways as a result of the forces im­
pacting upon it A
(Because states are abstractions, or at best conglomerates 
of personalities, it is not the nation or state that makes 
the political or military decisions and acts but always 
individuals (though they be politicians or statesmen),.. 
Bince decisions are translated into strategies^ by indi­
viduals, '"human elements are the real keys to the making
%nyder, _0£. cit., p. 167« This definition is a 
simplified definition of deterrence given in the Intro­
duction of this paper (see supra, p. 7, n. 16). This 
simplified definition will be the meaning of the term in 
the remainder of this paper.
^Clemens, ojd. cit. , p. 3»
^Strategy is here defined as: "The art of apply­
ing force so that it makes the most effective contribu­
tion towards achieving the ends set by political policy.” 
In Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy (New York: 
Praeger, 1965), p. 22.
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6and execution of strategy*" Leaders, statesmen, and
politicians make decisions, not states* Governments are
made up of persons and we have, through the use of more
sophisticated research methods, learned a great deal
7about the behavior of persons* This point need not be
labored; in the final analysis? "It is a truism that all
action within the international system can be reduced to
§the action of individuals The international system is 
a dynamic system, not a static one* It involves the 
transmission and communication of nations’ policies, atti­
tudes, and intentions* (Through the medium of "elite 
articulation," a nation’s stated objectives and national 
interests are expressed) It is through the manipulation 
of political power as well as military power that such 
interests are achieved* To this end, deterrence is the
means through which they may be secured*
Although the aim of deterrence strategy can
^Arleigh Burke, Risk of General Nuclear War, 
cited in David M* Abshire and Richard V* Allen, National 
Security (New York: Praeger, 1963), "Introduction*"
?This point is emphasized by Bernard Brodie, On 
Escalation, op* cit * , see pp„ 130-140,
°Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verda, The International 
System (Princeton, N*J*? Princeton University Press,
1962)* This particular quotation was taken from a 
theoretical essay written by Yerda, entitled "Assumptions 
of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the 
International System," p* 73° His particular political 
theories incorporate the concept of "elite articulation,"
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hardly be misinterpreted, nTo deter direct nuclear attack
Qon the United States » „ » ," the deterrent system also
must be able to ". „ , deter any kind of aggression,
10whether military or n o n - m i l i t a r y D e t e r r e n c e  strategy 
must not only be functional.at the level of deterring a 
major nuclear war, but it also must provide for the un­
foreseen, for technological or enemy-inspired surprises, 
for various options to insure that strategy can serve 
policy, and for a margin of error or miscalculation on 
both sides0 ^The outcome desired in implementing deter­
rence strategy can be described as follows?
o o 0 to force the enemy to accept the terms we wish 
to impose on him„ In this dialectic of wills a 
decision is achieved when a certain psychological 
effect has been produced on the enemy; when he be­
comes convinced that it is useless to_start or 
alternatively to continue the struggle.^ 1
As one author has stated? "Deterrence i_s the real world,
1 p fnot a game.," ( A  bipolar world loses the perspective for
^Henry Rowen, "The Basic Issues of National 
Strategy," Western Political Science Quarterly, XIII 
(September i960), Supplement, 42.
1 nThomas S» Power, Design for Survival (New York? 
Coward-McCann, 1965), p« 1&5« '
^Beaufre, 0£° cit., p„ 23.
^Arthur Waskow, The Limits of Defense (Garden 
City, NoYof Doubleday, 1965), p. 12. In Waskow’s refer­
ence to "game," he is referring to the mathematical games 
Thomas Schelling plays in his"Strategy of Conflict 
(Cambridge, Mass.? Harvard University Press, 1963). There 
are two main types: (1) "non-zero-^um game" and (2) "zero-
sum game,," The "zero-sum"' game is considered by strate­
gists as the "pure form of 'conflict
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nuance: a gain for one side takes the form as an absolute
3
loss for the other! The international system is like a 
"delicate balance of terror"^ in whieh a serious miscal­
culation by either super power may lead to the mutual
destruction of bothu^■ lr~ ■.'(^The capacity to deter is a function of several 
factors: (1) military capabilities, (2) military pre­
paredness, (3) credibility of threats, and (4) the total 
cost-gain expectations of the party to be deterred„ The 
summation of such factors may be called "political power»" 
Described in another fashion, Robert Dahl has written 
that power consists of four basic components: base, means, 
amount, and scope0 These four components are ultimately 
transformed through the use of deterrence strategy into 
national power,, National power is "1 „ » the ability to 
influence the behavior of another nation in accordance
with the goals of one!s own action*,"^
1 5Dahl states that the power base is the material 
or attribute (capability) that provides the capacity to 
affect the value positions of others, e og 0, military force
^■%ee Albert.Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of 
Terror," World Politics, XXXVII (January 1959)» 211ff0
^Dean G a Pruitt, "National Power and Inter­
national Responsiveness," in Sondermann and Olson, op0 
cito, p 0 293o
^Robert A., Dahl, "The- Concept of Power," 
Behavioral Science, II (1957), 201-16o
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and economic assets. The means, according to Dahl, is 
the method by which the power base is brought to bears 
for examples by threats ultimatums or force demonstration. 
The amount of power is the degree of influence over poten­
tial actionso The scope is the range of potential actions 
by the other party which can be influenced by the threat 
or promise of applying the base., To translate this into 
the terms of deterrence, the following would apply; the 
base in graduated deterrence is the capacity to inflict 
unacceptable punishment on the enemy; the means is the 
threat of retaliation; the scope refers to the various 
forms of aggression, the probability of which may be re­
duced by the threat; and the amount is the reduction in 
probability of each of these moves which results from the 
threat., ̂ ̂
f’ Aside from the four components just mentioned,
two other factors need to be mentioned; the object values 
and the credibility of a threat or promise. Object 
values are the values of the other party. They are typi­
cally his total cost-gain expectations in pursuing a 
certain act and they are subject to being decreased or 
increased by the actual carrying out of the threat or 
promise'h) The sixth component, credibility,^ is the least
1' For a definitive discussion of these categories, 
see Snyder, op>, cit, , p. l63ff°
1?For an operational definition of credibility, 
see supra, p, 9«
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tangible and most crucial element in the strategy of deter­
rence,, "Credibilitys" states David Singer, is ”T0 „ ■> making
the potential attacker believe that the threat will be
1 & /' ̂carried out„” (Interpreting what the author has so far
s-*
said, it can be seen that the political power and the 
foundation of deterrence reside in two distinct elements^ 
capabilities (i«e„, the capacity to affect the object 
values of the aggressor by application of a power base) and 
the deterrer’s intent to use these capabilities if one's 
demands are not metf!^ Political power is the ability to
j
persuade or influence which results from threat or promise 
to inflict deprivations to object values; physical power 
is the ability to affect object values„ Physical power, 
which in a state is transformed into military power, is 
" o o o ultimately the power to destroy and kill, or to 
occupy and control, and hence to coerce,"^ CDeterrence is 
a form of power relation--the power to dissuade„ Deter­
rence is the discouragement of military aggression by 
threat of applying military force in response to aggres- 
sion<j)PAhd as Henry Kissinger has said? "There can be no
^David Sanger, Deterrence, Arms Control, and Dis­
armament (Columbus, Ohio! State University Press, 1962), 
po 57o
^Snyder, o£„ cit«,, p„ 165®
^Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in 
the Nuclear Age (Princeton, N„J0r Princeton University 
Press, 1966), chap„ ii„
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gap in deterrence. Deterrence is either effective or it 
is not /
The Logic of Deterrence 
Deterrence, like all political phenomena, is not 
likely to operate as a strict law or principle,. However, 
it does have a consistent and logical foundation,,
^ T h e  object of military deterrence as stated is to 
T,deter a g g r e s s i o n w h e t h e r  it is of the military or non­
military typdy This involves reducing the probability of 
enemy military (aggressor) moves inimical to one’s self0
r"/Snyder states that the probability of any particular 
attack by the aggressor is the result of four factors 
which exist in his mind. All four taken together are the 
aggressor’s risk calculus„ Snyder defines them in the 
following manner:
(1) The aggressor’s valuation of an objective;
(2) The cost which he expects to suffer in an attack 
on the objective, as the result of various pos­
sible responses by the deterrer;
(3) The probability of various responses, including 
no response;
(4) The probability of winning the objective with 
each possible response„22
These are the basic factors the aggressor must assess in
determining whether an action is likely to result in a net
gain or a net costV The ’’risk calculus” is in part a
p 1Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice 
(New York: Harper Bros., 19o1)> p„ 12. ■
22see Snyder, ojd. cit. , p„ 167«
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psychological matter, ,TIt rests principally upon an 
enemy’s judgment of the likelihood of various possible 
outcomes of an attacko <> <> ,”^3 The third factor in the 
aggressor’s ’’risk calculus” represents the credibility of 
various possible responses by the actions of the deterrer<> 
The deterrent effectiveness of a possible or threatened 
response is a function of all four factors.
The Concept of Credibility 
( The ’’credibility factor” in deterrence strategy 
has an essential function inasmuch as it is through the 
aggressor’s calculation of the deterrer’s ’’credibility” and 
’’perceived intentions” that he bases his decisions to act~^ 
A restatement of this concept may be useful at this time:
23̂ Kahn, Thinking the Unthinkable, op, cit, , p, 111, 
Kahn presents a penetrating discussion of deterrence 
strategy and states that U,S, military policy seeks to . 
achieve at least six broad strategic objectives;
(1) Type I Deterrenee--to deter a large attack on the mili­
tary forces, population, or the wealth of the U,S,;
(2) Type II Deterrence— to deter extremely provocative 
actions short of war on the U.S.; (3) Improved War Outcome-- 
to limit damage to the U,S, and to improve the military 
outcome for the U,S>,; (4) Stability--to reduce the likeli­
hood of an inadvertent thermonuclear war; (5) Comprehensive 
Arms ControI--to control and limit both arms race and the 
use of force in settling disputes; (6) Type III Deterrence-- 
to deter provocations not covered by Type II Deterrence, 
such as Controlled Reprisal, other limited wars, mobili­
zations, negotiations, and so forth. This author cannot 
disagree with these objectives. These were valid military 
objectives actively pursued by our national government in 
the early 1960?s ,
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(Credibility is defined as the perception by the 
threatened party [aggressor] of the degree of 
probability that the power-wielder [deterrer] 
will actually carry out the threat if its terms 
are not complied with or will keep a promise if its 
conditions are met). (See supra, p. 9.)
"The paradoxical consequences,” when the aggressor 
attempts to calculate his risk calculus, "istthat the 
success of military policy depends on essentially psycho­
logical criteria."^ The aggressor’s "risk calculus" is 
determined by estimating the expected costs involved in 
pursuing a certain objective should that objective not be 
obtained, and also the expected net gains are calculated.
CThe potential aggressor is presumably deterred from a
military move not simply when his expected cost exceeds
his expected gain but when the net gain is less or the net
cost is more than he expects when he refrains from the 
25move. Expectations are based on the calculations of the 
deterrer1s image system, attitudes, intentions, and credi­
bility facto^o The images created by the credibility 
factor are crucial. ^"Images guide human behavior. . . . 
Most decisions are made on the basis of facts as seen by
^Kissinger, ojd. cit., p. 12. For a socio- 
psychological approach to international policies, see 
David Singer, Human Behavior and International Politics 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); also Joseph de Rivera,
The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, 
Ohio: C» E. Merrill Publishing Co., 196$).
25snyder, op. cit., p„ 1660
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2 6the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ( I t a l i c s  mine,) Since deterrence
strategy must appear credible, the deterrer must somehow
communicate to the aggressor that he really would strike
if his vital national or core interests were endangere'di)
The power base of nuclear deterrence which provides the
capacity to affect the value positions (expectations) of
the aggressor is the arsenal of weapons available to the
deterrer0 (As Hans Morgenthau has indicated, nuclear force
has a "psychological function pure and simple'^ He
further states that,
o o .("the prospective opponents are kept constantly 
aware"of the inevitability of their own destruction 
should they resort to nuclear force, and this aware­
ness prevents them from resorting to it„ „ „ „ In 
the nuclear age, the very purpose of threat and 
counterthreat is to prevent the test of actual per­
formance from taking place0 The appearance of pos­
sessing both the ability and the resolution, to make 
good the threat and counterthreat becomes, then, of 
paramount importance as a condition for the success 
of mutual deterrence„ „ „ <> The nature of this con­
dition, it will be rioted, is political rather than 
military for what is essential is the appearance, 
not the reality, of possessing the ability and reso­
lution to make good threat and eounterthreat„27 
(Italics mine o)
r\ /T
Stagner, apc cit „ , pp. 55-69ff<> For matters of 
clarification a decision is defined as n‘» » . any act, 
symbolic or overt, which is socially defined as a commit­
ment to carry out a specified task, to take the responsi­
bilities of a specified social role, or to execute a 
specified course of action in the future,," See Irving L, 
Janis, "Decisional Conflicts? A Theoretical Analysis," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, III (March 1959)y 6»
27'Hans Jo Morgenthau, "The Four Paradoxes of 
Nuclear Strategy," American Political Science Review, 
LVIII (March 1964), 24.
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.In the mechanics of mutual deterrence an element of bluffv,
either real or supposed is required. Deterrence works 
only because there remains in the minds of both sides a 
doubt as to whether the other side is really bluffing.
This creates a condition of mutual deterrence which is
. the ability— mutually recognized--of each side to 
destroy the other, no matter who strikes first
\Deterrence strategy is clearly based on a belief 
system^ involving such criteria as the followings 
interpretations of images, psychological dispositions of 
both parties, perceived intentions, and credibility fac­
tors, Since decision-makers act upon their definition of 
the situation and their images, it is imperative that 
threats and counterthreats be implemented in such a way 
as to reinforce positively the aggressor’s expectation of 
net loss rather than anticipated net gai'n^, The deterrer’s 
credibility factor must impress upon the aggressor through 
the perceptual mechanism of threats and counterthreats 
that certain objectives are valued highly by the deterrer.
(^’The problem of deterrence thus becomes the problem of
^Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy; A 
Historical Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1966;, p, 111,
^ F o r  an illustrative analysis of national "belief 
systems," see Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and 
National Images," Journal of Gonflict Resolution, VI,
No, 5 (1962), 244-245ff- Holsti notes that a belief 
system "orients the individual to his environment, de­
fining it for him its salient characteristics" (p. 245)«.
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30credibility.” The purpose of a threat is to prevent 
an undesired action (i0e„, military or non-military 
aggression) without actually engaging the aggressor in 
conflict® "A threat will be credible if there is reason
to believe that the one who makes the threat is both
^  31able and willing to carry it ou§<>” (Italics mine.)
Thomas Schelling has stated the matter quite definitively
when he said?
We have learned that a threat has to be credible to 
be efficacious and that its credibility may depend 
on the costs and risks associated with fulfillment 
for the party making the threat0 We have developed 
the idea of making a threat credible by getting our­
selves committed to its fulfillment, through the 
stretching of a ’’trip wiren across the enemy’s paths 
of advance or by making fulfillment a matter of 
national honor and prestige0 ® ® .32
Schelling further states that a threat must be backed by
action not words, both the threat and the commitment have
to be communicatedo If not, he (deterrer) may deter the
threat itself. Schelling goes on to say;
Any loopholes the threatening party leaves himself, 
if they are visible to the threatened party, weaken 
the visible commitment and hence reduce the credi­
bility of the threato
O O O O O O O O O  O O  O O  O 0 O © O © 0 9  © 9  9 0  ©
 ̂ Clinton F. Fink, ’’More Calculations about Deter­
rence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, IX (March 1965), 
54® Philip Green, in Deadly Logic; The Theory of Nuclear 
Deterrence (Columbus, Ohio; Ohio State University Press, 
1966), presents a somewhat similar line of argument.
31J Fink, op. cit o, p„ 54®
^Schelling, ojd. cit., p. 6.
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It is essential, therefore, for maximum credibility, 
to leave as little room as possible for judgment or 
discretion in carrying out the threat,
The threat must invoke overt acts rather than 
intentions; it must be attached to the visible deeds 
not invisible ones* 0 . »
O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O o o o o  o o o o o o o o o  o
And finally, the act of punishment must be one 
whose effect or influence is clearly a discernible 
one,33
A summary remark concerning the above might be helpful?
(Deterrence requires a combination of power, the will 
to use it, and the assessment of these by the poten­
tial aggressor. Moreover, deterrence is a product 
of those factors and not a sum. If any one of them 
is zero, deterrence fails. Strength, no matter how 
overwhelming, is useless without the willingness, to 
resort to if)34 (Italics mine,)
("Schelling states that the deterrer must threaten‘'■X,
that he will act, not that he may act, if the threat 
failsx. To say that one may act is to say that one may
A——/
not, and to say this is to confess that one has kept the 
power of decision— that one is not committed,35 jn order 
for threats to be credible and for the deterrer to be 
able to pledge his reputation behind a threat, there must 
be continuity between the present and subsequent issues
that will arise, (The deterrer must exhibit a uniformity\
and continuity in expressing threats, ))
It must be remembered that "deterrence fails when
33ibid,, pp, 40-41*
34Kissinger, op, cit,, p, 12,
35s-ee Schelling, op, cit,, p, 1&7,
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the attacker decides that the defender®s threat is not 
likely to be fulfilled."^ A successful threat is one 
not implemented.
(lit is somewhat of a paradox that deterrence 
strategy's logical core is based so much on psychologi­
cal factors. A good example is the matter of a threat 
which is meant as a bluff. If taken seriously by the
aggressor the bluff is more useful than a serious threat
37which is interpreted as a bluff. When bluffs are tested
and found wanting, rTthe nuclear threat will lose a measure 
of its plausibility," and in consequence "it will lose a 
measure of its restraining effectp’̂
At this point a word should be said about the
r~element of "rationality.” v̂ To act "rationally" means 
simply to choose from among the available courses of action 
(i.e., objectives in "risk calculus"), the one which
t
promises to maximize expected values (or minimize expected
IQcost) over the long run. i "A rational individual or
3^Bruce M. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, VII (June 19&7)> 98®
Urs Schwarz, American Strategy; A New Per­
spective (New York; Doubleday, 1966), entire "Introduction."
-^Morgenthau, Four Paradoxes, op. cit. , p. 24®
39ihe most usual concept of rationality is that it 
is a process of means-ends analysis. The simplest case of 
means-ends analysis involves a single goal sought by the 
decision-maker. Rational choice is the selection among 
alternatives of the action that maximizes the goal. See 
Sidney Verba in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, The
36
society/’ says Thomas Milburn, ’’will not, for example, seek 
loss but only some kind of win.”^  An example will suffice 
to explicate the definition of rational: /A rational indi­
vidual will be reluctant to participate in a game of chance 
in which he may lose his entire capital, even if his mathe­
matical expectation is one of substantial gain. The deter­
rence model assumes rationality of both deterrer and
a g g r e s s o r ’’Deterrence is not a game, it is the real/
world.” A potential aggressor for example will not start
or attempt a first strike if he knows that such action will
ultimately lead to his own destruction. Such calculations
are the workings of "taadmen.” But as Kahn has said:
Our deterrent must be powerful enough to withstand 
all of the stresses and strains of the cold war, of 
sudden and unexpected crises, of possible accidents 
and miscalculations, of satellite revolts, of limited 
wars, of fanciful calculations by optimistic gamblers 
or simple-minded theoreticians, and of these situ­
ations in which ’’reciprocal fear of surprise attack” 
might destabilize an inadequate deterrent. . . . 
Moreover we want to deter even the mad.
International System, article entitled, ’’’Rationality and 
Non-Rationality,” ojd. cit., p. 107; and William A. Scott, 
"Rationality and Non-Rationality of International Atti­
tudes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, II (1956), 6-10.
^Thomas Milburn, ’’What Constitutes Effective 
Deterrence/’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, III, No. 2 
(June 1959), 140; and Philip Green, op>. cit. , pp. 1$6-160.
^ K a h n , Thinking the Unthinkable, op. cit., 
p. 111. Kahn’s remarks concerning deterring the ”mad” 
may not be comprehensible to the layman, but Kahn is sin­
cere. Perhaps the ’’living would envy the dead" as Kahn 
remorselessly states.
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("I'n summary, for deterrent effectiveness, according'
\ ,  'V/
to S’nyder, the deterrer must make sure that his military 
posture and threats pose greater costs than gains for the 
aggressor and to make sure that his threat is believed.
The deterrer must estimate how much evidence supporting 
the threatened intent would be necessary to achieve credi­
bility,, \
Qthetorie is no substitute for action in foreign 
affairso Power and influence are the means of facili­
tating deterrence), and ” , . . they share the role of being
IQ
the means par excellence of foreign p o l i c y Power and 
influence are inextricably interrelated to will and 
determination. The first law of foreign policy is self- 
preservation , The two basic goals of foreign policy are?
(1) to enhance the security^ 0f the nation and (2)' to 
provide for the well-being^ of its citizenry. To these 
ends, deterrence strategy must address itself,
^Wolfers, _og, cit,, p, 104.
^Security is here defined as physical safety, 
territorial integrity, and political independence.
^♦Well-being requires the preservation of cultures 
and values of its way of life.
3$
The Requirements of Effective 
Executive Leadership
(.The role of the Chief Executive in foreign affairs 
is indisputable— his is the "vital center of action'V^ in 
the formulation, initiation, and implementation of foreign 
policy,, Throughout history, writes a leading student of 
the Constitution, "the greatest single force in setting 
the course of American foreign policy has been the presi­
dential i n i t i a t i v e T h e  many roles the President per­
forms in the Twentieth Century reveal the enormousness of 
his tasks and his duties: he is the chief executive; he is 
the chief legislator; he is the chief of foreign policy 
and the commander-in-chief and party leader and chief of 
state— the states' unifying symbol,, Herman Finer, one of 
the outstanding scholars of the presidency, has quite
^5John F, Kennedy, a Pulitzer Prize winner for his 
Profiles in Courage, was the thirty-fifth President of the 
United"States {l9bT“1963)o This speech was delivered to 
the National Press Club on January 14? 1960, as quoted in 
Robert £T, Hirschfield, The Power of the Presidency 
(New York: Atherton Press,—Inc,, 196$), p„ 131= This par­
ticular quote was paraphrased by Kennedy from a sentence 
written by Woodrow Wilson in his chapter on "The President 
of the United States" in Constitutional Government in the 
United States (New York: Columbia University Press" 190$)?
pp. 54=$1o This sentence read: "His is the vital place
of action in the system," See also Hirschfield, o£„ cit», 
Po 95°
^Edward SO Corwin as quoted in GO V„ Crabb, 
op, cito, p 0 43. The original quotation may be found in 
Edward S', Corwin and Louis W, Koenig, The Presidency 
Today (New York: New York University Press, 1956);,
39
realistically described not only the dynamism of the 
office but also its overshadowing burdens in the following 
remark:
The quality of the government of the American nation 
is staked almost entirely on a gamble--the gamble of 
the sufficiency of one man's personal qualities of 
mind and character and physique, pitted against the 
appalling tasks that history has thrust on the Office 
of the President of the United States.47
It may indeed be true, as Woodrow Wilson once said: "The
President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to
i g
be as big a man as he can," but as history has revealed 
law and conscience must often yield to time and circum­
stance o But the fact remains: "He himself must integrate
and decide. He must lead; his decisions define what the
49national interest is."
As Richard Neustadt sees it, the problem of the
President involves personal power and politics. "fresi-
50dential power is the power to persuade." The Presi­
dent's dilemma is power: what it is, how to get it, how 
to keep it, and how to use it. The power to persuade and 
influence is inextricably involved in foreign policy, for
47nerman Finer, The Presidency (Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1960), see "Preface."
4^Woodrow Wilson, "The President’s Role in Ameri­
can Government," cited in Hirschfield, op. cit., p. 93°
4 % e  Rivera, op. cit. , p. 131.
^Neustadt, op. cit., p. 10.
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"All foreign policy depends on the ability to get other 
nations to do what one wants them to do or to desist from 
doing what one does not want them to do.”’̂"* ( The President 
is the prime strategist in foreign policy. He defines 
and articulates the national goals, security objectives, 
and foreign policy. But government is not merely contem™ 
plation: ”It is action, the solution of problems and the
subdual of difficulties. Conviction and consciousness 
propose the direction and suggest the means.”^2 The act 
of conducting foreign policy successfully, Walter Lippmann 
has contended, ’’’consists in bringing into balance, with a 
comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s 
commitments and the nation’s power.” The President, in 
order to preserve the security of the nation, must act 
purposefully in the face of the challenges confronting the 
nation. (Since American policy is so explicitly based on 
deterrence strategy, our strategy must pay particular 
attention to determining how the aggressor is calculating 
his risks'^ Strategy must be able to assess the forces
4.---/
which move contemporary events and discover the means for 
shaping them in the desired direction. ’’A* good strategist,” 
according to Robert Ginsburg,
5"!Arnold Wolfers, ’’Vehicles of Political Stability,” 
in David M„ Abshire and Robert G. Allen, op. cit., p. 272.
52Finer, ojd. cit., p. 121.
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o « o will seek to preserve maximum freedom of 
action to cope with the enemy while restricting 
the choices available to him. To achieve this 
objective, he should devise a strategy that will 
take maximum advantage of national strengths, 
minimize the adverse effect of national weaknesses 
and restrict the enemy’s ability to do the same.53 
(Italics mine.)
The international system involving ’’'actors” and
’’nations” is an environment which has accurately been
called the ’’test of wills
Each side tries to probe and estimate the other 
side’s degree of commitment and fears, . . . Each 
sign of caution in the opponents is likely to be 
taken as evidence that the opponent wants to avoid 
confrontation and fears the consequences^ and this, 
of course, could then increase the morale and re­
solve of the other side.54
ĵ Xn the realm of world affairs, experience has shown that 
the surest way to convince the aggressor of U.S. resolve 
is not by ’’formal protests, solemn declarations, or 
threats of using the bomb but by quick countermeasures 
against harassment and infringements.”^  The mutuality, 
reciprocity, and interdependence of the international 
system dictates that threats and counterthreats by the 
aggressor must be met with firm resistance and commitment
f| An ironclad commitment to stated policy objectives
53Robert M. Ginsburg, United States Military 
Strategy in the Sixties (New York: Norton, 196$), p . 14«
5^-Kahn, On Escalation, op. cit. , p. 248.
55pavid Binder, "Are We Really Standing Firm in 
Berlin?” Reporter, XXVI (March 1$, 19621, 22.
42
establishes a "trip-line” across which the potential
aggressor dares not crossy Threats of punishment and
deprivation of object values serve to deter the aggressor
from moves inimical to one’s self. Threats by the enemy
will constitute ”probes for weakness or for lack of con-
56cern with a particular objective.” The President’s 
behavior, as expressed through his words and demonstrated 
by his actions must lend credibility to national strategy; 
if rhetoric is a substitute for action, a credibility gap 
will result. (The President’s resolve and determination 
in acting decisively in the face of unknown risks and 
dangers will ultimately determine whether the international 
system will experience a degree of stability^ Eor, as 
Robert Osgood has notedr
((it follows the mutual restraint of the superpowers 
in avoiding war or coming perilously close to the 
brink of war depends less on the military balance 
than on their estimation of each others’ comparative 
resolve to use force in a clash of interests.5^
(italics mine.)
(Resolve on the part of the President is merely his 
ability to give credibility to national strategy and 
security objectives^ Resolve can be demonstrated to the
^Morton Kaplan, ”The Calculus of Nuclear Deter­
rence,” World Politics, XI (October 1956), 55»
57Rc>bert Osgood, o£. cit., p. 146. Resolve in 
foreign policy decision-making is associated with the 
ability of a leader to make up his mind and to come to a 
decision. More specifically, it means ”a firmness in 
carrying out a decision or a purpose.”
(^potential 
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aggressor by offering , .th e  most powerful
and indisputable evidence of complete determination to re-
Resolve is demonstrated by making decisions which affect 
the behavior of the aggressor and make "a believer out of 
him." The President has the responsibility for making 
certain decisions, but whether he actually makes these 
decisions depends on his decisiveness. The office gives 
him certain powers, and he must assert them. The Presi=- 
dent ” , 0 0  cannot expect to ignore initiatives » , 
from the aggressor "„ . . with impunity but must respond 
in kind Since governments and their leaders "create
events which some other nation’s decision-makers will 
interpret in their own way and will react to it in the 
context of their own internal affairs,"^ (It is imperative 
that national leaders impart positive images of strength, 
resolution, and willingness to use fore The President’s -3
task is to provide leadership based upon understanding the 
requirements of correct and effective01 action. Such
' Robert Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev 
(New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 242,
ciated in the strategy of deterrence with the term "win," 
Effective action is action which subdues or resolves a 
conflict in your favor— a win, A win defined in deterrence
that he may attempt.
^Triska and Finley, op, cit., p, 307.
60de Rivera, oj>, cit,, p. 1&»
61"Correct and effective" action is closely asso
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action requires the successful implementation of power and
physical forces Former President Eisenhower has said
that this country’s prestige and power should never be
committed unless its chief executive was determined to
win, ’’There is no alternative,” he declared„ ’’Force is
a naked, brutal thing in this worldo » . . If you are
going to use it, you have got to be prepared to go all 
63the wayc” J The use of physical force serves notice on 
the aggressor that,we value highly certain national 
Interests and objectives., Implementation of force clari­
fies the basic goals of policy toward major issues and 
areas. The President cannot afford to be indifferent about 
the use of force„ The threatened use of military force is 
a dissuading mechanism employed to persuade the aggressor
strategy is the ” „ <> . success in prohibiting the opponent 
from employing military force against other nations and/or 
restricting their political, economic, and social influ­
ence o” See Thomas Milburn, ’’What Constitutes Effective 
UoS'o Deterrence,” as quoted in John M„ Mackintosh, Strategy 
and Tactics of the Soviet Union (New York: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1963.)/ P° 181 .
ZL pD<”Force represents the capacity to compel compli­
ance” normally pursued through overt means such as mili­
tary power* Force is a cause that produces a change or 
stops action* See Reinhold Niebuhr, ’’Berlin and Prestige 
in Europe,” The New Republic, CXLV (September 2£, 1961)),
17; and cf» Robert Osgood, Limited War (Chicagot Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1957), pp» 11-20„
63statement made by former President Dwight ©<, 
Eisenhower concerning the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion 
in April 1961, cited in Mario Lazo, Dagger in the Heart; 
American Policy Failures in Cuba (New Yorkt Funk and 
Wagnalls, 1968), p„ 251«
45
\
from taking military action against your vital interests,?)
<lv J
National leaders and particularly the President
, o „ cannot be indifferent to the impact of war and 
military power upon national self-interests; there­
fore, they must base national strategy upon a sound 
conception of the conditions for using military 
power effectively064
As Robert Osgood has further noted, "A capricious, compul­
sive, or irresponsible use of military power cannot be 
6*5expedient,” J Force is indeed a "naked, brutal thing" and 
commitments must be honored, fnie cost involved in not 
honoring threats of military deprivation results in a 
weakened and unbelievable credibility posture„ If a 
"test of wills" occurs, the deterrer must fulfill his 
threat obligations by exhibiting to the aggressor the 
necessary resolve and force to persuade him to desist from 
the aggressive action^ According to Robert Tucker, there 
can be no hesitation in fulfilling our commitments to use 
force;
Any attempt to set limitations upon the manner 
of employing force must not only prove quite 
artificial and ineffective in practice, but 
might serve to encourage potential aggressions,
What the U,S, does in world affairs testifies
much more positively about its claimed attachment to
^Robert Osgood, Limited War, op, cit,, p. 13»
^ Ibid,, p 0
6£>Robert Tucker, "Force and Foreign Policy," 
Yale Review, CLII (Spring 195&)? 3&2-S3,
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freedom* or national security objectives, or its concern 
for core interests than what its leaders say about such 
principles. The mark of a great nation is determined not 
alone by its inherent finiteness or extrinsic capability 
but also by the degree of its steadfastness in accepting 
the burdens that challenge its very existence.^7
Hans Morgenthau, in writing about the role of the 
chief executive in conducting foreign policy, has elabor­
ated the distinctive qualities of the statesman's decision­
making capacity in the following manner:
It is a commitment to action. It is a commitment 
to a particular action that precludes all other 
courses of action. It is a decision taken in the 
face of the unknown and the unknowable.6$
Morgenthau goes on further to discuss the relationship
between words and deeds:
His rhetoric is verbalized action, an explanation of 
deeds to come. What still moves us today in the 
recorded oratory of a Churchill or a Roosevelt is 
not so much the literary quality per se as the 
organic connection between the words and the deeds.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 « 0 9 0 « 0
The statesman must commit himself to a particular 
course of action to the exclusion of all others.
He must cross the Rubicon or refrain from crossing 
it, but he cannot have it both ways. If he goes 
forward he takes certain risks, and if he stands 
still he takes other risks. There is no riskless 
middle ground. Nor can he, recoiling before the
67'Harold K. Jacobson, America's foreign Policy 
(New York: Random House, 19o5), pp. 99-102ff.
6%ans J. Morgenthau, "The Trouble with Kennedy," 
Commentary. XXXIII (January 1962), 51o
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risks of one course of action, retrace his steps 
and try some other tack, promising risks different 
and fewer* He has crossed the Rubicon and cannot 
undo that crossing.^9
vpnce a national leader makes a commitment to 
action through verbalized statements of policy, the imple­
mentation of such policy, if it is to be credible, must
demonstrate its uniformity and continuity through time.
*\
There can be no middle course.
The sources of power which are directly derived 
from military capabilities are contingent upon the quality
and the image which presidential leadership projects in
r~the world. \The President protects his power and personal 
influence by making decisions that build up and strengthen 
his image and prestiggT) "To make decisions with insight, 
the political leader must have learned to know himself 
and to master his identity."^ Presidential decision­
making requires conviction, will, vision, and commitment. 
As Charles Marshall states:
Will is the faculty for making choices. The dif­
ference between a weak and a determined will is 
simply a difference in steadfastness in carrying 
through with the renunciations inescapably involved 
in making choices.71
69Ibid., p. 52.
7^Max Lerner, The Age of Overkill (New York? 
Simon and Schuster, 1962), pp. 206-207*
71 Charles B. Marshall, "The Limits of Foreign 
Policy," as quoted in Jacobson, ojd. cit., p. 9&.
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Choices made by the President in decision-making guard 
his influence. They serve his power.^ (The President’s 
reputation is either made or altered by the man himself? 
What he says; what he does; what he omits; or what he 
does not do. The President’s own conduct will decide 
what other people and other nations think of him. As 
Neustadt states, the President’s reputation is a crucial 
factor in determining whether he will be able to influ­
ence
His general reputation will be shaped by signs of 
pattern in the things he says and does. These are 
the words and actions he has chosen day by day.
His choices are the means by which he does what he 
can do to build his reputation as he wants it. 
Decisions are his building-blocks, He has no 
others in his hands,73
His choices of what he will do and when and how-- 
his choices also of whom he will tell and in what 
way, and words— are his means to protect this 
source of influence, just as they are his means to 
guard those other power sources? bargaining rela­
tionships and professional reputation, , „ , A 
President’s own prospects for effective influence 
are regulated by his choices of objectives, and of 
timing, and of instruments, and by his choice of 
choices to avoid,74
For the President to make the most of power and 
to guard his own reputation and prestige, he must under­
stand the composition of power. According to Neustadt,
^Neustadt , ojd, cit,, pp, 56-57, 
73Ibid,, p, 64,
7^Ibid,, p, 107,
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if the President wants power for the future, he must
guard it in the present# He protects his power, as best
he can, when he appraises the effects of present action
75on the sources of his influence#
The President must act with resolve, conviction,
command, courage, coherence, constancy, conscientiousness,
and decisive firmness^ if he is to solve successfully
and effectively the many emergencies he is called upon to
meet# His task is not an easy one, but his power to meet
and solve problems is only as great as his knowledge of
what power is and how to use it# ”The presidency is no
77place for an amateur” politician or statesman#
Effective leadership by the chief executive in 
foreign policy requires that the following criteria be 
met:
/"’ 1, We must emphasize rather than belittle our
strengths if we are to keep our enemies con­
vinced of our military superiority#
2# We must make every effort to impress on the 
enemy that we have an unquestionable war- 
winning capability and that we have taken 
I adequate measures to preserve that capability
i 3o We must continuously demonstrate to our friends 
\ and enemies, through both word and action, thatV we have the determination to apply our military
o o o o
75lbid0 s p 0 181#
^ F o r  definition of terms, see Finer, jO£# cit #, 
pp# 120-147#
77ibid#, p# 124#
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superiority as may be necessary to protect 
our interests and those of our allies.'/&
(Italics mine.)
(.^However difficult the challenge, the test of 
deterrence strategy will be its ability to meet it. When 
all is said and done the TT, „ . great test of effectiveness 
for any defense posture lies in its performance as the 
basic guardian of American interestsn'?9 (italics mine);.
^Power, ©jo. cit o , p. 137.
?9william W„ Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy 
(1st ed»; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965)»
p. 251. See also Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and 
Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1957), pp« 1-20 e
CHAPTER II
THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION t A DESIGN 
FOR DETERRENCE
In the United States, every great "crisis period"
has been marked by the correspondingly powerful and strong
executive leadership of one man-=the President„ The terms
of George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Andrew Jackson,
Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D, Roosevelt were periods of
aggressive and strong executive leadership,, A-s Hirsch-
field has noted, "It is not surprising, therefore, that
all of the ?Great Presidents® have held office during
1periods of great crisis0"
The Kennedy Administration was not without its
challenges and crisis periods,, ^In the first eight months
\
of the Kennedy Administration, the President was to face 
a national recession, the Congo, Laos, the Bay of Pigs, 
Berlin, nuclear testing, the United Nations, the Dominican 
Republic, Cuba, Vietnam, and the race in space,)
The decade of the 1960's brought major changes to 
the world on the international scene as well as on the
Hirschfield, ojp„ cit0 , p„ 9°
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domestic fronts. But one of the most hopeful and re­
assuring events of the early 19605s was the election of 
John F 0 Kennedy to the presidency of the United States.
To many, the election of the young, seemingly prophetic 
senator from Massachusetts meant a rebirth of the asser­
tiveness of the U.S. in all spheres of activity. Presi­
dent Kennedy not only spoke of the many problems that 
beset this country, but of the country5s latent greatness. 
The urgency of his message was clear. In the State of the 
Union Message, in January 1961, President Kennedy said:
I speak today in an hour of national peril and 
national opportunity. Before my term has ended, 
we shall have to test anew whether a nation organized 
and governed such as ours can endure. The outcome 
is by no means certain. The answers are by no means 
clear. All of us together--this Administration, this 
Congress, this nation-must forge those answers.2
Life in 1961 will not be easy. . . . There will 
be further setbacks before the tide is turned. But 
turn it must. The hopes of all mankind rest with 
us | o o o 3
So, with the orderly transition of power from one 
administration to the next, the Kennedy Administration 
prepared itself for the difficult task of rebuilding and 
reasserting the political, economic, military, and moral 
capabilities of the U.S.
^John F. Kennedy, "State of the Union Message," 
January 29, 1961, in To Turn the Tide, ed. John ¥.
Gardner (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp. 15-16.
^Ibid., p. 33.
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All this will not be finished in the first one 
hundred days* Nor will it be finished in the first
one thousand days, nor in the life of this Adminis­
tration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this 
planet. But let us begin,b
John F, Kennedy in the White House
(This chapter will be concerned with identifying 
and examining the statements made by John Kennedy while
he was campaigning for the office of President of the
United States and also the statements of policy enunci­
ated in his first legislative year as President, The
first year of a President's term is of more than ordinary
\importance,) In his first year the President "sets the 
force and style of his Administration, and in large part 
formulates the goals that will concern him throughout his 
years in the White House,"5 ( This writer is interested in 
knowing what John F, Kennedy said, what he did, and how 
he acted. Foreign policy objectives and interests are 
what the foreign policy elite say they are; and in the 
areas of foreign.policy the President's statements define 
and clarify such objectives and interests. The views the 
President expresses concerning foreign policy are the 
tangible evidence to the commitment and direction of the 
nation itself^ "The history of this nation," said
^-Kennedy, "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1961 , 
in To Turn the Tide, op, cit., p, 9»
^Gardner, op. cit., "Editor’s Note."
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Kennedy, "its brightest and its bleakest pages--has been 
largely written in terms of the different views our 
Presidents have had of the Presidency itself."^
^ It has been said of John F. Kennedy that "No otherv.
President in history had been as well prepared for the 
7job*" j His knowledge of the office was excellent* He had 
spent years reading past histories and biographies of all 
the "great Presidents*" As Theodore Sorensen has said,
"* * * he [the President] enjoyed reading Dick Neustadt?s 
Presidential Power, with its emphasis on personal power 
and its politics; what it is, how to get it, how to keep 
it, and how to use it."^ Kennedy brought to the White 
House unusual firsthand knowledge of the foreign, domestic, 
legislative, and political arenas, but no experience in 
executive affairs* His area of expertise was in foreign 
affairs* While a senator, he spent most of his years on 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee* As a young sena­
tor, Kennedy had on many occasions referred to the U.S.* s 
tenuous position in world affairs, armaments, and economic 
growth as inexcusable* Kennedy talked in terms of
^Hirschfield, ojd* cit*, p* 5o
?Hugh Sidey, John F* Kennedy; President 
(New York: Atheneum, 1965), p* 11*
dTheodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Macmillan,
1965), p» 3$9o
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"problems and s o l u t i o n s K e n n e d y  believed in rationality
and action0 "As a grandchild of the Age of Reason,” as
Sidney Hyman has said, "Kennedy believed » ° « that pure
1 0reason could make all good things happen as they say„” 
Kennedy5s knowledge of the history of the presidency, of 
the theory of presidential power, and of the techniques 
of Congressional infighting was developed to a degree un­
heard of in the histories of former Presidents. Kennedy*s 
political philosophy is clearly revealed in the following 
remarks:
Both the Constitution and practical experience 
demonstrate that initiative in foreign affairs must 
come from the Executive branch,.
It is the intractable and unresolved differences 
within the Executive branch— and its failure of 
nerve— that inhibit decisive action,,
It is finally a matter of demonstrating our 
determination to defy any threats of blackmail, such 
as those which were applied in the Suez crisis and 
whose success obviously impressed the Soviet 
leaders„11
I want to be a President known— at the end of 
four years— as one who not only held back the Com­
munist tide but advanced the cause"of freedom and 
rebuilt American prest ige— not by words but by 
deeds--not by stating great aims merely as a .good
9see Bernard Rossilep,/"Shadow*and Substance in 
a New Frontier,” Progressive, XXVII (January 1963), 19°
1°Sidney Hyman, "The President in Power,” 
Progressive » XXVII (January 1963)j 14°
1^John F„ Kennedy, "When the Executive Fails to 
Lead,” The Reporter, XVIII (September 4, 195&), 15°
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debaterj but by doing great deeds as a good 
neighbor--not by tours and conferences abroad, 
but by vitality and direction at home. . . .12 
(Italics mine.)
(Kennedy*s philosophy was action-oriented; he
turned away from verbal solutions. If the goals of peace,
freedom, justice, and prosperity were to triumph, they
must first become meaningful in concrete American deeds,
not in propagandized policy exhortations^ The Kennedy
image was one of "sober common sense and resolute
action. . . The Kennedy Administration was to be an
executive show. Kennedy's overall charge was that the
U.S. had been "drifting, slipping, and dawdling in the 
1 iworld." In the campaign it became clear that only he 
could provide the strong presidential leadership the nation 
needed in the 1960's, or so he began to insist. In a cam­
paign speech delivered before the National Press Club, on 
January 14, 1960, Kennedy spoke of the need for a strong 
and determined leader to face and resolve the challenges 
of the coming decade?
12John F. Kennedy, as quoted in James MacGregor 
Burns, "Kennedy in Midpassage," Progressive, XXVII 
(January 1963), 36.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "Mistaken Venture,”- TheJNew 
Leader, XLIV (May 1, 1961), 3»
^Theodore Sorensen, The Kennedy Legacy (New York: 
Macmillan, 1969), p. 69«
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In the coming years, we will need a real fighting 
mood in the White House. „ . . In the decade that 
lies ahead, the President must place himself in the 
very thick of the fight. . . . He must be prepared to 
exercise the fullest powers of his office— all that 
are specified and some that are not, . . . The 
President alone must make the major decisions of our 
foreign policy."*5
^Kennedy had come to believe that what was necessary to 
build the economic, military, and moral power of the nation 
was "affirmative government”̂  ̂  directed by a strong Presi^ 
dent.J As far as Kennedy was concerned, "there could be 
no sign of weakness,""^ whether it was in domestic poli­
cies, foreign policies, or administrative affairs.
(^Kennedy’s policy statements conveyed a sense of\
concern, a vast command of information, and a mood of 
decisive leadership. In his Inaugural Address, President 
Kennedy spoke of the determination and conviction of this 
great nation to meet its commitments t
Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well 
or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any bur- 
den, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose 
any foe to assure the survival and success of 
liberty.
o o( o'* O O O o O O O  O o o o © o e o o © « © o o © o  o
\Let all our neighbors know that we shall join 
with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere 
in the Americas. And let every other power know that 
this hemisphere intends to remain the master of its 
own house. \  (italics mine.)
^victor Lasky, J.F.K. The Man and the Myth 
(New York? Macmillan, 1^63 ) , p. 31 3 <>
^ F o r  an explanation of the term, see Lasky,
pp. 209-211.
^Sidey, o£„ cit., p. 1$0.
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We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only 
when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be 
certain beyond doubt that they will never be 
employed.1°
Kennedy’s forceful language imparted an image of 
steadfastness and certainty. The firmness in his address 
conveyed by such phrases as "pay any price” and "bear any 
burden" was unmistakingly clear. The conviction expressed 
in Kennedy’s presidential speeches can also be found in 
his campaign speeches. They shed a particularly illustra­
tive light on his policy goals, ideas, and objectives.
Most of Kennedy’s campaign speeches were typically a con­
demnation of weak executive leadership in the nation and 
a plea for strong, creative leadership. "Platitudes and
slogans” were to Kennedy "no substitutes for strength and 
1 Qplanning." 7 One of Kennedy’s caustic criticisms of the
Eisenhower Administration was its lack of long-range
planning, and the lack of a coherent and purposeful
national strategy backed by strength. Kennedy’s policy
statements, as many historians have written, had "ringing
20Rooseveltian overtones." Kennedy was appealing to the
^Kennedy, To Turn the Tide, op. cit. , 
pp. 7-9ff.
1 97John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace 
(New York: Harper, .1960), see "Introduction."
20For further explanation, see Lasky, op. cit.,
pp. 21-23.
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American instinct for the recovery of elan.^ He had on 
many occasions during his campaign stated that words and 
discussion were not substitutes for strength,!, His message 
and image were one of firmness and action in dealing with 
the enemy:
Our task is to rebuild our strength and the 
strength of a free world—-to prove to the Soviets 
that time and the course of history are not on 
their side, that the balance of world power is not 
shifting their way--and that therefore peaceful 
settlement is essential to mutual survival, . . „
As a power we will never strike first, , , „ We 
must regain the ability to intervene effectively 
and swiftly in any limited war anywhere in the 
world, , , , tfe must begin to develop new workable 
programs for peace and the control of arms, , , .
We must halt the spiraling arms race that burdens 
the entire world with a fantastic financial drain, 
excessive military establishments^ . , , We must 
work to build the stronger America on which our 22 
ultimate ability to defend the free world depends,
Kennedy's speeches were a strange blend of incom­
patible policy objectives. Build the strength of the 
nation, but at the same time pursue peace and limitation 
of weapons. At times Kennedy emphasized that this country 
must demonstrate that it has the capacity to defend itself 
in a world of intercontinental-ballistic missiles, while 
simultaneously expressing the belief that this country
21"Elan is something indefinable that sets in 
motion all its forces and resources, stretching each to 
the utmost and giving the ensemble its meaning,” See 
Lerner, cjp, cit,, p. 233,
22Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, jDp, cit,, see 
"Introduction.”
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must— -on American initiative— exploit every opportunity 
that the dynamics of the change in Soviet life may offer 
to move toward peace,, In a speech given in Washington, 
D.C., in January 1960, Kennedy said?
The first duty of an officer in a democratic 
government is to uphold the integrity of words 
used in public debate; and to do this by himself 
using them in ways where they will stand as one 
with the things they are meant to represent.23
The importance of such a duty can be seen in its role as
an influencing and communicational device which demon­
strates your intentions to the enemy,, {The interpretation 
of behavior in the international system is based on images 
and statements of policy; and demonstrations of action 
determine how the enemy evaluates the images. Credibility 
of words and threats is positively reinforced by decisive
met Khrushchev in 1959> Kennedy said that he was ”shrewd,
went on to say,
No, Khrushchev has left no doubt of his self- 
confidence— and I am equally confident that, in con­
ditions of peace, we can see freedom thrive and 
spread-even someday to Mr. Khrushchev’s grand­
children. . . .  It may be that an agreement in the
action and firmness in dealing with aggressioi
/..^ Kennedy’s approach to the Soviet Union appeared 
unambiguous in his early campaign speechest When he had
tough, vigorous, well-informed, and confident Kennedy
23Ibid., p. 3. 
2^Ibid„, p . 5 »
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control and limitation of nuclear tests will be the 
beginning. . . . Another dramatic step that might 
reverse the present problem would be an agreement 
on general disarmament and demilitarization for some 
particular area of tension,,25
We look for deeds not words. And we too must 
offer deeds, not words.
o o o o o e o  o o o o  o o o o o o o o o o « O o O O
We need a new approach to the Eussians--one that 
i-s -iust as hard-headed and .1 ust as realistic as 
Mr. Khrushchev's but one that might well end the 
current phase— the frozen, belligerent, brink-of-war 
phase— of the long cold war. . . . All this we can 
do, with imagination, patience, determination, and 
above all, effort„26 (Italics mine.)
Iks John Kennedy had made clear, strong words alone do not
make meaningful policy; they must, in foreign affairs in
particular, be backed both by a will and by weapons that
27are really strong. 1 Kennedy’s position made clear
America’s goal;
. o . convincing the Soviet leaders that it is dan­
gerous for them to engage in direct or indirect 
aggression, futile for them to attempt to impose 
their will and their system on other unwilling 
people and beneficial to them, as well as to the 
world to join in tim^achievement of a genuine and 
enforceable peace.2oj
Such an undertaking meant a determined search for peace,
a willingness to negotiate, a will to explore problems
25Ibid., p . 29o 
26Ibid., pp. 11-12.
2^See Kennedy, To Turn the Tide, op. cit., 
"Introduction,” p. xvi.
7 $^ N e a l  Riemer, "Kennedy’s Grand Democratic 
Design," Review of Politics, XXVII (January 1965)? 10.
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mutually, and the need to find areas of cooperation,, 
Kennedy was keenly aware of the dangers of nuclear war, 
and he sought to prevent violence and distrust from repro­
ducing themselves. He sought to return to the path of
29"accommodation,” 7 William Leuchtenburg has gone as far 
as to say that once Kennedy was in office,
Z.He directed his efforts both toward reaching an arms 
agreement and toward effecting a rapprochment with 
the Soviet Union,, In fact, Kennedy was pursuing as 
peaceful a course as events would permit, „ , . He 
refused to act except under extreme provocation, , . ,
Kennedy pushed for a detente with the Soviet Union, His
policies speak for themselves. To him, the only authentic
alternative to mutual annihilation was negotiation] "Let
us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to
n e g o t i a t e . K e n n e d y  spoke eloquently of achieving
peace in a world in which there existed only violence,
crisis, and aggression.
29ihe Kennedy brand of accommodation cannot be 
defined as "capitulation” but his willingness to negotiate 
reflected an image of reserve in using force to his advan­
tage, His paths of accommodation gravely decreased the 
credibility of the U.S. threat posture. See Sorensen, 
Kennedy, op, cit., p. 515*
3°William E. Leuchtenburg, "J.F.K, 1917-1963,” 
American Review, III (Winter 1963), 25-27.
^Kennedy, To Turn the Tide, op. cit. , p. 9. 
Similar views of Kennedy’s willingness to negotiate and 
reach accommodation are expressed by James A, Wechsler, 
"John F. Kennedy? A Retrospect," Progressive, XXVIII 
(January 1964), 12-13.
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^The viability of the Kennedy image was never 
better demonstrated than on the war-and-peace issuer 
n . . . Kennedy was a man of peace. . . ."32 He wanted 
to answer Soviet threats aiid probes of American resolve 
”firmly but not harshly
A New Approach to International Affairs 
and Nuclear Strategy? Cuba, Laos,
Berlin, and the Soviet Union
'vIn the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy had
taken firm stands on several issues. One of the most
\prominent issues was Cuba> In a campaign speech at 
Johnstown, Pennsylvania, on October 15s 1960, Kennedy had 
said of his Republican rival, Richard Nixon:
L.No , Nixon hasn’t mentioned Cuba very prominently 
in this campaign,. He talks about standing firm in 
Berlin, standing firm in the Far East, standing up 
to Khrushchev. But he never mentions standing firm 
in Cuba. And if you can’t stand firm in Cuba, how 
can you be expected to stand up to Khrushchev. . . . 
The transformation of Cuba into a Communist base of 
operations a few minutes from our coast— by jet plane, 
missile or submarine--is an incredibly dangerous 
development t^ have been permitted by our Republican 
policy-makers .'34
32Lasky, ojd. cit. , p. 366. Kennedy stressed the 
value of negotiations, the need for multilateral and non­
military responses and the use of limited steps that made 
clear the nation’s intent without forcing the other side 
to the wall. He wanted any conflict to be confined, not 
widened or escalated. His aversion to the use of mili­
tary force was apparent.
33sidey, o£. cit., p.
34john F. Kennedy, as quoted in Elie Abel, The 
Missile Crisis (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1966), p. 12.
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The implication was clears Kennedy was promising
more aggressive action against Castro. Kennedy flatly 
charged that Eisenhower and Nixon had had a do-nothing 
policy toward Cuba. Warning of the presence of a Commu­
nist foothold only 90 miles from our shores, Kennedy 
promised to do something about it if elected; n „ . « with­
in 90 days" after assuming the presidency he would reassert 
American leadership at home and abroad.^ At a California 
Democratic Council meeting in Fresno on February 12, 1960, 
Kennedy saids 'tfWe cannot afford in the turbulent sixties 
the persistent indecision of a James Buchanan,5 which 
caused Ohio5s Senator Sherman to say, 5The Constitution 
provides for every accidental contingency in the Execu­
tive— except a vacancy in the mind of the President.5”^6
f
I Kennedy's commitment and concern over Cuba and 
the growing menace are revealed in the following campaign
utterances r
For the first time in the history of the United 
States an enemy stands poised at the threshold of 
the United States.
I think it is -a source of maximum danger. I 
think the big task for the next administration is 
going to be to contain this revolution in Cuba 
at s eIf o . o  o ̂
^^Lasky, ojd. cit., pp. 470-76ff.
^ I b i d ., p. 361 .
August 24» 1960
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October 15. I960
We must let Mr. Castro know that we do not in­
tend to be pushed around any longer, . . . W e  must 
let Mr. Khrushchev know that we are permitting no 
expansion of his foothold in our hemisphere. . . .
October 20, 1960
We must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista, 
democratic, anti-Castro forces in exile, and in ;\
Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing j 
Castro. !■ ■i
October 23, 1960 j
I have never advocated and I do not now advocate /■' 
intervention in Cuba in violation of our treaty obli­
gations and in fact stated . . . that whatever we did 
in regard to Cuba should be within the confines of./ 
international law.37
As John F. Kennedy became the thirty-fifth Presi­
dent of the United States, he had made up his mind:
^"Castro has to go because he is dangerous to American 
security. . . .”3$ The Kennedy attitude was reflected in 
the following passage in the President’s first State of 
the Union message: ’’Questions of economic trade policy
can always be negotiated. But Communist domination in
39this hemisphere can never be negotiated.”' As the Presi­
dent himself remarked to one aide, ”We can’t go on living 
with this Castro cancer for ten years more.” The U.S.
37John F . Kennedy, ’’Campaign Speeches,” in Inter- 
American Economic Affairs, XV (Winter 1961), 79-95.
3^Tristiam Coffin, ’’Kennedy and Crisis,” The New
Leader, XLIV (May 1961), 6-7.
•^Kennedy, To Turn the Tide, op. cit., p. 23.
^•Ojohn F. Kennedy, as quoted in Paul W. Black- 
stock, The Strategy of Subversion (Chicago: Quadrangle,
1964), p. 241.
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position was further clarified in the Cuban "White Paper"
of April 3s 1961, in which "the revolution betrayed" was
presented as both "a grave and urgent challenge" and "’a
/ 1clear and present danger" to the hemisphere„
/ X.
^In other areas of international crises, such as 
Laos and Berlin, the Kennedy Administration was just as 
emphatic in stating its resolve and determination to pro- 
tect vital national interests.} The Kennedy position on 
Laos involved maintaining the freedom and self-determina­
tion of its people:
/~
\V_W@ seek in Laos what we seek in all Asia, and 
indeed, in all the world: freedom for the people 
and independence for the government. And this 
nation shall persevere in our pursuit of these ob­
jectives 0
We strongly and unreservedly support the goal 
of a neutral and independent Laos, tied to no out­
side power or group of powers, threatening no one, 
and free from any domination. . . . If there is to 
be a peaceful solution, there must be a cessation 
of the present armed attacks by externally supported 
Communistso If these attacks do not stop, those who 
support a genuinely neutral Laos will have to con­
sider their response0
No one should doubt our resolution on this point. 
We are faced with a clear threat of a change in the 
internationally agreed position of Laos.
O O O O O  O O O O O © O O O O O O O  0 O O O O o 0 O o
I want to make it clear to the American people, 
and to all the world, that all we want in Laos is 
peace, not war; a truly neutral government, not a 
Cold War pawn; . 0
4lFor full context of "White Paper," see the 
New York Times, April 26, 1961.
^Kennedy, To Turn the Tide, op. cit. , pp. 23-41»
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(Tin Berlin, a historical and geographical core 
interest of the U.S., the President’s messages unmis- 
takingly revealed an earnest and firm commitment to pro­
tect Berlin ”at any risk .A After Kennedy had returned 
from the Vienna talks with Khrushchev, he stated that he 
had made it clear to Khrushchev that,
o o * our [U*S*] security of Western Europe, and 
therefore our own security, are deeply involved in 
our presence and our access rights to West Berlin, 
that those rights are based on law and not on suf­
ferance, and that we are determined to maintain 
those rights at any risk, and thus meet our obliga­
tion to the people of West Berlin and their right 
to choose their future*43
In another statement made six days later on a ’’Report to 
the Nation on the Berlin Crisis,” Kennedy made the follow­
ing remarks t
In Berlin, as you recall, he;, [Khrushchev] intends 
to bring.an end, through a stroke of the pen, first, 
our legal rights to be in West Berlin and, second, 
our ability to make good on our commitment to the two 
million free people of that city that we cannot per­
mit* * * * But if we and our allies act out of strength 
and unity of purpose, with calm determination and 
steady nerves, using restraint in our words as well 
as our weapons, I am hopeful that both peace and free­
dom will be sustained*
C\West Berlin has now become, as never before, the 
great testing place of Western will in Europe and . * . 
we cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive 
us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force* . , *
We must meet our oft-stated pledge to the free peoples 
of West Berlin, and maintain our rights and their 
safety* * * * We intend to have a wider choice than 
humiliation or all-out nuclear action*)
43ibid* * pp* 1B2-1B3.
In short, while we are ready to defend our 
interests, we shall also be ready to search for 
peace, in quiet, exploratory talks, in formal or 
informal meetings,44
r
!vlt is with some irony that Kennedy should go on to say 
that if "we do not meet our commitments to Berlin, where 
will we later stand7 ^  If we are not true to our word 
there, all that we have achieved in collective security 
which relies on these words, will mean nothing. And if 
there is one path above all others to war, it is the path
i /L
of weakness and disunity,"
v--vvIt was clear that Khrushchev had chosen Berlin as 
a chief battleground for the Cold War, as a major "'test 
of wills"; and Kennedy had vigorously pledged and com­
mitted this eountry. If necessary "we will fight," The 
security of Berlin cannot be negotiated^ "We cannot nego- 
tiate with those who say, ’What’s mine is mine and what’s 
yours is negotiable,5 "47
^"Berlin was a crucial testing place for U.S. re- 
solve. If the U.S. exhibited any kind of weakness in ful­
filling its obligation, or was driven or squeezed out of
^ I b i d ,. pp, 1S9-197.
^implicitly the answer to that question is "in a 
defensive, reactionary position in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis of 1962," due to the failure of decision-making at 
a much earlier stage,
^Kennedy, To Turn the Tide, op. cit., pp. 177-197<
47ibid., p. 194.
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West Berlin, the Soviet Union would interpret this as an 
indication that the U.S.'. NATO guarantee to defend Europe 
was meaningless.^
A cursory review of President Kennedy’s policy 
statements on international affairs also requires a brief
examination of security policy.^9
f[During the early 1960’s, the strategy of deter­
rence was a major instrument of U.S. foreign policy, par­
ticularly in its relations with the Soviet Union.^  ’’Our 
strategy,” writes Stagner, ’’vis-a-vis the Communist block 
is one of deterrence.”̂ "*
The security objectives of the U.S. and its deter­
rence strategy were defined by President Kennedy in his 
’’Special Message to the Congress on the Defense Budget” on 
March 2$, 1961. This document, Robert Ginsburg has 
written, ” . . . remains today the best brief statement of 
our security policy.”5^ President Kennedy began with the 
following statement t
^ C f . , e.g., John W. Spanier, World Revolution in 
the Age of Revolution (New York? Praeger, 1965), especi­
ally pp. 228-30ff, in which the author describes all 
Soviet challenges to American power in Berlin as only 
limited challenges of Western rights.
^9For definition of ’security,” see supra, p.
^OMilburn, _op. cit., p. 174.
^Stagner, op. cit., p. SO.
^^Ginsburg, op. cit., p. 62.
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fUhe primary purpose of our arms is peace, not 
war—-to make certain that they will never have to 
be used— to deter all wars, general or limited, 
nuclear or conventional, large or small'— to convince 
all aggressors that any attack would be futile--to 
provide backing for diplomatic settlement of dis- 
putes— to insure the adequacy of our bargaining power 
for an end to the arms race. . , . Our military pos­
ture must be sufficiently flexible and under control 
to be consistent with our efforts to explore all 
possibilities and to take every step to lessen ten­
sions, to obtain^peaceful solutions, and to secure 
arms limitations.^3
Kennedy went on to the consideration of the basic defense
policies:
■{Our arms will,never be used to strike the first 
blow'"'in any attack. . . .  We must offset whatever 
advantage this may appear to hand an aggressor by so 
increasing the capability of our forces to respond 
swiftly and effectively to any aggressive move^as to 
convince any would-be aggressor that such a movement 
would be too futile and costly to undertake. . » .
Our arms must be subject to ultimate civilian 
control and command at all times, in war as well as 
peace. The basic decisions on our participation in 
any conflict and our response to any threat—  
including all decisions relating to the use of 
nuclear weapons, or the escalation of a small war 
into a large one-~will be made by the regularly con­
stituted civilian authorities. . . .54
These brief statements do not provide all the answers to
American security problems, but they do outline basic
strategic goals. On the other hand, these statements
raise several questions about American military strategy
^ T h e  President of the United States, Recommenda­
tions Relating to Our Defense Budget (Washington, D.C.t 
Government Printing Office, 1961) (House Document No. 123), 
pp. 1-2. Hereafter cited as Budget Recommendations.
5^Ibid., ppB 3-4o
which the President did not answer. / Do these policy 
statements preclude the U.S. initiating hostilities when 
our core interests are threatened by enemy aggression 
which does not include outright military action? The 
implication is not clear. Does the policy of not striking 
"the first blow in any attack" rule out the possibility 
of the U.S". never striking first with nuclear weapons as 
a response to successful enemy non-nuclear aggressions?
If the answer to such questions can be considered affirma­
tive , the credibility of deterrence strategy is greatly 
weakened, if not zero. Credibility of nuclear threats and 
retaliation is not normally increased by making such 
statements as, "Our arms will never be used to strike the 
first blow in any attack. . . ." These statements tend to 
deflate and make highly incredible--in the eyes of the 
aggressor--the U.S.’s threats and policy commitments. One 
doesn’t make a potential enemy believe that his defense 
posture and deterrence strategy is credible by saying that 
he will not use it to prevent aggression. President 
Kennedy’s security statements left in doubt the U.S.'s 
intentions to use its most vital asset— its power as per-
In the matter of strategic war planning, President 
Kennedy stated two basic principles?
ceived by the enemy.
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/  (1) Our strategic arms and defenses must be ade­
quate to deter any deliberate nuclear attack on the 
United States or our allies . . . <»
I (2) Our defense posture must be designed to reduce
j the danger of irrational or unpremeditated general
i war--the danger of an unnecessary escalation of a
 ̂ small war into a large one, or of miscalculation or
\ misinterpretation of an incident or enemy
\ intention. . . .55\
For the Administration’s policy concerning limited 
war, President Kennedy’s first defense budget message is 
instructive v.
In the event of a major aggression that could not 
be repulsed by conventional forces, we must be pre­
pared to take whatever action with whatever weapons 
are appropriate,. But our objective now is to increase 
our ability to confine our response to nonnuclear 
weapons, and to lessen the incentive for any limited 
aggression by making clear what our response will 
accomplish,,
Our weapon systems must be usable in a manner per­
mitting deliberation and discrimination as to timing, 
scope, and targets in response to civilian author­
ity; „ o o There must be no uncertainty about our 
determination and capacity to take whatever steps are 
necessary to meet our obligations.5°
President Kennedy’s explanation of the new emphasis 
on conventional and non-nuclear forces was that?
Our strength may be tested at many levels. We 
intend to have at all times the capacity to resist 
nonnuclear or limited attacks— as a complement to our 
nuclear capacity, not a substitute. We have rejected 
any all-or-nothing posture which would leave no 
choice but inglorious retreat or unlimited retali­
ation. . „ .57
55ibid., pp. 3”4o
56ibid.
57president John F. Kennedy, State of the Union 
, January 11, 1962.
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Secretary of Defense McNamara addressed the problem in the 
following manner:
Even in limited war situations we should not pre­
clude the use of tactical nuclear weapons. . . . But 
the decision to employ tactical nuclear weapons in 
limited conflicts should not be forced upon us simply 
because we have no other means to cope with them. . . . 
What is being proposed at this time is not a reversal 
of our existing national policy but an increase in our 
nonnuclear capabilities to provide a greater degree 
of versatility to our limited war forces.5$
These remarks did not clarify the U.S.’s position 
concerning the use of nuclear weapons; doubts still re­
mained. { On another occasion McNamara stated: ”It would
be our policy to use nuclear weapons wherever we felt it 
necessary to protect our forces and achieve our objec­
tives.
'These policy statements bring into question the 
U.S.?s determination to use nuclear weapons if necessary, 
particularly in Europe. This and the Administration’s 
NATO strategy weakened the credibility of the U.S;.!s 
willingness to use nuclear weapons./
The outlines of the new U.S. NATO policy were 
described by Kennedy in Ottawa on May 17, 1961:
5 % . S’., House of Representatives, Committee on 
Appropriations, Subcommittee, Department of Defense 
Appropriations for 1962, Hearings, S7th Cong., 1st Sess., 
Part 3 (Washington, D.G.: Government Printing Office,
1961), pp. 18-19.
59Ibid., p. 137.
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Our NATO alliance is still, as it was when it 
was founded, the world's greatest bulwark of free­
dom, , „ , Now if we are to meet the defense require­
ments of the 1960®s the NATO countries must push 
forward simultaneously along two major lines.
First, we must strengthen the conventional capa­
bility of our alliance as a matter of the highest 
priority.
Second, we must make certain that nuclear weapons 
will continue to be available for the defense of the 
entire treaty area, and that these weapons are at all 
times under close and flexible political control that 
meets the needs of all NATO countries.^0
Kennedy’s remarks on U.S, defense policy did not explain 
the strategic thinking and concepts that were the founda­
tion of such a policy, j Furthermore, his aversion to a 
conventional build-up weakened the credibility of the 
nuclear deterrent; and in light of the Soviet Union’s over­
whelming military superiority in conventional forces in 
Europe, U,S, conventional build-up was meaningless^?'
This chapter is an attempt to review only a few 
of President Kennedy’s major policy objectives, statements, 
and beliefs. Kennedy projected himself as a strong, reso­
lute chief executive who would get the country moving 
again. He pledged himself and his Administration to solve
60president John F, Kennedy, ’’Address to Members 
of the Senate and House of Commons, Ottawa, Canada,"
May 17, 1961.
6^Cf., e.g,, William Wo Kaufmann, up. cit,, 
pp, 101-15» Kaufmann presents a detailed analysis of 
President Kennedy's NATO strategy in Europe. His remarks 
are rather critical of President Kennedy's defense 
policy.
problems, to rebuild the strength and prestige of the \ 
U.S. in world affairs which had been weakened in the \ 
Eisenhower Administration,, He stated eloquently: "I am
determined upon our system®s survival and success, 
regardless of the cost and regardless of the peril 
The President had pledged to stop reacting to the enemy^s 
moves and to start acting like the bold, hopeful, inven- 
tive people that Americans were thought to be. * For if 
we failed to act the U.S. would find itself at the "’mercy 
of events” instead of anticipating the danger and shaping
a firm and consistent policy to meet i t . ^
r"T^ese were the statements and policies of John F. 
Kennedy. They conveyed his principles and his convic­
tions. The real test of any administration is not what 
it says, but what it does--not what it might do, but what 
it will do. Credibility of deterrence strategy requires 
that the deterrer demonstrate his willingness to employ 
force with concrete, positive action. The ultimate test
£ ̂ John F. Kennedy, as cited in Edward P. Morgan, 
”U„S'„ Policy and Social Revolution,” Hew Leader, XLIV 
(May 1, 1961), 5« For an exceptionally well-written 
analysis of the Kennedy Administration, see Richard 
Neustadt, "Kennedy in the Presidency,” Political Science 
Quarterly, LXXXIX (September 1964), 321-34.
63por further elaboration of comments, see 
John F. Kennedy, The Burden of Glory (New York: Harper
and Row, 1964), pp. 225-27.
^ I b i d ., p. 227.
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of effectiveness of any defense policy is determined by
|its performance in the field of battle^
Chapter III will be concerned with examining the 
performance of deterrence strategy in the Kennedy Adminis­
tration in world affairs, through the analysis of the 
deterrence model developed in Chapter I, to determine 
whether the "subjective factors"^ Gf American policy were 
present„
^ F o r  explanation of "subjective factors," see 
supra, pp0 8-9o.
CHAPTER I I I
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FAILURES:
A SIGN OF WEAKNESS
k'Fhis chapter will be concerned with examining the 
five international crises (i.e., American-Cuban relations, 
the Bay of Pigs, Laos, Vienna, and the Berlin Wall) to 
determine whether the T?!sub jective factors” of American 
foreign policy were in fact present in each one of these 
criseso In each case it will be shown that President 
Kennedy greatly weakened the credibility of deterrence 
strategy* His actions in dealing with each one of these 
crises illustrate his inconsistency in pursuing policy 
objectives, the discrepancies between his stated inten­
tions , and his actual behavior in handling these crises* 
These discrepancies became more obvious to the Soviet 
leaders as Kennedy was confronted by each crisis and be­
haved in a manner which was irresolute, indecisive, and 
counterproductive* His actions in dealing with these
crises made incredible our deterrence strategy and its
- ...threat components* \
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American-Cuban Relations; A Decade 
of Failure
I To say that American foreign policy goals toward 
Cuba have been confused and undefinable is an under­
statement,, U.S.. relations with Cuba have demonstrated 
the ” . „ . failure of American foreign policy."^ The 
history of American-Cuban relations has been one of
American economic exploitation, military intervention,
oand general Mcultural arrogance,,” Probably one of the 
greatest failures in American-Cuban relations was the 
ineptness of our economic policy and the failure to worry 
about or understand the Cuban revolution.j
The question of why the U.S. has been unable to 
act as a first-class power in the Caribbean deserves to 
be answered in an objective manner, (Cuba has been recog­
nized as a vital core interest of the U.S. for many years. 
Cuba, ”unlike other areas of conflict in the Cold War, is 
geographically close”  ̂ and traditionally the area has
^Adolf A. Berle, Jr., ”The Cuban Crises,” Foreign 
Affairs 9 XXXIX (October 1960) , 40.
^For a discussion of this concept, see Bayless 
Manning, ”An Overall Prospective,” in John Plank, Cuba 
and the U.S.: Long Range Perspectives (Washington, B.C.:
Brookings Institute, 1967), pp. 224-22$; also David L, 
Larson, The Cuban Crisis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
^Paul Ekman, et al., "Coping with Cuba,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, X (June 1966), 130.
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been deemed so vital to the security of the U.S. that it 
would consider a threat to that area as a threat to its 
own security. "For over a century the Monroe Doctrine 
defined the diplomatic behavior of the United States to- 
ward the Western Hemisphere."]4' President Kennedy, early 
in 1961, had said:
The Monroe Doctrine means what it has meant 
since President Monroe and John Quincy Adams
enunciated it, and that is that we oppose a
foreign power extending its power to the Western 
Hemisphere.5
r-;The Kennedy Administration was firmly opposed to the exten­
sion of any foreign power into the Western Hemisphere; the
U.S. would take care of its own backyard. But at the same
time the U.S. was committed to the principle of "’non­
intervention" in the internal affairs of other countries. 
"Washington was reluctant to take any step that might seem
to violate this p r i n c i p l e P r e s i d e n t  Kennedy had
^Crabb, op. cit., p. 265. Basically, the Monroe 
Doctrine provided for the self-defense of nations of the 
Western Hemisphere, which is the inherent right of a 
sovereign state, and non-intervention in European affairs. 
See Ramin H. Hulsey, "The Cuban Revolution," Journal of 
International Affairs, XIV, No. 2 (1960), 158.
5John F. Kennedy, as quoted in Charles 0. Lerche, 
"The Monroe loctrine; Cold War Anachronism: Cuba and the
Dominican Republic," Journal of Politics, XXVIII 
(May 1960), 323.
^Crabb, 0£. cit. , p. 273» For a discussion of the 
historical development of U.S. non-intervention policy in 
Cuba, see Raymond Carr, "The Cold War in Latin America," 
in Plank, op>. cit., pp. 158-161.
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/established the principle that this country's foreign 
policy goals toward Cuba meant ". . keeping her out of
the Communist orbit» . . If this was the policy of
the U.S. government, it certainly had a strange way of 
showing it 4
Kennedy stated while he was campaigning for the 
presidency that the failure of the U.S.. foreign policy in 
Cuba could be attributed to lack of understanding and 
perspective. He went on to says
c
The story of the transformation of Cuba from a 
friendly ally to a Communist base is— in large 
measure— the story of a government in Washington 
which lacked the imagination and compassion to 
understand the needs of the Cuban people— which 
lacked the leadership and vigor to move forward to 
meet those needs— and which lacked the foresight 
and vision to see the inevitable result of its 
own failureo°
Kennedy had even gone as far as to say in his
Strategy of Peace that t
Fidel Castro is part of the legacy of [Simon]
Bolivar [the great Latin American liberator] who 
led his men over the Andes Mountains, vowing "war 
to the deatho . . ." Castro is also part of the 
frustration of that earlier revolution which won 
its war against Spain» . . .9
( According to Kennedy, it was the U.S.'s failure to give
^Hulsey, ojd. cit. , p» 172. (See supra, pp. - . )
Kennedy, "Campaign Speeches," jdjj. cit.,
PPo 79-94.
^Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, cit.,
pp0 132=33. See also Sidey, 0£ o cit a » p a 446.
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Cuba sufficient economic aid that turned the people 
against us, paving the way for conversion of Cuba to 
,TCommunism* s first Caribbean base.” Kennedy said that?
(1) We refused to help Cuba meet its desperate need 
for economic progress, and
(2 ) We used the influence of our government to 
advance the interests and increase the profits 
of the private American companies which domi­
nate the island’s economy.
(.The contradiction between these statements and Kennedy’s 
strong interventionist policy ("We must attempt to 
strengthen the non-Batista, democratic anti-Castro forces 
in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of 
overthrowing Castro. Thus far these fighters for freedom 
have had virtually no support from our Governmental1) is 
further compounded by a later statement in which he said:
kj have never advocated and I do not advocate 
intervention in Cuba in violation of our treaty 
obligations. . . . What I have advocated is that 
we use all available communications— radio, tele­
vision and the press— and the moral power of the 
American Government, to let the forces pf freedom 
in Cuba know that we are on their side^f 2
l^These statements are so totally contradictory and con-
v\.
fusing that viable policy goals and objectives concerning 
Cuba are indeed undefinable'l At one point Kennedy
p. 447.
p. 454<
 ̂̂ John Fo Kennedy, as quoted in Lasky, op. cit.,
Ibid., p. 450. See also Kennedy, The Burden 
.22® cit»8 P« 70.
 ̂̂ John F. Kennedy, as quoted in Lasky, _op. cit.,
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^criticizes the Eisenhower Administration for not under­
standing the Cuban people and their leader, while later 
he advocates intervention while simultaneously pledging 
himself to adhere to the principle of "non-intervention,"
As President he pledged to "oppose a foreign power extend­
ing its power to the Western Hemisphere," while simul­
taneously acting with complacency and ambivalence toward 
the Soviet military buildup in Cuba) Although President 
Kennedy had once stated,that Fidel Castro is part of the
jlegacy of SimonBolivar, as Castro's revolution continued 
its radical bent through agrarian reforms and U,S» capital 
expropriations the future coordinator of Latin-American 
affairs for the Kennedy Administration, Adolf A, Berle, Jr., 
took the position that the Castro regime had "betrayed 
the revolution," and that the Gommunization of Cuba had 
followed the classic tactical pattern of the Soviet 
model,^ ̂
(tn 1959? when the Castro regime came into power, 
there was a rapid disintegration of Guban-A'merican rela­
tions ,\ The U.S. government accused the Cuban government 
of executing civilians, expropriating capital without com­
pensation, destroying the press autonomy, recognizing 
Communist China, accepting aid from the Soviet Union,
^ S e e  "White Paper on Cuba," New York Times,
April 26, 1961,
S3
allowing Communists to infiltrate the government, pro­
moting revolution throughout Latin America, and depriving 
U.S. officials of their lawful, personal freedoms« By- 
January 1961, the U.S. had broken diplomatic relations 
with Cuba and had branded the Castro revolution as Commu­
nist . That Cuba had identified with the Soviet Union was
more a fault of the U.S. government than any particular
1 *5propensity Castro had for Communism,, J "I believe his­
tory,” Charles Osgood has written, ’’will ultimately record
that we literally drove the Cuban revolution into the
16arms of the Soviet Union and Communism,,” U.S. policy 
toward Cuba was ambivalent, inasmuch as it did not under- 
stand the nature of the revolution,, \ While professing
^Richard Fagen, a very well-known and respected 
Latin American scholar, presents in his work The Trans­
formation of the Political Culture (Stanford, Calif,t 
Stanford University Press, 1962) a thorough analysis of 
the interplay of U.S., foreign policy in Cuban affairs,,
His position is far from neutral,,
 ̂5lt is indeed difficult to pinpoint the exact 
moment when the Castro movement began its fateful turn to 
the left towards the Communists. Perhaps this is so be­
cause at the beginning the turnings were subtle, mysteri­
ous, and impenetrable. For a discussion of these facts, 
see U„S'», Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Events 
in United States-Cuban Relations (Washington. B.C.; 
Government Printing Office, January 29s 1963); also U.S., 
Department of State, Cuba, Publication No. 7171 (Washington; 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1961).
I^Gharles E„ Osgood, Perspective in Foreign 
(Urbana, 111.; [no publisher given], 19651, p. 31° 
For a similar view, see Robert F. Smith, The United 
States and Cuba (New York; Bookman Associates , 1960),.
commitment to the idea of national self-determination,
the U.S. had tended to support the status quo and resist
change. ("The United States must share the blame for the
situation which erupted into the Cuban trek toward
Moscow." j  Our relations have not only been characterized
by errors and shortsighted policies, but we failed to
recognize in the underdeveloped areas the significance of
the wave of "rising expectations” among the disadvantaged<>
TJ.S. leaders failed to assist the Cuban revolution when
it most urgently needed assistance. "What is important
1 $is that a void in policy did exist.” And as Daniel 
Tretiak has so realistically summarized: "The severance
of Cuban-U.S', relations in 1961 left it to the U,S.S.R. 
to meet Guba?s excessively ambitious economic and politi­
cal demands.”^9 This severance was the culmination of a 
policy towards Cuba which reflected the history of U.S. 
relations with all of Latin America--neglects economic 
exploitation and, by and large, inept diplomacy, (in the 
years preceding the Cuban revolution, U.S. attention was 
fixed on the Soviet challenge in other parts of the world 
to the neglect of Latin America, which was assumed to be
^Smith, op. cit., p. 27»
^Hayes Johnson, _et al., The Bay of Pigs (New York 
Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p. 25o
Spaniel Tretiak, "Cuba and the Soviet Union,” 
Orbis. XI (September 1967), 440.
2safe. / T,If statesmanship requires a sense of history,w' 
as Arthur Whitaker has noted, nit also requires accurate 
knowledge, sound interpretation, and skill in projecting 
the results of the interplay between the ever active his- 
torical forces of continuity and change.n 1̂ ( President 
Kennedy had expressed his understanding of the Cuban 
problem many times. His policy was strikingly similar to
ppthe Castro line. But when it came time to make deci­
sions about the fate of Cuban-American relations, American 
policy was Tl . . . characterized by ambiguity„ . .
American policy in the Kennedy Administration not only 
alienated Cubans from U.S. capitalism but also from the 
Western tradition itself.^ When the Kennedy Administra­
tion announced it had severed diplomatic relations with 
Cuba, it had in effect, according to Earl E. T„ Smith,
20^uCf., Andres Suarez, Cuba? Castroism and Commu­
nism (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967).
21 Arthur P. Whitaker, "Yankeephobiat The U.S. 
and L.A„,n Current History, ILII (January 1962), 15»
22pere I am referring to Castro's accusations 
concerning American economic exploitation and military 
intervention.
23Whitaker, op. cit. , p. 15.
24-Maurice Zeitlin, Cuba: Tragedy in Our Hemis-
similar views, especially on pp. 142-20$. See also
Walter La Feber, America, Russia, and the Cold War 1 945~ 
1966 (New York: Wiley, 1967), pp. 214-l6ff. ——
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caused a type of "negative intervention."25 Smith goes 
on to state that many people may have been sincerely mis­
led by Castro, but the Department of State and the United 
States cannot afford to be misled or "to excuse such mis­
takes by saying that the revolution was betrayed by 
Castro." Maurice Zeitlin has aptly depicted U.S. in- 
eptness in dealing with the social revolution in Cuba?
(^During the period the U.S. had an opportunity 
to "extend economic aid to a professed anti­
communist nationalistic revolution, and thus re­
turn, if not its friendship, at least its cor­
diality* However, it did not do so)27
The U.S. did not act and the Kennedy Administration 
exacerbated the situation by severing relations with Cuba, 
which had been a core interest of the U.S* for over 50
^ F o r  definition'of term, see Earl E„ T. Smith,
The Fourth Floor (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 226.
The psychological effect of withdrawal of American support 
was devastating* Smith called it intervention by innuendo.
26Ibid* , pp* 233-34. For a splendid discussion 
of U.S. policy failure in Cuba, see Herbert Dinerstein, 
Intervention Against Communism (Baltimore:* Johns Hopkins 
Press7 1967; Dinerstein qualifies many of his remarks 
concerning U*S:* policy failures by saying: "Great powers
rarely act with perfect wisdom and foresight, especially 
in their dealings with small powers" (p. 42)*
27zeitlin, op* cit*, p* 36* That the Soviet 
Union filled the vacancy left by the U.S. was an unex­
pected victory for the Communists, according to Herbert 
Dinerstein, who is a highly recognized Kremlinologist*
See Herbert Dinerstein, "Soviet Policy in Latin America," 
American Political Science Review, LXI (March 1967),
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years. The purpose behind such actions was not clear„
At one point President Kennedy spoke of coming to a 
better understanding with our Latin American neighbors, 
while at the same time he pursued a contradictory policy« 
/The great confusion in our relations with the Cubans 
w o o o arises from the uncertainty as to what our policy 
really isc”^  Charles Osgood described President Kennedy's 
foreign policy toward Cuba as "1 „ . the ambivalence of 
the mighty American elephant in dealing with the little 
Cuban mouse."^9 The frustrations and contradictions of 
UoSo foreign policy toward Cuba made it "the most vulner­
able area for Soviet penetration of the hemisphere in the 
Cold War of^ Ambassador to Mexico, Robert Hill, at times 
a critic of President Kennedy's policies in Latin America, 
was "shocked by intelligence reports that the Soviets were 
amazed at the ease with which they were being permitted 
to penetrate Cuba <>"31 The Kennedy Administration was 
certainly not taking care of its own backyard» "American 
policy and American diplomacy avoided giving any pretext 
for hostility, and acted with remarkable moderation in
2%mith, The Fourth Floor, op0 cit0 , p. 228„
29charles Osgood, An Alternative to War or Sur­
render (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 19&2) ~
p„ 20o
3®Lester Do Langley, The Cuban Policy of the 
United Slates (New York: Wiley, 1968), "Introduction."
3"*Lazo, ££0 cito , pp0 184-85.
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the face of growing provocation.”3^ ^Instead of aiding 
the Cuban revolutionaries, the U.S. forfeited this role 
to the Communist bloc, a fact to which the Kennedy
Administration did not respond\
)
The Bay of Pigs: The S'tigma
of Indecision
jThe Kennedy Administration had pledged action 
against Cuba. The contingency plans had been put to use 
and the freedom fighters were trained,, The American 
leaders and President Kennedy were aware, of course, that 
the long~term existence of a pro-Soviet regime in Cuba 
was intolerable.-^ The Soviet military build-up in Cuba 
was a clear "challenge to United States* hegimony in the 
Western Hemisphere„”3^ On April 17, 19£Bf the invasion 
party began its assault on Cuba in a small inlet which 
became known as the Bay of Pigs (Giron);. Three days later 
the invasion was over; it had been totally defeated.
Theodore Draper, author of Castro*s Revolution, 
has characterized it splendidly when he wrote” ’’The
32Berle, cp>. cit., p. 47„
33This is well documented in both Haynes Johnson, 
The Bay of Pigs, op. cit., and Tad Szule and Karl E.
Meyer, The Cuban Invasion:- The Chronicle of a Disaster 
(Mew York: Praeger, 1962). — ’
34Suarez, ££. cit., see ’’foreword.”
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ill-fated invasion of Cuba was one of those rare politico- 
military events--a perfect failure."^ [^This particular
event was not only a disaster for the image of the U.S.,
\
but it was a personal failure for John F. Kennedy-’-a 
failure of such magnitude that Pierre Salinger was 
prompted to s a y " T h e  Bay of Pigs was J.F.K.’s first 
major defeat as President and the greatest disaster of 
his entire Administration."^6 Q^ith all the available 
military power and influence to destroy the world,
John F c Kennedy did nothing as „ . Fidel Castro glee­
fully spouting communistic shibboleths, rounded up pri-
" 3 7soners from the beach.''^' In commenting on Kennedy’s
handling of the Cuban affair, Arthur Krock wrote:
r—|And, after the debacle of the Bay of Pigs expedi­
tion that his half-in, half-out support had fore­
ordained, he blamed it on incompetent counsel of 
the military Chiefs of Staff. . . . Kennedy's 
transfer of blame from himself to the Chiefs of 
Staff for the Bay of Pigs disaster was leaked to 
the press to preserve for him the reputation for 
resolute leadership he had definitely failed to 
demonstrate in this instance7\38 (italics mine.)
^Theodore Draper, Castro’s Revolution: Myths
and Realities (New York: Praeger^ 1962).
36pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (1st ed.; Garden 
City, N 0Y„: Doubleday, 1966), p. 149. See also Arthur M„ 
Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the 
White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965).
37sidey, ojd. cit., p. 124.
3$Arthur Krock, In the Nation: 1932-1966 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 196$), pp. 321-25.
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Krock*s appraisal of Kennedy is interesting in light of
a very aggressive and decisively firm statement Kennedy
made in his book, Why England Slepti
I We cannot tell anyone to keep out of our 
hemisphere unless our armaments and the people 
behind those armaments are prepared to back up 
the command, even to the ultimate point of going 
to war. . o . If we debate, if we,question, if 
we hesitate, it will be too late.3y
When the debating, questioning, and hesitating ended in
the Giron disaster, Herbert L. Matthews made a comment
entirely in character: ”Thank the Lord,” he wrote, ”for
the United States and Cuba that the invasion of April 17,
1961, failed!”^0
The reactions in the White House were from extreme 
emotionalism to somber reflection. Kennedy said to 
Salinger: ”We really blew this one,"^ His brother, the
Attorney General, is reported to have told the President 
emotionally, ”They can't do this to you--those black- 
bearded Commies can't do this to you!”^2
(But they did, and nothing can alter the grim fact 
that instead of overthrowing Castro the invasion further
39john F. Kennedy, Why England Slept (New York:
Wo Funk Inc., 1961).
^Herbert L. Matthews, as quoted in Lazo, 
op. cit., p. 299«
^Salinger, op. cit., p. 148.
^National Review. May 2, 1967, p. 479«
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secured his hold on the country; that instead of pro­
tecting the image of the country as President Kennedy had 
stressed in keeping the operation covert and adhering to 
a policy of "non-intervention/1 it had subjected the 
country to worldwide scorn. No one believed the persis-
i,o yitent Peking claims that the U.S. was a "paper tiger, 
but everyone believed that it behaved like one.^
Jpresident Kennedy had made a decision^ to support 
the invasion. Whether it was covert or overt does not 
matter. He had made a commitment to action. The invasion 
party is an example of that tacit commitment. The Presi­
dent had to choose between two courses of action suggested 
by his advisors: (1) to stage an invasion of Cuba with
military support if necessary, or (2) not to intervene.
In order to avoid the risks which either course of action 
would have involved. President Kennedy attempted to take 
the middle course, intervening just a little, but not 
enough to assure s u c c e s s " Y e t  in foreign policy," as 
Raymond Aron puts it, "the half-measure, the compromise
^3see "On Khrushchev4s Phoney Communism and Its 
Historical Lessons for the World" (Peking: Foreign
Language Press, 1964)0
44For reference to term "’decision," see supra, 
p. 31» n. 26.
^^See Morgenthau, The Trouble with Kennedy, 
op. cit., p . 51.
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ordinarily combines the disadvantages of the two possible
16 / ~'vpolicies." yin foreign policy, there can be no middle 
ground! Whether Kennedy should or should not have approvedJ
the invasion attempt is not at issue here. That was for 
him to decide. He was President of the United States.
Only he could have made the decision-one way or the other.
(Having made an affirmative decision, Kennedy had to assure 
victory and this he failed to do. He chose the gray; he 
chose the compromise between "black and white" and this 
ultimately was a "decision for d i s a s t e r T h e  President 
had made a commitment and then failed to stand firm. His 
choices were clear;1 (1) to disband the invasion, (2) post­
pone it, (3) intervene militarily with overwhelming force, 
or (4) support it just a little. His fourth choice was a 
disaster. He . . jeopardized the national interests 
o f  the United States by aiming at a short-run, short­
lived, and ill-fated maneuver . „ . to restore the 
balance of power^ in the Caribbean, instead of pursuing
^Raymond Aron, "An Open Letter to President 
Kennedy," Le Figaro, September 30, 1961, as quoted in 
Morgenthau, The Trouble with Kennedy, op. cit., p. $1.
^Lazo, pp, cit., p. 379o
^Harjs J. Morgenthau, The Impasse of American 
Foreign Policy (Chicago; University of Chicago Press,
1962), p . 14 o
^ T h e  term "balance of power" is here used in its 
classical sense of restoring the equilibrium in the Carib­
bean which had been materially changed by the influx of
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a more realistic and viable policy through innovative 
executive leadership» The immediate calling off of the 
invasion might have made some sense; its abandonment to 
destruction made nonea The Kennedy Administration had 
been overly concerned with the effect which open involve­
ment of American troops would have upon "world opinion 
/The fact is that the U.S., abandonment of the invasion 
force probably affected world opinion more adversely than 
a successful invasion would have). As Kennedy himself j
saidi "There is an old saying that victory has one 
hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan."^®
^Kennedy's behavior towards the invasion force 
was inconsistent and vacillatory0 It was Kennedy himself 
who called off the strategic air strikes that would have 
demobilized Castro's infant air force; it was Kennedy's 
refusal to permit a second Cuban air strike which "!put 
the enterprise in irretrievable period. . . <,”51 A 
tacit commitment had been made by supporting the invasion 
plan and training its members„ But when the time came
Soviet armaments and military hardware to the area. For 
an excellent classical discussion of the term, see 
Inis Lo Claude, Power and International Relations 
(New York: Random House, 1962).
-^John F „ Kennedy, as cited in Johnson, op0 cite,
p. 176o
51 Blackstock, ojd0 cit., p. 252.
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for action, the Kennedy Administration failed to respond„ 
President Kennedy’s decision to avoid further involve­
ment by not allowing the two remaining air strikes was a 
decision for disaster,. The whole fiasco greatly diminished 
both the prestige and the material power of the U„S„ 'X\
Kennedy's unwillingness to use force proved costly, as J 
Henry Wriston has recorded;
(Total failure seriously damaged American pres­
tige and impaired its influence in other sensitive 
areas. „ „ „ The disaster enhanced the prestige of 
Castro o The man who had bested the ’’Colossus of 
the North” became a hero to many and was made to 
appear a good deal larger than real life« <> ® 0 
Moreover, failure impaired the standing of the 
United States not only in t~his hemisphere, but 
also with its major allies, j « „52
((in the Bay of Pigs episode, the U 0S „ had failed 
to live up to its reputation for greatness),, ’’The United 
S:tates is a power among powers,” writes Morgenthau,
\J”fatefully involved in the affairs of the globe where
'A
prestige is an indispensable ingredient of power^,^
(The risks involved in not fulfilling a commitment or 
honoring one's words is that the enemy may be tempted to 
put that reputation to the test-^ President Kennedy's 
dilemma was that a full-scale invasion might be held
5^Henry Wriston, ”A Historical Perspective," 
in Plank, Cuba and The United States, op„ cit», p„ 34®
53Morgenthau, The Impasse of American Foreign * 
Policy, op, cit,,, p 0 4&o
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comparable to Russia's conduct in Hungary and would shock 
the world's leaders beyond redress. President Kennedy 
had failed to heed the historic axiom concerning the use 
of military power and force:; "In starting or making a 
war, not the right is what matters, but victory 
Kennedy chose, instead of victory, a middle course-- 
intervention without adequate air cover--which was carried 
out with "amateurish i n e p t n e s s . T h a t  Kennedy decided 
in favor of a compromise was " . . .  due in part to a want 
of resolution."56 President Kennedy may have very well 
read Neustadt’s book on Presidential Power, with its 
emphasis on personal power and its politics, but his be­
havior in the Bay of Pigs affair certainly did not show 
i t H i s  decisions markedly dissipated his personal power 
and reputation.) Shortly after the crisis the President 
asked himself aloud: "How could I have been so far off
base. All my life I've known better than to depend on
the experts. How could I have been so stupid, to let them 
5 7go ahead?"'' His anguish was surely deepened by the fact
^Adolf Hitler, as quoted in Blackstock, op. cit. ,
p. 253.
55Lerner, op. cit., p. 93«
c A'Charles J. Murphy, "Khrushchev’s Paper Bear," 
Fortune, LII (December 1964), 230.
57sorensen, Kennedy, op. cit., p. 309« President 
Kennedy was quite emotionally upset over this disaster, 
as Sorensen relates.
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that the rest of the world, and particularly the Soviet 
Union, was asking the same quest ion , (^After the Bay of 
Pigs fiasco, Kennedy decided that the deadliest sin was
to be irresolute 5 8
(^In the American support for the Bay of Pigs in­
vasion, the Kennedy Administration would have liked to 
have had a new regime which was both non-Communist and
not aligned with the Soviet Union^ It would undoubtedly•o
be useful if the foreign policy-makers would put a pri­
ority on these goals, but there is no evidence that such 
a priority existed in the Kennedy Administration , In­
stead, it attempted to accomplish with covert or clandes­
tine means that which it was unwilling to attempt with
59diplomacy or direct military action, As Max Beloff 
describes it, President Kennedy was pursuing a policy of 
"limited liability" in the Cuban invasion,. The image
 ̂ This particular change in President Kennedy’s 
attitudes toward foreign policy is particularly well 
analyzed by Ian McMahan, "The Kennedy Myth," New 
Politics, III, No. 1 (1963-64)5 41-48,
59see Lyman B „ Kirkpatrick, Jr„, The Beal C.I.A. 
(New York: MacMillan and Co,, i960), pp„ l84-87ff°
^Limited liability is a policy in which there is 
little reason to intervene in a situation where the like­
lihood of success is marginal and the penalties for 
failure fall on one’s self. The Bay of Pigs fiasco is the 
best example of this. See Max Beloff, "Reflections on 
Intervention," Journal of International Affairs, XXII 
(1968), 202-12; also Adam Yarmolinsky, "American Foreign 
Policy and the Decision to Intervene," Journal of Inter­
national Affairs, XXII (1968), 231,
of sober common sense and resolute action that President 
Kennedy had projected to the world during his vigorous 
campaign and early presidential statements was failing t 
materialize„ \President Kennedy's irresolution caused 
n o 0 o one of the most grievous diplomatic blunders in 
American hi story 0,? 1 To a man who had promised to get 
the country moving again, the Cuban affair was a humili­
ating, personal failures. The repercussion revived cam- 
paxgn allegations that Kennedy was immature and ill- 
prepared to guide the nation in international affairs, 
/"but the real significance of the disaster, as Thomas 
Freeman has written, was not so much that Cuba was lost, 
but that the U „S » was unwilling to use its power to 
defend and control a vital national interest 2
At the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, United States 
diplomatic and military policy failed*, But the 
real significance of the failure was not in American 
relations with Guba„ Cuba was already lost, and the 
Bay of Pigs only recorded the facto The real sig­
nificance of the Bay of Pigs, which the United 
States Government was slow to realize, was.that to 
the Russian regime and all Latin America it showed 
a disastrous paralysis of will-in short weakness» o
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0  0 0 0 0  0 0 0  o ' o  0 0 0
After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the United States 
Government was cautious <,■■■„ „ it seemed less sure 
of itself and, worgt^ of all, impotent to handle the 
gnat sting of Cubac.6^ (Italics mine*,)
^Lasky, op<= cit„ , p„ 4?60
^Thomas Freeman, The Crisis in Cuba (Derby, 
Conn*, ? Monarch Books Inc., 1 963 ) s ' P» 1 23«
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Cfhe failure of the U.Si to act decisively at this 
juncture created a vacuum which the Soviets were more 
than willing to fill.
And to make things worse, in the orgy of national 
self-recrimination that followed the Bay of Pigs invasion. 
President Kennedy took the full blame .j Thus, like Presi­
dent Eisenhower in the U-2 operation, our chief of state 
acknowledged complicity in an activity about which he 
should have remained silent. In espionage and other covert 
operations, there are certain standards of conduct and 
operative principles which have developed out of long 
experience. One of the most elementary of these is that 
when a covert operation has been seriously exposed, it is 
disavowed and dropped.^ This is done not so much for the 
appearance of being tough, but as a matter of realistic 
politics .
It permits the normal conduct of international 
relations to continue without the constant dis­
ruptions that would occur if every apprehended 
agent were acknowledged.64
f The damage done, Kennedy accepted sole responsi­
bility for the events. A great power had in fact ad­
mitted that it had n . . . violated the spirit and probably 
the letter of international agreements into which it had
6>33ee Blackstock, op. cit., pp. 241“60 for a 
thorough discussion of diplomatic behavior in such events.
64k irkpatrick, rg. cit. , p. 201.
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freely entered; it had winked at the violation of its own 
neutrality laws*}^'’ "There is one absolute requirement," 
writes Arthur Plank, "for intervention by a great power 
in a small nation: it must be done skillfully enough and 
on a large enough scale to guarantee its success."^6 
This requirement was violated by the Kennedy Administration*
When one looks back upon the invasion and the 
politics that surrounded the decision, the dilemma of 
American policy toward Latin America becomes increasingly 
clear: 0*The Bay of Pigs was a public confession by the 
United States that it had failed to understand or deal 
with the most significant political change in the hemi­
sphere in fifty years *""̂ 7
Our ignorance of the Cuban situation was merely a 
particular instance of our long-standing national disin­
terest in and lack of knowledge of Latin America as a 
whole* Our policies have been "ethnically and culturally
arrogant*"uo Cuba, in particular, is an American 
69tragedy because Cuba has always been the area of
65piank, op* cit * , p„ 33°
66Ibid*
^LaFeber, _op* cit., p* 223°
6$Bayless Manning, "An Overall Perspective,"' in 
Plank, op* cit * , p* 225*
69zeitlin, op* cit*, p* 207°
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primary interest to'the U.S. in Latin America (i.e., a 
traditional and geographical core interest of the U.S.).
Kennedy had learned many things about the use of 
military power--or rather, he learned what happens in 
the absence of it. He learned about the resiliency of 
the Communist enemy and about inaction and irresolution.
But the occasion was still bitter defeat.
fvThe prestige of the United States, already danger­
ously eroded around the globe, suffered more, and 
more important than any of these was the danger 
that Nikita Khrushchev might look at the wreckage 
on the beach and decide that the President of the 
United States could be pushed to virtually any 
limit. A war of miscalculation could easily arise 
from such conclusionsTv . .70
Several days after the disaster, Kennedy addressed 
the problem of Cuba, giving a stern and authoritarian 
statement concerning our core interestsr
Any unilateral American intervention in the 
absence of an external attack upon ourselves or 
an ally would have been contrary to our inter­
national obligations. But let the record show 
that our restraint is not inexhaustible„
Should it ever appear that the inter-American 
doctrine of noninterference merely conceals or 
excuses a policy of non-action; if the nations of 
this hemisphere should fail to meet their commit­
ments against outside Communist penetration, then I 
want it clearly understood this government will not 
hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which 
are the security of our nation. We intend to 
profit from this lesson. We intend to re-examine
7^Sidey, op. cit., p. 123. For an analysis of 
Soviet foreign policy toward Cuba during these events, 
see Herbert Dinerstein, "Soviet Foreign Policy in L.A.," 
op. cit., pp. S0“S4«
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and reorient our forces of all kinds . . . disappoint­
ments will often accompany us, „ . .
Let me then make clear as the President of the 
United States that I am determined upon our system’s 
survival and success, regardless of the cost and 
regardless of the peril,,71 (Italics mine.)
These were typical Kennedy words,. Would there be action?
This was the question? would there be the determination
that would win the next one?
April 20, 1961, Cuba was definitely a geographical core 
interest. Also, as of that date there was still an ideo­
logical U.S. interest in Cuba expressed in Kennedy’s 
reference to opposing Communist penetration in this hemi­
sphere „ But unless the leaders of the U„S„ were willing 
to take positive measures (e„g„, invasion) to assert that 
ideological interest, it can no longer be properly con- 
sidered as a core interest in its own right or an element 
of a geographical core interest. Throughout the following 
year, policy statements made by the Administration suggest 
that the national leaders would not invade Cuba to oust 
Communism,, The Kennedy Administration did, however, take 
a number of aggressive actions— constituting an economic 
boycott— which were designed to bring the downfall of the 
Castro regime. Thus, the U.S. position during this period 
was ambiguous J The Administration did not admit final
From this statement two things emerge. As of
7̂  New York Times. April 21, 1961, p. 1
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(loss of Cuba, although it did take several measures to 
redress the setbacks But it stopped short of taking the 
kind of action (military) which would have been necessary
at that point to bring about the desired result,\
— ■"
Laos: The Travesty of
Neutralization
<\The international political situation in Laos 
reached serious or crisis proportions during the close of 
the Eisenhower and the beginning of the Kennedy Administra­
tions o There had been strong pressures for American mili­
tary intervention in Laos and Eisenhower told Kennedy the 
day before the Inauguration, T,You might have to go in 
there and fight it out,ff72 By the end of May, these 
pressures had reached their peak* But President Kennedy
in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs fiasco had become more
\,N.
skeptical of military advice and military solutions'*, He 
had requested position papers of the prospects for Ameri­
can military intervention in Laos from each of the Joint 
Chiefso (The Chiefs* basic premise was simply for the U 0S« 
to go all out for a military victory or get out of Laos* 
President Kennedy found both proposals unacceptable. He 
once again chose the middle ground— neutralization#!
Throughout April 1961, attempts to arrange a
^Theodore Sorensen, The Kennedy Legacy, op, cit,,
p o 1 S3 o
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cease fire with the guerrilla fighters and the Pathet Lao 
had failed. (On April 24, the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
joined Great Britain in an appeal for a cease fire and a 
fourteen-nation conference to begin in Geneva on May 12. 
The appeal was effective, and after months of wrangling, 
agreement was reached on December 18 on a declaration 
reaffirming the sovereignty and neutrality of■Laos and on 
the supervised withdrawal of all foreign troops. ;
.jThe position of the U.S. government, and partieu- 
larly President Kennedy, is quite baffling.*^
'‘Going back to President Kennedy’s press conference 
speech on Laos on March 23, 1961, he stated that the U.S.
strongly and unreservedly supported the goal of a neutral
\and independent Lao^, tied to no outside power or group of 
powers, threatening no one, and free from any domination. 
Kennedy went on to state that if present Communist hos­
tilities and attacks did not stop those who supported a 
genuinely neutral Laos would have to consider their 
response.^ ”No one should doubt our own resolution on 
this point,” Kennedy said. ”We are faced with a clear 
threat of a change in the internationally agreed position 
of Laos.-75 (in essence, Kennedy threatened to take
^Blackstock, op. cit», p. 199.
7^S:ee Kennedy, To Turn the Tide, op. cit,, 
pp. 33-41* »
^ Ibid., pp. 39-40.
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action if hostilities did not cease and
a o o appealed to the Soviet Union to respect 
the neutralism of Laos and warned that the 
Western Powers cannot permit Laos, which is geo­
graphically a perfect buffer state between the 
two great coalitions, to_be taken over by Com­
munists or pro-Communistsi 76
^Kennedy had called for a neutral Laos in hopes that the 
Communists would call off their offensive and would agree 
to let the country have peace.\ "His answer was the whine, 
of Communist bullets As Henry Kissinger has remarked,
(^Kennedy's professed willingness to defend Laos was in­
consistent with his policy of neutralization."^ / Kennedy 
had demanded a cease fire in Laos, but he failed to back 
up his strong words uttered at the press conference on 
March 23, 1961. He cheapened what he said, and it cast 
doubt on his credibility. It was a well-known fact at 
that time that the Communists were increasing their guer­
rilla efforts in Lao^j. "In 1961 and 1962, the Soviet 
Union (and possibly China) threw large amounts of arms and 
equipment into Laos, while North Vietnam supplied the 
Pathet Lao with troops, instructors, and advisors
^Frederick L. Schuman, The Cold War; Retrospect 
and Prospect (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1962), p. 95°
77Sidey, o£. cit., p. 75°
7 $ H e n r y  A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy 
(New York: Norton, 1969), p° 33°
79J. Librach, The Rise of the Soviet Empire: A,
Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1964),
p. 2oS.
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C._In his speech, Kennedy had warned that a Commu­
nist takeover would "quite obviously affect the security 
of the United States." He had warned Khrushchev to be 
prepared for a fight. Several days later, Andrei Gromyko, 
the Soviet Foreign Minister, visited' the White House. 
Kennedy warned Gromyko against pushing the U.S. too far 
in a situation where its prestige was at stake. President 
Kennedy informed Gromyko that the U.S. did not intend to 
stand idly by while the Communists took over Laos.
Gromyko made it clear that the Soviet Union shared the 
U.S.'s desire for an independent and neutral Laos and ex­
pressed hope that an agreement could be reached),
(In the process of these meetings, Kennedy had 
downgraded his position from will fight, to may fight, 
to will not fight for Laos. His policy went from firm 
commitment to open accommodation. "Kennedy’s tough words, 
spoken as Laos was being swallowed by the Communists, 
proved to have no impression on K h r u s h c h e v . K e n n e d y  
argued finally that Laos was not worth a,fight, and he 
sought to alleviate the situation by neutralizing a 
country in which the U.S. had spent more than three million
ouJohn F. Kennedy, as quoted in Lasky, 0£. cit.,
p. 563.
See Lasky, o£. cit., pp. 563-69.
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$2dollars in "anti-Communism" programs. Thus, in less 
than four months— between January 1961 and May 1961-™ 
President Kennedy's policies in Laos had run the gamut 
from the Duliesian concept of Laos as a "bastion of the 
free world”^  to the hope that Laos would remain an 
effective neutralized zone. Bernard Fall goes on to say 
that the U.S. accepted one by one every aspect of neutral- 
ization in Laos which it had fought against so tenaciously 
since 1957A The U.S. position was also seriously weakened 
by the inability of SEATO to deal with the political 
problem in Laos. ^(^The U.S. was unable to present a uni­
fied strategy to deal with the problem.""".
That Kennedy was pursuing a policy of accommodation
$2Francis B. Stevens, ”When Kennedy Faces 
Khrushchev,” U.S. News, L (May 29, 1961), 40. For an 
account of U.S. financial involvement in Laos, see Keyes 
Beech, "How Uncle Sam Fumbled in Laos," Saturday Evening 
Post, CCXXXIV (April 22, 1961).
^ B e r n a r d  Fall, "Reappraisal in Laos," Current 
History, XLII (January 1962), 11. Gerald Hickey and 
Adrienne Suddard, in "Laos: Pawn in Power Politics,"
Current History, XLI (December 1961), especially 
pp. 353-35» present a similar argument as does Fall. They 
see neutralization as just another word for Communist 
takeover, followed by the retreat of the West.
^This problem was exacerbated by the fact that 
the British and French would not support American strategy 
in Laos. Diplomats freely admitted that joint Western 
strategy for the neutralization of Laos was confused and 
uncertain of its objectives. See Edmund Clubb, "The 
Lesson of Laos,” Progressive, XXV (May 1961), 5-6; also 
”Geneva--0ne More Setback for the United States,"
U.S. News, L (May 29, 1961), 41-42.
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and appeasement in Laos is undeniable. \ The U.S. had failed
'V...
in an expensive attempt to mold the situation in Laos to 
its purpose; consequently, Kennedy ” , . » decided not only 
to neutralize Laos but also to win Russian backing for this 
plan.”,_j7 Kennedy had assumed that the Communists could 
persuaded that further military actions in Laos were 
unnecessary and provocative. Kennedy’s mistake in such 
thinking was that ” . . .  areas that are in contention, 
like Laos, cannot be effectively ’neutralized’ without 
fairly active American intervention and a credible mili­
tary presence in the background to maintain the local
. -  ̂ ■*
balance of power.” [ Kennedy had made a choice--neutral- 
ization rather than confrontation--and he accepted the \ 
logical imperative: "The Communists would have to be II
granted substantive concessions.”^? Kennedy wanted a j
(political rather than a military solution. The U.S. posi?- 
tion was ambiguous because while disengaging from Laos, 
the Kennedy Administration was busy trying to strengthen 
the Saigon government^
I The neutralization of Laos was a major victory , tV, -V\\ r 1 for the Communists^ Premier Khrushchev’s willingness to
^Kenneth L. Hill, "President Kennedy and the 
Neutralization of Laos,” Review of Politics, XXX 
(July 1969), 354=
66Robert F„ Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968) , p. 22*1
S7Hill, op. cit., p. 354.
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neutralize Laos did not mean that he opposed the exten- 
sion of Communism in Southeast Asia.00 The neutrality 
and coalition government agreement were not inconsistent 
with his philosophy of nwars of national liberation.n 
/[That Kennedy should believe that Khrushchev could be 
persuaded to use his influence on the Pathet Lao to make 
them desist the aggressive acts is nothing but sheer 
political naivete and diplomatic ineptness. President 
Kennedy’s actions conveyed to the Communists that he was 
deferring rather than excluding a military response. He
wanted a way out of the situation and the Communists were<
more than willing to go along with him. "The Communists
could legitimately claim that the 1961 Geneva agreement
was a major victory for them and a major defeat for the
39United States.” Kennedy had repeatedly warned the 
Communists through threats of military action against 
using military force in Laos. However, Kennedy’s own 
actions made his own warnings and threats incredible. 
These warnings were ignored by the Communists; military 
force was employed, and they won a political victory. 
President Kennedy’s policy in Laos brings to mind an old
6^Cf., Philip E. Mosely, "The Kremlin and the Third 
World,tT Foreign Affairs, XLVI (October 1967)® Here the 
author discusses the Kremlin’s foreign policy toward the 
Western Hemisphere, particularly Latin America. The dif­
ferences in policies are evident.
^Hill, op. cit., p . 364=
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sayingr "The road of appeasement is not the road to
peace, but is surrender on the installment plan,!’
/  —l.The effect that Kennedy’s neutralization policy
had on our credibility posture is that it weakened it
substantially^ As Thomas Schelling indicates, President
Kennedy’s policies toward Laos were "casuistieally"
oriented:
If one reaches the point where concession is 
advisable, he has to recognize two effects:- it 
puts him closer ,to his opponent’s position, and it 
affects his opponent’s estimate of his firmness,, 
Concession not only may be construed as capitu­
lation, it may mark a prior commitment as a fraud 
and make the adversary skeptical of any new pre­tense at commitment090
 --
;The fact is that Laos is not now neutral, nor was it in*
1961. In the words of Tran Van Binh, Charge d ’Affaires 
and Acting Ambassador of Vietnam to the United States in 
1964, "Laos neutrality is a fa9ade„"91
While Laos was being neutralized at the bargaining 
table, the Pathet Lao marched on. And the Kennedy yf
Administration did nothing,, U.S. resolve had faltered 
once again.
9^For an explanatory discussion of casuistry in 
foreign policy, see Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of 
Conflict» opo cit 0 , p„ 34.
9“lTran Van Dinh, "The Fiction of Neutrality in 
Laos," New Republic, CLVIII (February 24, 196S)', 45.
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Vienna? A Soviet Probe of 
American Resolve
(John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev met in 
Vienna June 3 and 4, 1961“-the only face-to-face confronta­
tion they were to have as heads of state. It was to be a 
sober two days as President Kennedy mentioned some time 
later. The Bay of Pigs disaster only six weeks earlier 
and the U.S. disengagement from Laos had brought American
prestige to its lowest point since the Francis Gary Powers
92U-2 incident in May 1960. Khrushchev, sensing the time 
was right to force important American concessions on the 
German question, came to Vienna not to negotiate but to 
dictate to the young American President. And that he /■
did.^ |
< ^
President Kennedy was anxious to meet Premier 
Khrushchev. He was going to Vienna to size up Khrushchev 
and to establish a personal, relationship that might be 
useful later. As Theodore Sorensen relates the facts, 
Kennedy wanted to look at Khrushchev, hear him talk, 
listen to his words, and watch him as he sat across the 
table. One meeting was worth more than all the diplo­
matic messages. ("If the Soviet Premier had the idea that 
Kennedy’s actions in Laos and Cuba indicated weakness, he
92S:alinger, ojc. cit., pp. 175-158.
93ibid., p. 175„
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thought that a face-to-face meeting would dispel that 
impression."^  Kennedy hoped that a meeting would disabuse 
any misapprehensions Khrushchev may have had concerning 
Kennedy's recklessness or weakness of will.(j,
Khrushchev was a formidable opponent,, Kennedy was 
up against a leader who placed only a propaganda value on 
words. When dealing with Khrushchev, the opponent had to 
realize that "action is the one and only language respected
cby the Soviet dictator of the Communist empire."^5 vSo 
far, Kennedy's "action record" was sorrowfully lacking, 
Cuba, Laos, and the failure of the nuclear test ban 
treaty had been humiliating setbacks for the U.S. The 
images Khrushchev had perceived of these events were 
extremely important. For images in the interplay of 
international politics are the real world, Kennedy was 
aware of the fact that he must convince Khrushchev that 
the U.S. would go to the "brink" if necessary to defend 
its commitments. (And as Llewellyn Thompson had told 
Kennedy, much of Soviet policy was based on Khrushchev's 
personal estimate of government heads.s
Kennedy had made a misjudgment at the Bay of Pigs. 
Khrushchev had to make many judgments about the West.
The whole purpose of the meeting was to bring precision
9^-Sidey, qjd. cit. , p. 163.
^Stevens, op, cit. , p. 40.
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into those judgments. It is doubtful whether precision 
was ever obtained„ Subsequent events indicate that it 
was not (i.e., Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis).
jrhe discussions at Vienna revolved around three 
main topics: (1) Berlin, (2) Cuba, and (3) Laos. 'Of
great interest are Kennedy's responses to Khrushchev's 
belligerent and provocative statements. If it was 
Kennedy's purpose to show Khrushchev that the U.S. was 
determined and not lacking in will or resolution, his 
behavior did not impart that image\ Kennedy had tried, 
as always, to be "4 . . rational and calm with Khrushchev 
to get him to define what the Soviet Union could and 
would d o . \Khrushchev bullied Kennedy and threatened 
him with war over Berlin. While Kennedy talked of 
securing peace for all the world, Khrushchev was threaten­
ing to cut off Western access rights in Berlin],
Khrushchev's early discussions included a reaffirmation 
of the inevitability of the Communist revolution and 
"wars of national liberation." In effect, he candidly 
told Kennedy that Communist frontal attacks on "capitalist" 
positions were ineffective and that he was banking on the 
indirect approach, the coexistence policy which had
96<James Reston, "What Was Killed Was Not Only 
the President, But a Promise," New York Times Magazine, 
November 15? 1964? p. 126.
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already brought results in Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam.97
Kennedy retorted by expressing the view that Communism
was undemocratic and this country wanted the nations of
the third world to determine their own destiny, free of
outside intervention. Khrushchev then brought up the
matter of Cuba. Khrushchev stated that the U.S. was
largely responsible for the proliferation of Communism.
Fidel Castro, he said, was being forced into the Marxist
camp because U.S. economic sanctions had left him no-
where else to go.
( Kennedy passively disagreed, stating that the
U.S. had taken action against Castro because he was sub™
verting the island into a Communist base that was a
direct threat to democratic governments in Latin America.
Cuba alone was not regarded as a threat.9^ "Would
Khrushchev stand idly by if a pro-American government
were to come to power in Poland and begin subverting its
99 !Communist bloc neighbors to capitalism?” Of course noty
r~I That Kennedy had not destroyed Castro when he had\
the chance was somewhat baffling and confusing to Khrush­
chev^ The fact is that the Russians would have
9?For documentation of these talks, see J. Librach, 
chapter entitled "Summit Diplomacy,” ojs. cit. , pp. 230-50.
-9?Sne Sorensen, Kennedy, op. cit., p. 547.
99Salinger, o£„ cit., p. 179.
: 1 1 4
/ ' " ' v  *. . wiped out a similar threat in a matter of
h o u r s , a n d  Khrushchev found it hard to understand
• ""X
why Kennedy had not done so. Kennedy’s infirmity of pur­
pose was evident to Khrushchev. Kennedy’s action in 
handling the Cuban case revealed to Khrushchev 
” . . .  little evidence of willingness to recognize the 
developing danger and to move resolutely to cope with
\The important thing, Kennedy stated, was that the 
two super powers avoid miscalculations that might lead to 
nuclear war. He stressed peaceful competition, disarma­
ment, and continued efforts to open up channels of 
accommodation.^Khrushchev was unsympathetic and unbending. 
Kennedy’s pleas were met with more threats and belliger­
ence^) Kennedy’s central thesis of the entire meeting was 
to convince Khrushchev that the two great nuclear powers 
must avoid situations which commit their vital interests 
in a direct confrontation from which neither could back
"I 00A very perceptive analysis of Soviet-Guban 
foreign policy is presented in Lazo, Dagger in the Heart, 
op. cito Lazo is of the opinion that President Kennedy’s 
Cuban policies encouraged Soviet penetration of the 
Caribbean. I can hardly disagree.
101oie H. Holsti, Richard A. Brody, and Robert G. 
North, "Measuring the Effect and Action in International 
Reaction Modelst Empirical Materials from the 1962 
Cuban Crisis,n in James N„ Rosenau, International Poli­
ties and Foreign Affairs (New York: Free Press, 1969)9
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1 02down. When Kennedy talked with Khrushchev of the 
tragedy of killing millions of people in both countries 
in a matter of minutes should either nation misjudge the 
other, Kennedy said that therefore, perhaps, both men should 
soften a little in their positions,, Khrushchev was un­
moved*) He admitted the disaster of nuclear war, but he 
did not admit that concessions were a way to avoid it.
They talked about the possibilities of general disarma­
ment and negotiation, but no viable solution was found. 
Kennedy stated that his one ambition was to secure peace, 
and he hoped that the meeting was a step in that direc- 
tion. }
vThe most heated discussions concerned Berlin. 
Khrushchev threatened that the Berlin situation could no 
longer be postponed and he would sign a separate peace 
treaty with East Germany in.December 1961. The treaty 
would recognize no continuing American rights in West 
Berlin. Khrushchev was militant about the necessity of 
eliminating Western power in West Berlin. Kennedy 
answered that the West was in Berlin legally and would 
use force to maintain its rights there "at any risk.")
Kennedy reiterated his warnings to Khrushchev not to mis­
calculate American intentions. (His stand was clear:
. V
1 02 For a detailed account of conversations be­
tween the two leaders, see Sorensen, Kennedy, op. cit., 
pp. 543-646; Sidey, ojc. cit., pp. 192-201; Lasky, op. cit., 
pp. 56G-574; and Salinger, o£. cit., pp. 133-196.
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\The threat to the brave city of Berlin remains.,
In these last six months the Allies have made it 
unmistakedly clear that our presence in Berlin, our 
free access thereto and the freedom of the two 
million West Berliners would not be surrendered 
either to force or through appeasements, that to 
maintain those rights and obligations, we are pre­
pared to talk, when appropriate, and to fight if 
necessaryo103
Worried about the effects of the Bay of Pigs and 
the Laos settlement upon American credibility, and dis­
turbed at public reports that Khrushchev had browbeaten 
him at Vienna, Kennedy prepared himself for the showdown 
in Berlin which he* once described as the ’’touchstone of 
American honor and r e s o l v e T h e  ’’test of nerve and 
will”^ ^  that Kennedy had once spoken of was not long in 
coming!
)For Kennedy, the Vienna meeting with Khrushchevv,.,. -
had been a traumatic expedience» Khrushchev’s belligerent 
attitude and unyielding behavior was confirmed„ It was 
indeed going to be a ’’long, cold winter^”
\Had Kennedy been firm and forceful in dealing 
with Khrushchev? Did Kennedy convince Khrushchev of his
, i
determination and resolve? Would the U»S 0 use the force ^  
Kennedy had pledged if Berlin access rights were violated?
The Berlin Wall speaks for itself?)
^Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, op0 cit„, p„ 16„ 
"*04see Sorensen, Kennedy, _opQ cit., pp„ 5S3-5S60
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The Berlin Wall: A Contingency Plan
That Did Mot Exist
'̂ ’’Influenced by his reading of President Kennedy’s
susceptibilities, and by the weakening of the American
position as a result of the Bay of Pigs disaster,
r-̂Khrushchev reopened the Berlin crisis in the summer of 
1961 At Vienna, Kennedy had made it clear that the
UoS’o would stand firm in Berlin<> It would meet its com­
mitments o In his Berlin statements of June 6, July 19, 
and'July 25, 1961, Kennedy had reaffirmed American resolve 
and determination to honor its commitments "at any risk.-** 
Nevertheless, Khrushchev was anxious to test the serious­
ness of Kennedy’s statements with regard to Berlin,, 
Khrushchev’s peace treaty ultimatum of June 4, 1961, in 
Vienna was designed to test the mettle of Kennedy, The 
new Berlin crisis that Khrushchev had manufactured posed 
for the U.S. "the viability of collective security and of 
NATO and the balance of power in Western Europe»
fKhrushchev’s peace treaty declaration shrewdly
105Marshall D „ Shulman, "Recent Soviet Foreign 
Policy*" Journal of International Affairs, XXII, No„ 1
(1963) 2W„ ~ ~
6̂6fyjai£ R0stow, "Conference Address," in.David 
Abshire and Robert Allen, National Security, op, cit0, 
p. 420o For an analysis of Khrushchev’s policies toward 
Berlin, see Stefan T„ Possony, Analysis of the Khrushchev 
Speech of January 6, 1961, UoSU Senate, Internal Security 
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, £7th 
Congo, 1st Sesso, 1961, p 0 7«
placed on the U.S:. the burden of initiating the use of 
force., "The Soviets merely had made the d e m a n d s . I t  
was the U.S. that had to decide whether to stand firm in 
enforcing its legal and putative rights in Berlin or to 
allow them to be violated. Standing firm in Berlin re­
quired at all times the possibility of using force to 
back up Western rights
Throughout the summer of 1961, several harsh
statements were made by Kennedy and Khrushchev regarding
their respective positions. The attention of Kennedy and
the Western allies at this time was concentrated largely
on negotiating an agreed position. There was no official
reaction to Khrushchev’s June 4 aide memoire note until
July 17, 1 961 . V,,,Some observers concluded that "Premier
Khrushchev, looking at Western effectives [military and
political] had good reason to doubt the West’s resolu-
1 nstion to stand firm in Berlin or elsewhere." The U.S. 
and the Western allies could not come to a generally 
agreed position.^
C The U.S. commitment in the face of the Soviet 
challenge was further weakened by the fact that the 
Kennedy Administration " . . .  wished to concentrate
* ̂ Spanier, op. cit., p. 230.
^^"Reflections on the Quarter," Orbis.
Summer 1961, p. 126.
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decisions on access and administration of Berlin in the 
White House, and thus deprive the commanders on the spot 
of the initiative to act immediately in a time of emer­
gency 3/̂/\When Moscow heard of President Kennedy®s strategy 
in limiting the commanders in the field to act on initia­
tive, Ambassador Menshikov is quoted as saying at a diplo­
matic reception on July 14 in Washington: T,In the final
analysis, when the chips are down, the American people 
won't fight for Berlin.”"®^ Kennedy's reply to the Soviet 
note of June 4> when it was finally delivered, had a firm 
tone and yielded nothing* President Kennedy went on to 
say that "with regard to Berlin the United States , . , is 
insisting on and will defend its legal rights against any 
unilateral abrogation* * «
The Kennedy Administration had made its commitment* 
It would not yield; it would protect its rights in Berlin*)
Upon examining Kennedy's July 25 statement^^ on
f "*09Eleanor Lansing Dulles and Robert Dickson Crane,
Detente; Cold War Strategies in Transition, op, cit., 
p* 131j article entitled ”Berlin--Barometer of Tension,n
110U*S* News & World Report, July 13, 1961, p. 20,
"^U,S„, Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, £7th Cong,,
1st Sess, , December 1961, p, 681,
H^"Report to the Nation on Berlin Crisis,” 
broadcast from the White House, July 25, 1961, (See 
supra, pp0 6.7-63,)
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the Berlin crisis, several contradictory and ambiguous 
statements are apparent that brought doubt to the 
Administration’s willingness to defend its interests.
As Professor Jean Edward Smith notes, Kennedy’s July 25 
speech states that though calling for money for defense, 
his pledge of a ’’diplomatic offensive to reduce the 
crisis” sounded like an appeal for disengagement and he 
adds that Kennedy once more ’began to waiver before the
I 1 Othreat of nuclear war.” J There were even reports that
Secretary Rusk was willing to offer certain concessions
1 1 *in return for proper guarantees of Western rights. ^
On August 7, 1961, Khrushchev delivered his most 
belligerent speech. In effect, he gave a warning to the 
U.S'. not to interfere with a possible closing of the 
border.
Nineteen days after Kennedy’s Berlin speech, the 
Communists gave their reply. ( They began to erect the 
wall that slashed Berlin--”the great testing place of our 
courage and will,” according to Kennedy--in hallj. Once 
again Kennedy was caught off balance^ He acted surprised, 
and complained bitterly, ”No one had even warned him
^ 3 j ean Edward Smith, The Defense of Berlin 
(Baltimore: n.p., 1963), pp. 234-50.
I^S'ee Dulles and Crane, ojd. cit. , p. 132.
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that such a dreadful thing could happen,^"* 5
/^But it did happen and the U,S« did nothing. In
factj it took two days before the Western powers could
agree on a statement of protest. The Berlin Wall had
left the U.S. without a policy.
The response from the West was silence. In the 
first hours no one had any advice. John Kennedy 
and his government had no plan of action for such 
an event, despite the sheaves of emergency measures 
dreamed up for every other crisis,
Kennedy stated that the wall was illegal, immoral, and 
inhumane. Where was the decisive firmness and determi­
nation to protect Western rights in Berlin of which
Kennedy had so eloquently spokent The construction of
x..y
the wall shocked the free world, According to Robert 
Strausz-Hupe, the violation of American access rights 
was evident;
East Berlin has been sealed off, and thus 
Inter-Allied agreement on Berlin has b_een breached 
unilaterally by the Communists, . . .(jLot the 
position of the Communists in East Berlin but the 
access rights to West Berlin of the Western jLOLlies 
became the subject of East-West negotiations^,!"* 7
^United States inaction in confronting the Soviet 
challenge produced a deep shock and undermined the confi­
dence in the U.S.'s ability or even willingness to defend
11 ̂ Lasky, ojd. cit. , p. 573<>
^"^Sidey, oj3. cit. , p. 234,
^^Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Soviet Strategy," in 
Abshire and Allen, ojc, cit,, p. 11,
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Western rights and interests* U.S. credibility was
greatly weakened by its unwillingness to respond to a
blatant test of American resolver,/
Allied deeds have not measured up to allied words 
and Berliners know it as well as the Russians. 
President Kennedy said the U.S. would fight to 
protect access routes. But since the erection of 
the wall the Communists have repeatedly held up 
trains and trucks and they have reduced the number 
of existing rail points on the West Berlin per­
iphery from five to one.1 °
(,The trepidation of President Kennedy and the State 
Department over Berlin and their refusal to maintain 
Western rights greatly damaged the credibility of deter­
rence strategy. Again, as in the Bay of Pigs and Laos, 
there was irresolution, conflicting opinion among the 
President’s advisors, embarrassing publicity, and humili­
ation. ̂ 9  rphe U.S. response to Soviet blackmail tactics 
was non-existentI The Berlin Wall not only eroded the
U.S. position in Berlin, but also defined Western rights
1 20on a descending scale.
Lin Berlin it was quite obvious that the U.S. had
11 ’David Binder, op. cit., pp. 20-21
^ ^ g ’eej for example, the discussion by Carl G. 
Anthon, "The Berlin Crisis and Atlantic Unity," Current 
XLII (January 1962), 22-24.
120jror a detailed analysis of erosion of Western 
_______ iB Berlin, see Daniel Schorr, "The Trojan Troika
in Berlin," The Reporter. September 27, 1962, pp. 25-27; 
also John Spanier, ojd. cit. , pp. 230-240.
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failed to impress the Kremlin with its determination to 
honor its commitments^ Although the Kennedy Administra- 
tion had stated it would react sharply to affirm its 
position in the defense of Western legal and putative 
rights,'such commitments were meaningless. Such commit­
ments become incredible if there is no response to spe- 
cific challenges. ’̂Tests of will” such as Berlin cannot 
be met with formal diplomatic protests or solemn assur­
ances of U.S. determination. Soviet probes must be met 
with speedy, effective, and continuous countermeasures. 
"Upholding one's rights does not raise international
tensions," writes Spanier, "it lowers them because the
1 21test of wills has been successfully met." Spanier goes
on to state that the real danger in nuclear blackmail 
situations is not a war stemming from a determination to 
stand firm, but a war of miscalculation resulting from
weakness"^
American Policy; Indications of Irresolu­
tion, Inaction, and Unwillingness 
to Use Force
. In summarizing the performance of the Kennedy
Administration in foreign affairsy I think E. M. "Ted"
Dealey, publisher of the Dallas Morning Hews, has best
described^Kennedy's leadership qualities when after the
 ̂21spanier, o j d .  cit., p. 235.
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first year of the Administration he told Kennedy to his 
face at a meeting in Washington that '^the general opinion 
of the grassroots thinking in this country is that you
">”\ i  p pand your Administration are weak sisters. ”j
/*"V\(Upbn having examined the five international crises, 
it remains to answer whether the "subjective factors”
(i.e.» irresolution, inaction, unwillingness to use force, 
and vacillation) of American foreign policy were present 
in these crises„ The answer is that they were. Kennedy’s 
policies in handling these crises not only brought doubt 
as to the credibility of our intentions by the constant 
reiteration that force would never be used, but his actions 
brought doubt to his own capabilities as a national leader. 
One of his greatest deficiencies was his "failure to 
evolve and adhere to a reasonably consistent philosophy of 
foreign relations.” jn case of the Cuban invasion, 
his handling of the crisis clearly revealed, as Kirk­
patrick has said, that the right hand of government did 
not know what the left was doing. Kennedy never really 
did make up his mind until it was too late. He had his 
chance to act decisively but he allowed circumstance to 
control his choices. His decisions reveal that he did not
^^Ted Dealey, as quoted in Lasky, _op. cit.,
p. 533.
^23crabb, o j d .  cit . ,  p .  449»
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extract power from his choices. He failed to make his 
choices serve his influence,, He failed because he left 
out of account the stakes and risks involved in such a 
choice. He saw the issues through the eyes of his ad­
visors. As a candidate Kennedy had criticized President 
Eisenhower for indecisiveness, for lack of candor, for 
failure to use the full powers of the office. But as 
Arthur Krock states? "He repeated every one of the errors 
of weakness he attributed to Eisenhower. }Take Cuba, he<r_j
was indecisive there. You can't blame advisors: the ulti-
12 h- {mate responsibility was his.” 1 After the abortive Bay 
of Pigs invasion, Kennedy stated that he had learned many 
lessons from the venture and he intended to profit from 
his mistakes.) That he hadn't yet learned was hardly the 
strongest recommendation for the leadership of the free 
world. Kennedy had not only shied away from his campaign 
commitments, but he had failed to exert the strong execu­
tive leadership he had so vigorously pledged. Kennedy 
did not carry out a firm and consistent policy in regards 
to the Soviet Union and Khrushchev. This mistake mani­
fested itself in October 1962. The ironical thing about 
Kennedy's errors was that even though he was fully aware
^Arthur Krock, as quoted in William Manchester, 
Portrait of^a^President (New York: Little, Brown and
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of them, he seemed incapable of doing anything about them*") 
When a reporter remarked in the autumn of 1961 that he 
wanted to write a book about the President's first year in 
office, Kennedy inquired, "Who would want to read a book
about disasters?" (Kennedy was particularly lax inv
learning that a favorable American image in the world can­
not be created by speeches not followed by political 
action., In the international arena, a great power should 
not resort to threats unless its leaders are fully pre­
pared, without any inner reservations, to back them up 
with acts of strength,, Credibility can only be strengthened 
by positive action.] The Bay of Pigs disaster was "the 
worst example of the uses of American power and diplomacy 
in this generation."}
In several of the five crises, Kennedy had vio­
lated one of the sanctified axioms of foreign policy;
. Foreign policy cannot be conducted without an 
awareness of power r e l a t i o n s h i p s V . P o w e r  implies force, 
and force is the means through which deterrence becomes
^^Told by Elie Abel, quoted by I. F. Stone in 
New York Review of Books, April 14, 1966, p. 12.
^ % e s t o n ,  oj). cit., p. 126. See also Jullian 
Towster, "The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.; Challenge and 
Response," Current History, XLII (January 1962). The 
author is of the opinion that American foreign policy 
has not been effective in the last decade.
^ ^ K i s s i n g e r ,  Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 
opo cit., p. 427.
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credible. Ironically, deterrence strategy was not 
strengthened in credibility in the Kennedy Administration 
--it was weakened. The Kennedy Administration based its 
deterrence strategy on the pause theory. This convinced 
the Russians that the U.S. lacked faith in its own nuclear 
deterrent', i.e., that it did not have the will to use
if)128 ^
Instead of emphasizing strengths as deterrence 
requires, Kennedy chose to belittle them. The counter­
measures he adopted to respond to Soviet probes of Ameri­
can resolve lacked firm resistance and commitment— two 
essential components of deterrence strategy. The most 
crucial element of deterrence strategy--credibility--was 
continually weakened by President Kennedy’s acquiescence 
and complacency in carrying out threats or promises to
take action. Kennedy did not make fulfillment of threats/
a matter of national honor and prestige in responding to
the Berlin Wall; consequently, American deterrence
\strategy was weakened). In Berlin, there was no response, 
no action, and no discernible punishment for encroachment 
on Western rights. The U.S. had the power to resist the 
change in the status quo in Berlin, but it did not have
the will to use it.
12$See David M. Abshire, "Grand Strategy Recon­
structed," in Dulles and Crane, ojd. cit., pp. 250-65.
VvCuba, Laos, Vienna, and the Berlin Wall were 
Kennedy disasters. In international affairs the chief 
executive must act purposefully and he must take maximum 
advantage of national strength. Kennedy's actions in 
these crises did not impart positive images of strength, 
resolution, or willingness to use force's
PART II
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICYs A CHALLENGE TO 
AMERICAN POWER 1960-1962
CHAPTER IV
KHRUSHCHEV: A QUEST FOR POWER
QThe purpose of this chapter is to examine briefly 
the politics of Premier Khrushchev. Such an examination 
may be helpful in explaining what led Khrushchev to be­
lieve he could successfully place missiles in Cubal
The Politics of Premier Khrushchev
Khrushchev was a very able statesman and a skill-
!ful politiciano /His personal and political record demon­
strates that he had determination, stubbornness of char-
1acter, and considerable political prowess. He was a 
sincere Communist. Khrushchev was also a shrewd tacti- , 
cian as Dinerstein concludes: "The Kremlin will continue
to probe political weak spots throughout the world, and
2whenever an apparent vacuum appears, will try to fill 
/Khrushchev's politics were a blend of Marxism, 
Leninism, pragmatism, opportunism, and, most of all, the
^S’ee Thomas P. Whitney, Khrushchev Speaks (Ann 
Arbors- The University of Michigan Press, 1963) , p . 61 .
p^Herbert S . Dinerstein, ’’Future Soviet Foreign 
Policy,’’ in Abshire and Allen, ojc. cit., p. 70.
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pers©nal idiosyncrasies of the man himself). Merle Fainsod, 
a Soviet scholar, has described Khrushchev as "shrewd, 
earthy, endowed with boundless energy, a bouncing confi­
dence, and a quick if coarse wit, he was the very epitome 
of the self-made man in s o c i e t y . Khrushchev was a 
master politician besides being a skillful statesman. He 
knew well the art of persuasion, and he used it to his 
advantage in his long rise to power as Premier of the 
Soviet Union. His authority, from the very beginning of 
his leadership of the Communist Party, appeared to rest on 
an underpinning of collective leadership of the Party.
f—
^Khrushchev maintained a tight rein on the Party Secre­
tariat and on the apparatus of the Central Committee. He
was able to do so both through persuasion and adroit 
political maneuvering. From 1960 to the end of 1962, 
"Khrushchev took upon himself the principal role in the 
implementation as well as the formation of policy.”^
Khrushchev’s brand of leadership, as Myron Rush describes
it, was uniquely "Khrushchevism."5 He was bold, tough, 
astute, resourceful, and an agile negotiator for a system
^Merle Fainsod, Khrushchevism in Retrospect,” 
Problems of Communism, XIV (January-February 1965)} 1•
^•Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind 
(New York: Praeger, 1963), p . 164«
^Myron Rush, "Khrushchev’s Strategic Views"
(Santa Monica, Calif.* Rand Corporation, Mem. No. P-2$SS, 
-June 12, 1962), pp. 1-19o
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which he felt was far superior to any other,\^ Khrushchev
possessed a boundless confidence in the virtue, via-
"*1 bbility, and world destiny of the Soviet way of life;
/Although Khrushchevas politics may have at times seemed
reckless and risky, "he genuinely believed that nuclear
7war had to be avoided,,” ' But at the same time he firmly 
believed that the American position would be slowly 
weakened by wars of national liberation^ His words were 
strong and suggested boldness, but his moves included a 
careful calculation of their effect on his own political 
position,, Khrushchev was also a pragmatic doctrinaire. 
His pragmatism operated within the framework of basic 
Communist interests in the world. His pragmatism was
o o bound to Communism, delineated by Communist
$ideology and aimed at Communism7s advance,” Khrushchev 
was not particularly a revolutionary zealot; he was a 
” . . .  supreme politician, a first-class manager of men 
and a human dynamo.” ,/Crankshaw goes on to state that 
Khrushchev was a man of action, not a thinker; even as a
6s«e Tucker, og. cit., pp. l65~70ff.
^Mark Frankland, Khrushchev (New York? Stein 
and Day Publishers, 1967), p« 208.
$Konrad Kellen, Khrushchev? A Political 
Portrait (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 24$»
^Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev7s Russia (Balti­
more: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 62.
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man of action he was a politician first, a balancer, an 
intriguer, a fixer, an opportunist in the grand manner. \ 
Khrushchev sought power and he enjoyed it.
rv.
/Although Khrushchev justified his policies in
terms of Marxist legitimacy, he felt free to use any means
possible to him to execute the will of history and the
1 0 .inevitability of Communism. Since peaceful coexistence 
was a matter of expediency for Khrushchev, he did not 
want nuclear war; but he was always ready to take advan­
tage of Western mistakes or complacency^ By making ex­
cessive and threatening demands and by manufacturing 
crises, Khrushchev hoped to extract concessions profit­
able to himself. This was to be done in a piecemeal 
fashion if possible.
Khrushchev was a firm believer in a strong military 
posture for the Soviet Union. Khrushchev supported the 
policy of strategic missile deterrence, and his tenure as 
Premier ” . . .  marked a transformation in military thought 
and the military establishment.”^  In the Soviet Union, 
party control over the military is supreme. As Dinerstein 
remarks: ”In the Soviet outlook, military doctrine and
strategy have no independent life of their own. Both are
^Cf., Walt W. Rostow, The Dynamics of Soviet 
op. cit.. p. 1?S-269o
11 Garthoff, op>. cit., p. 60,
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understood to be permeated by and subordinate to poli-
12tics* . . Soviet policy decisions tend to be poli­
tical decisions, and Khrushchev concentrated on weapons 
with maximum political effect. /The historical trend in 
Russia has been to consider military and political poli­
cies before domestic or economic programs, even if the 
policies adopted spell economic burdens and sacrifices. 
This particular policy-making trend was accelerated during
Khrushchev’ s tenure in office,, The Soviet Union’s reli-
1 3ance on what Robert Conquest calls ”crash programs” was 
typical of Khrushchev’s policies to find quick solutions 
to economic problems„
r~j
/In foreign affairs, Khrushchev’s behavior dis­
played political aggressiveness and an itch for probing
1 Zlwith extreme military caution, Khrushchev was always 
most respectful of American strength. Soviet policy has 
been quick to take advantage of American weaknesses.^, 
Khrushchev’ s probing policy was based partially on a 
” . . .  correct appreciation that the United States
12V. D. S'okolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, 
trans. Herbert Dinerstein, Leon Gourfe, and Thomas W.
Wolfe (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.r Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 6.
^3see Robert Conquest, o j d .  cit., pp. 110-111. An 
example of one of Khrushchev’s crash programs was the 
Virgin Lands project in agriculture.
^This belief is also expressed by Bernard 
Brodie, ojd. cit. , pp. 44-4$.
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government only wields national power when it is at war
and that it can be persuaded to prefer cold war to hot.”^5
This strategy has proven to be very successful. ’’The
West has still to come up with a coherent and comprehen-
1! 6sive answer to the Communist ’nibbling process.’” )
Khrushchev monopolized the role of chief architect and
r*'
spokesman for Soviet foreign policy.^ /His rule was 
characterized by personal diplomacy. He sought power and 
he knew how to extract it. His policies of intimidation 
in 1961 and 1962 increased the West’s caution; conse­
quently j, Khrushchev was able to gain valuable political 
leverage and concessions from the West (e.g., Berlin and 
Laos), His control of the Soviet Union during the early 
sixties was unchallengeable. His power was indeed 
sovereign. He alone was the only member of all the chief 
organs of dictatorships (1 I the Presidium, (2) Secre­
tariat, (3) Bureau of the Central Committee, and (4) the 
Council of Ministers. Khrushchev also had the leading 
posts in the Party, the government, and the army, being
h . S. Grossman, ’’Reading Khrushchev’s Mind,” 
Commentary, XXXII (December 1961), 50$®
l6Robert Strausz-Hupfe, ’’Soviet Strategy,” in 
Abshire and Allen, pp. cit., p. 13.
1?For one of the most scholarly and authoritative 
discussions of Soviet foreign policy, see Triska and 
Finley, op. cit., pp. 50-150ff.
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First Secretary of the Central Committee, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers, and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of
1 $the armed forces. He projected upon the world a Russia 
that was dynamic, self-confident, and forward-looking,
[He earnestly believed that Communism would triumph over 
capitalism and his policies reflected this belief. "The 
Khrushchev era then may be regarded as a transitional 
phase of Soviet society moving from an insular, semi- 
industrial stage into that of a modern, advanced industrial 
society with global pretensions to power.^9
1 $'See Myron Rush, "Succession and Institutions in 
the Soviet Union," Journal of International Affairs,
XVIII, No. 1 (1964), 71.
^Bernard S„ Morris, "Soviet Policy Toward the 
West," in A, Bromke, The Communist States and the West 
(New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 2$,
CHAPTER V
SOVIET PRE-CRISIS CALCULATIONS
V, This chapter will attempt to provide an explana­
tion of and an answer to the following question:. What 
led Khrushchev to believe he could successfully deploy 
missiles in Cuba? In this chapter the hypothesis state™ 
ment will be examined to determine whether it can provide 
an answer to the preceding question* The first part of 
this chapter is a description of Soviet risk-taking and 
decision-making„ In the second part, Soviet Leaders5 
expectations regarding U *S * response will be evaluated*
The Risk of Thermonuclear War 
During the Khrushchev era, Soviet-American rela­
tions became an active, indeed, crucial area of Soviet 
decision-making * These were turbulent years in which both 
major powers confronted each other in several major 
crises* /Soviet conduct in foreign affairs in these years 
was characterized by challenges to American power below 
those that might trigger a general nuclear war and, for 
that matter, below thresholds of limited war that might
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escalate into general war j  The basic characteristic of 
this strategy has been supplied by General David Sarnoff, 
who called it the "'nibbling process, "jf This nibbling 
process has taken shape in several Communist-launched 
forays into the Western Hemisphere (e.g., Cuba and Latin 
America),, These penetrations have, to a great extent, 
been based on Soviet calculations of American intentions 
and behavior,. Although such moves have been shrouded in 
the ideological rhetoric of "peaceful coexistence," they 
have been undertaken with caution.j When perceived gains 
from such forays have indicated potential advancement of 
Communism,fsoviet leaders have normally been 
". . . always ready to take advantage of Western mistakes 
or complacency."3 Q'The Soviet view of American inten­
tions has always been a basic determinant of Soviet 
p o l i c y W h e n  S;oviet leaders have perceived gaps in 
American defense policy, they systematically probed at, 
them^j It must be remembered that decision-makers act upon 
their images of the situation rather than upon objective
1 f‘See Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Soviet Strategy," in 
Abshire and Allen, cit. , pp. 9-11 <>
2Ibid., p . 10.
3R o Stow, O£o cit o a p. 262.
^Ibid„, p . ko
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5reality. Whether these gaps or weaknesses were actually 
real in the minds of American leaders is not of impor­
tance here. What is important is whether the Soviet 
leaders perceived an apparent weakness. "Once a statesman 
has formed an image of an issue, this image acts as an 
organizing device for further information and as a filter 
through which this information must passj.”^ \When the 
Soviets have perceived weaknesses and discontinuities in 
American policy, their perception has stimulated 
responses.y Khrushchev's foreign policy toward the U.S. 
was conditioned by the foreign policy and military 
strategy of the U.S. Because the international system is 
composed of actors and nations performing and interacting 
with one another, Soviet shifts in attitude may be ex­
plained as responses to American positions or behavior. 
These responses were based on certain perceptions held by
Khrushchev, and as Stagner has stated, " . . .  perception
Sprecedes the policy decision and shapes it."
Historical analysis has proven that the Russians,
5For a detailed discussion of image formation in 
foreign policy, see Holsti, pp. cit., pp. 244-45ff°
■ ^Stagner, pp. cit., p. 15»
^Triska and Finley document this point very well 
in their book Soviet Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 144- 
350.
$Stagner, op. cit., p. 11.
being doctrinaire activists,jare relentless in securing 
all possible changes favorable to them so long as no
Qundue risks are involved„ Khrushchev’s behavior in Cuba 
in 1962 has been incorrectly described as reckless, ir­
rational, emotional, adventuristic, scheming, and perfi­
dious „ While he did accept some unusually high military 
and political risks in embarking on the Cuban venture, 
the risk of an immediate U„S„ thermonuclear response 
against the Soviet Union was almost certainly not one of 
them0 Khrushchev established a very crucial upper limit 
on the risks he was willing to accept. /"There were risks, 
of courseo The Soviet marshals most certainly pointed
10them out to hinu ’’But he knew Kennedy? they did not.”5' 
The Soviet Union was no more anxious to precipitate a 
nuclear war than was the United States,, Moreover, the 
Soviets have always subordinated military operations to 
political objectives= Clearly, Khrushchev’s goals did 
not warrant the resort to nuclear war which would have 
placed in jeopardy the future of Communism not only in 
Cuba but perhaps also in the Soviet Union,, /’’There can be 
no doubt that Khrushchev personally had no intention of 
letting the crisis deteriorate to a point where a nuclear
^See Brodie, op„ cit„, pp„ 75-85«
^Abel, 0£o cit„, p„ 40„
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t|
war became even likely; let alone inevitable,”^
/Throughout the last fifteen years, the Soviet
Union has displayed a preference for low-risk ventures
1 ?in foreign policy,, The successes the Soviets have had 
have been in part the result of Western errors (e,g», 
Cuba), The successes were also well balanced by Soviet 
retreats forced by effective resistance abroad to Soviet 
pressures (e.g„, Iran, Greece, Berlin, Yugoslavia), The 
Berlin crisis in 1961 is a good example of what Klaus 
Knorr would refer to as caution in Soviet foreign policy: 
"The Soviet government, which initiated this crisis, in­
creased the pressure step by step, taking discriminating 
care that no new move was apt to provoke a violent 
r e s p o n s e I n  Cuba, Khrushchev believed the U.S, would 
not strike without cause, and he believed he could control 
the risks and would not press a challenge that would
^Frankland, ojd, cit „, p, 194„
12s?ee Triska and Finley, ojd, cit,, p, 312,
"Risk is a liability to error; it is a function of pos­
sible change. Risk involves a level of uncertainty.
Where no prediction of the outcome is possible, pure 
change is involved; this, however, is not the usual situ­
ation in international relations. Here, one can at least 
broadly define the limits of possible gain or loss. When 
uncertainty is involved, it is a function of experience; 
if many cases are involved, a statistical probability may 
be calculated. Risk then becomes objectified uncertainty”
(po 31$).
^Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in 
the Nuclear Age, op, cit,, p, 91 o
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provoke the U.S'. into taking aggressive action.^ The 
costs involved in Khrushchev's risk calculus were minimal 
compared to the possible gains that might have been 
achieved had the deployment been successful,, Soviet risk- 
taking and risk-calculation was a product of rational 
behavior„j Relying on William Riker's definition of 
rationality— " in politics rational men are men who would 
rather win than lose, regardless of the particular 
stakes"^ can be seen that Khrushchev's risk-taking in
Cuba did anticipate a win but this initial risk action was 
coupled with an automatic risk-reducing mechanism, 
t^Putting missiles in Cuba was a high-risk action. But it 
was combined with what Triska calls a "risk-reducing 
emergency strategy” ? "If the United States gets tough, 
we pull out. The U.S. got tough, and the Russians did 
pull out0"16 (Nobody consciously enters into a risk 
situation without calculating what to do if the situation
should escalate. Khrushchev was a determined but con-
 -
trolled, forward-moving but cautious leader.) Risk-reducing
1ifCf. , for example, Roger Hilsman, Foreign Policy 
in the Sixties (Baltimore:- Johns Hopkins Press, 1965)? 
pp. 5-7.
^William Riker, The Theory of Political Coali­
tions (New Haven, Conn.? Yale University Press, 1 962);,
p o 2 2 o
^Triska and Finley, op. cit „ , p. 322. See 
also Even Luard, "Conciliation and Deterrence," World 
Politics, XII (January 1967)°
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strategy in the Soviet Union is synonymous with retreat­
ing,, ^Retreating is a normal behavior under certain con­
ditions o Retreating is not necessarily seen as the 
result of prior mistakes, but as an act of preservation, 
as a condition of future advance. Soviet policy is 
probing and exploratory but essentially conservative and 
ready to withdraw in the face of hostile determination.^ 
The Cuban gambit is the best example of Khrushchev’s 
initial challenge to U.S'. resolve; and the subsequent 
retreat was a useful political tool involving little risk. 
Khrushchev’s behavior during the crisis was cautious, 
conservative, and circumspect. When the U.S.. got tough, 
Khrushchev hastily and even ignominiously removed the 
m i s s i l e s S u r e l y ,  the circumstances of that removal 
qualify one’s estimate of his boldness in putting the
18 P""missiles in. placing of missiles in Cuba was not
an imprudent, reckless, or irrational gamble. On the 
contrary, as Herbert Dinerstein remarks:
^ S e e  Leites, ojo. cit. , pp. 24-29; and John S. 
Reshetar, Jr., ’’Predicting Soviet Behavior,” in Alvin 
Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966),
p. 427.
°Bernard Brodie presents somewhat similar re­
marks, while contending that the Russian action in Cuba 
was indeed a manageable risk-taking situation (pp. 40-
55) o
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I would not characterize the Cuban attempt by 
the Soviet Union as a reckless gamble. I would, 
if I were writing about it, I think, five years 
from now, give them very high marks for good sense. 
After all, the problem for the Soviet Union is how 
to advance Communism.c
P O O  O O O O  O 0  0  0 Q O O O O O  0  0 , 0  0  0 0 6 0 0
The gains they would have acquired from such a - 
success would have been enormous politically and 
not negligible militarily. What have they lost?
Well, they’ve lost a lot of prestige; they didn’t 
get what they wanted, but they haven’t had to re­
treat from anything they had before.19
As past events and crises have revealed, Soviet calcula­
tion of risk relates to their calculation of U.S. resolve. 
”If they calculate that [U.S.] resolve is low, and if it 
is in fact low in a given crisis, they face low actual 
risk, although the risk may appear high.”^
/Given the considerable margin of American stra­
tegic superiority prior to the Cuban crisis, which the 
emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba was intended to 
reduce, on what grounds could the Soviet leaders be con­
fident that the U.S. would not launch a first strike 
against the Soviet Union in order to prevent an unfavor­
able change in the strategic balance?)
f"The primary grounds for this confidence were 
political. Even when the U.S. enjoyed decisive strategic
^Herbert Dinerstein, ’’Discussion,” Part I,” as 
quoted in Abshire and Allen, _op. cit., p. 200.
^Ofbid., Preface article entitled "Soviet 
Strategy: Risk of General Nuclear War.” See also Herbert
Dinerstein, "Future Soviet Foreign Policy,”' _ojd. cit., 
pp. 21-27.
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superiority, as during the Kennedy Administration, its 
leaders showed themselves to be strongly disinclined to 
initiate general war so long as the Soviet Union avoided 
extreme measures of provocation that could not be dealt 
with by other means» Increasingly, it appeared to the 
Soviet Union and Premier Khrushchev that nothing short of 
actual application of violence against the U „S . or an
important U.S. ally would risk a nuclear attack on the
S ISoviet Unionoj |If one excludes from Soviet pre-crisis 
calculations any serious concern that the U.S. would 
launch a thermonuclear attack against the Soviet Union, 
the Cuban gambit no longer appears to be a reckless, 
irreational scheme, but a calculated and limited risk
O 1undertaken for substantially attractive gains. The
Sovietsf attempt to deploy missiles in Cuba was a very
oo\ JrT sensible risk."_ j CAnd furthermore, "to ship such missiles 
to Cuba ," writes Knorr., "'required months of complicated
Thomas Schelling might equate this risk calcu­
lation to the game of chicken. As long as calculations 
involve a series of discrete steps taken deliberately, 
without uncertainty as to the immediate consequences, 
this process of military maneuver does not lead to war. 
If the threatening side knows how far the other side can 
be pushed, he does not push that far. See Schelling, 
"Uncertainty, Brinkmanship, and the Game of Chicken," in 
K. Archibald, Strategic Interaction and Conflict 
(Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1966),
pp. 75-86.
^Dinerstein, "Discussion, Part I," in Abshire 
and Allen, op. cit., p. 200.
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preparation--a requirement that is not conducive to a 
strong component of emotional or irrational decision 
making."^ To Khrushchev the possibility of escalation 
of the crisis was not negligible! But as the crisis 
revealed, his calculations included a risk-reducing 
strategy. Tin fact, the quick withdrawal of the missiles 
may be interpreted as a decision to end the crisis 
quickly before it became necessary to accept even greater
losses which could be avoided--only at the cost of facing
\serious risk of nuclear wary
Expectations Regarding United States 
Response
jConfidence that their action would not directly 
provoke nuclear war was a prerequisite for embarking on 
the Cuban missile venture, but it could not be a suffi­
cient condition for success. What, then, aside from 
their belief that the U,S, would not respond by striking 
the Soviet Union, were the calculations that led 
Khrushchev and the Soviet leaders to believe their venture 
could succeed?]
^Undoubtedly, the subjective factors of American
23Rlaus Knorr, "Failures in National Intelli­
gence Estimates" The Case of Cuban Missiles," World 
Politics, XVI (April 1963), 463; and see also Roberta 
Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor," Foreign Affairs, 
XLIII (July 1965), 694-705o
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foreign policy toward the Soviet bloc convinced Khrushchev 
and the Soviet leaders that the U.S. would not respond 
with military force to the creation of an offensive mis- 
sile base in Cuba,./ (Khrushchev* s action in deploying mis­
siles in Cuba can be explained as a product of a rational 
anticipation of American acquiescence to a fait accompli, 
based on a reasonable interpretation of a succession of 
American actions (e.g.., Bay of Pigs, Laos, Vienna, and 
the Berlin Wall) and American responses to these actions. 
Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba was based on a eare-
2Zlful analysis of American responses to Soviet pressure.
And furthermore, the placing of missiles in Cuba was con­
ceived of as a limited probe of American deterrence 
strategy to prove that the U.S. threshold of response, 
both tactical and strategic, was high even in an area 
where the U.S. had overwhelming military superiority and 
where the Soviet Union had no vital interests to make 
defeat unacceptable.j
(As this study has developed, the Soviets have 
based their policies for many years on cold calculation)' 
rather than on fear and recklessness^) and have taken 
advantage of whatever weakness, vacillation, or tenden­
cies,toward accommodation under pressure they detected in
2^For further explanation, see Crane, 0£. cit.,
p. 531 .
u s
U»S. foreign policy. Khrushchev’s assessment of Presi­
dent Kennedy’s expected behavior in Cuba was . . based 
largely on expediential calculations and the rational
working out of plans.n „
|In foreign affairs, the Kennedy Administration had 
demonstrated incredible naivete. Kennedy had come into 
office, hoping that the Soviet Union and Khrushchev would 
be more tractable in dealing with the Administration. In 
fact, the President had even sent Khrushchev a personal 
message, asking him to give his new Administration a 
six-months’ reprieve from crises in which to formulate new 
policies designed to reach a modus vivendi with the 
Soviet Union. This turned out to be a terrible ’’diplo­
matic blunder.”^6 This action convinced Khrushchev that 
the new President and his Administration were unsure of 
themselves and the time was ripe for some heavy-handed
probing tacticsl?
~s*4
Khrushchev and Soviet leaders, according to Lowe,
. . follow American strategic pronouncements very 
closely and understand clearly the crucial semantic 
nuances. . . .’’2? ’’The mere fact,’’ writes Kissinger, ’’that
25Myron Rush, Khrushchev’s Strategic Views, op. cit.,
p. 4e
26see Lasky, ojc. cit. , p. 568.
^George Lowe, The Age of Deterrence (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1965), p. 238. ~
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thefWest constantly feels constrained to emphasize thatV
a nuclear conflict is unthinkable may raise serious 
questions about its resolve to resort to the chief
— \P  $strategy at its disposal,,”)
/\^Premier Khrushchev’s understanding of U.S. Cuban 
policy was a major factor in his decision to send mis­
siles to Cuba* The ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion attempt 
of April 1961 s while demonstrating the depths of U.S. 
hostility toward Castro, also suggested to Khrushchev that 
President Kennedy’s reluctance to engage its own forces 
directly in military action against Cuba was so great that 
even the deployment of Soviet strategic weapons on the 
island would be tolerated, or at least resisted by means 
short of direct use of U.S. armed forces.*^ ’’Unquestion­
ably, Khrushchev was astonished at our failure to carry 
through the . * * i n v a s i o n K h r u s h c h e v  had studied 
the events at the Bay of Pigs; he would have understood 
if Kennedy had left Castro alone or destroyed him; but
o dKissinger, The Necessity for Choice, op. cit.,
p. 14 o
^This particular expectation was based on the 
U.S. proven inability to use its power— i.e., its lack 
of will and skill to employ various techniques of coer­
cion available to it. Such examples are Laos, Berlin 
Wall, and American-Cuban relations. See Horelick, 
op. cit., pp. 35-38; also Lowenthal, erg. cit., pp. 63-64«
30James Burnham, ’’The Gentle Khrushchev,”
National Review, XIII (December 31> 196?)> 505»
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,/when Kennedy was rash enough to strike at Cuba but not 
bold enough to finish the job, Khrushchev decided he was 
dealing with an "inexperienced young man who could be
stated: ’’Premier Khrushchev expanded gleefully on the
demonstrated to Khrushchev that the President 
". * * lacked resolve and would not take determined
vital area* The great cost of non-involvement when U,S.„ 
core interests are threatened is projected onto the world 
as an indication of U„S„ impotence and indecisiveness in 
her own backyard. Khrushchev was more than willing to 
take advantage of such irresolution,, His own nerve had 
not failed when it became necessary to send tanks into 
Budapest on November 4, 1956, to throttle the revolution* 
Kennedy had not lifted a finger to crush Castro* To
T
Khrushchev, the dilemma was clear: ’’The Americans cer­
tainly possess overwhelming power--but they have forgotten
intimidated and blackmailed*"3^ As Robert Strausz-Hupe
West’s failure of nerve*’’-^ Kennedy’s action in Cuba
action * * ."33 against a challenge to its hegemony in a
how a great power must behave
3lReston, crp. cit * , p* 24°
32strausz-Hupe, "Reflections on the Quarter,"
op* cit* , p* 505 *
33stoessinger, op* cit *, p* 165; and Plank,
0£* cit., p. 34.
34Abel, ap° cit *, p* 36.
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penetration of Cuba was rather unexpected0 "It was
greatly stimulating, it was even a little intoxicating,
to see a Communist regime amazingly established within
3 5a stone’s throw of the American mainland."
rv.fTne Kennedy Administration’s acceptance of in­
creasingly open Soviet involvement in Cuban affairs after 
the Bay of Pigs incident, including particularly the 
Soviet military involvement, strengthened the belief of 
Khrushchev and the Soviet leaders that the U.S. would 
engage in armed intervention only in response to the 
actual use of Cuba-based weapons against some Western
Hemisphere country
• ~ - o
A few weeks after the abortive Cuba invasion, 
Soviet leaders were further enlightened regarding 
American foreign policy when President Kennedy met with 
Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961 and prepared the way 
for the neutralization of Laos (i.e., virtual abandonment
of Laos to C o m m u n i s m ) T h e  Kremlin’s belief that the\
Kennedy Administration was merely a "paper tiger" was re­
affirmed by the President’s loud threats to intervene in
35Frankland, ap„ cit„, p 0 2S1 ; see also Diner- 
stein, "Soviet Policy in L 0A.„," _op0 cit., p. £4; and 
Mosely, ojd„ cif „, pp„ 66-67®
3%'ee Horelick, _op0 cit», pp. 37-3&ff®
3?See the discussion in Reiman Morin, "Days That 
Shocked the World," The Washington Star, November 6,
1 962 „
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Laos and its later inaction,,
At Vienna, Khrushchev had bullied Kennedy over 
the Bay of Pigs defeat* Kennedy called it a mistake. 
Khrushchev saw it as evidence of "weakness and indeci- 
sion."^l From Khrushchev5s point of view, this meeting 
was in no way a climacteric; it was no more than a useful 
exploration. Khrushchev went to Vienna . . t o  see 
this young man [Kennedy] with the toothpaste-advertisement 
smile and youthful head of hair. Ĥe needed to decide 
whether he really was a president or only a personable 
figure manipulated by unseen hands~-and, if so, whose 
h a n d s ."39 In Vienna, Khrushchev did not deliberately set 
out to be unpleasant or belligerent.^ That the President 
was a young man in a hurry he could see. Upon the end of 
the meetings, Khrushchev was unable to determine what 
Kennedy believed; if indeed he believed anything at all. 
Khrushchev left the encounter convinced he could get away
3^01eg V. Penkovskii, The Penkovskii Papers, 
introduction and commentary by Frank Gibney, foreword by 
Edward Crankshaw, trans. Peter Deriabin (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965)? P»
3^Crankshaw, Khrushchev, op. cit. , p. 27$.
^Khrushchev was simply being himself in the ' 
encounter. His successes in the last few years had given 
him tremendous confidence that his mental and physical 
powers were adequate to almost any crisis that he might 
face. These successes had made him extremely bold. 
Khrushchev5s strategy was simpler he sought to confront 
and encounter his antagonist.
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with some daring move* President Kennedy had failed to 
exert himself; he had confused Western policy at a time
when firmness and resolute diplomacy were necessary!^
?A joint communique issued at the end of the 
Vienna meetings described them as frank, courteous, and
/V.
useful. But useful to whom? /From the President’s view­
point, the meeting had failed. "Khrushchev had sized up 
Kennedy as a ’pushover.’ The meeting had totally 
negative results.\ "Khrushchev concluded we are people 
who first shake our fists, then shake our fingers, and 
then shake our heads jfhrushchev had walked away
quite confident from the Vienna meeting. Later, it was 
reported on the diplomatic circuit that Khrushchev had 
boasted to the East Germans, ”1 think that I have taught 
that young man what fear isf'^j
(The American acquiescence over the Berlin Wall was 
interpreted by Khrushchev as confirming his estimate of 
Kennedy’s unwillingness to use force to protect vital 
American interests and rights. Kennedy had „ „ ignored 
the provocation of the construction of the Berlin Wall."^-
^•iLasky, op. pit. , p. 571°
^Henry J. Taylor, Reporter, U.S. Hews & World 
as cited in Lasky, pp. cit., p. 571°
^3premier Khrushchev, as quoted in Lasky, 
op. cit., po 571 .
^Leuchtenburg, pp. cit., p. 20.
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^Khrushchev had taken measure of President 
Kennedy5s determination and resolution and found them 
incredible. The lesson Khrushchev had drawn was that the 
U.S. talked loudly but carried a small stick.^ On 
September 9th, a few weeks before the Cuban crisis, 
Khrushchev told Robert Frost that the "modern liberals" 
in the U.S. were "too liberal to f i g h t . I n  the Cuban 
crisis, as past American behavior had demonstrated, 
"Khrushchev did indeed have ground for believing that the
rx
U.S. would not act.'J (On October 16th, just a few days 
before the beginning of the open phase of the Cuban 
crisis, Khrushchev told Kekkonen of Finland that he was 
"absolutely convinced" that the U.S. would never fight 
over Berlin, Cuba, or anything else.'^ Premier Khrushchev 
had calculated that the U.S. would consult its allies, 
who would urge caution to bring the case before the 
United Nations, and the United Nations would decide in
- - " i nfavor of Cuba and the Soviet Union. \
  — >
^5See Spanier, ojp. cit. , pp. 234-37.
Crane, op. cit., pp. 531-32; also James Burham, 
op. cit., p. 505.
^Alexander Dallin, "What Happened in the 
Kremlin," Newsweek, LX (November 23, 1962), 25.
^ % e e  Crane, ojd. cit. , p. 536; also interview 
with Alexander Dallin in Newsweek, November 12, 1962.
49Cf., Klaus Knorr, "Failures in National Intel­
ligence Estimates," op. cit. , p. 465.
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The subjective factors of American foreign policy 
had indeed convinced Khrushchev that the U.S. would not 
respond with force to the creation of an offensive mis­
sile base in Cuba. Khrushchev had long since come to 
the conclusion that President Kennedy’s lack of experi­
ence and his tendency to temperorize could be safely 
exploited„
Khrushchev had become convinced that the Kennedy 
Administration would not run risks to protect its inter­
ests, either because it did not understand its interests 
or because it did not have the will to use its power, 
■"'Kennedy's behavior in handling the five international 
crises and the damaging effects these defeats had on 
American deterrence strategy . . led the Soviet 
leaders to the conviction that given a face-saving for­
mula, the United States would choose retreat rather than
 "c oa head on confrontation,”j The Kennedy Administration 
had precipitated the crisis by its own actions--according 
to Thomas Schelling when he referred to the President's 
conduct in foreign affairs: "No service is done to the
other side by behaving in a way that undermines his belief 
in one’s ultimate firmness,’^  ^Sometime after the crisis,
5%enry A. Kissinger, "Reflections on Cuba," 
Reporter, XXVTI (November 22, 1962),, 22.
51 Thomas Schelling, "Uncertainty, Brinksmanship, 
and the Game of Chicken," as quoted in Archibald, 
op, cit», p. $7.
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Dean Acheson was asked why the Russians had put the mis­
siles in Cuba. His answer was anything but flattering 
to his own government. He said that the Russians had been 
led to believe that they could get away with itê J
5^S:ee Abel, op. cit., p. 113? for full text of 
conversation Acheson was having with Charles DeGaulle.
CONCLUSION
The discussion of the deterrence model as devel­
oped in Chapter I and analyzed in Chapter III has proven 
to be a useful theoretical tool. Not only has it served 
as an explanatory model but it has also helped provide 
some of the answers to the questions this thesis has 
attempted to resolve.
Similar to any theoretical model, the deterrence 
model has flaws. It cannot truly represent a valid 
interpretation of reality. It is only an approximation. 
Does this fact negate its usefulness? It does not. If 
a theoretical model helps us understand the internal 
logic between cause and effect and the interrelated vari­
ables in any event, crisis, or’social phenomena, it has 
served its purpose.
The analysis of the deterrence model in Chap­
ter III has, it is hoped, brought added understanding to 
the cause and effect relationships involved in the Cuban 
missile crisis. Deterrence, like all political phenomena, 
is not likely to operate as a strict law or principle. 
However, it does have a consistent and logical core. And, 
as Kissinger has stated, deterrence is either effective or
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it is not. Cln the case of the Kennedy Administration, 
deterrence was not effective; in fact, it failed. It 
failed not so much because of any weakness in the deter­
rence model. Its failure can be attributed more to the 
frailties and insufficiencies of men and their use of 
national power than to the deterrence model^>
(The evaluation of the deterrence model has not 
only demonstrated the disastrous outcomes when deterrence 
strategy is not implemented effectively, but it has also 
indicated several inherent weaknesses in the use of 
nuclear power. These weaknesses, as Morgenthau expressed 
them, are the four paradoxes of nuclear power: the commit­
ment to the use of force, nuclear or otherwise, paralyzed 
by the fear of having to use it; the search for a nuclear 
strategy which would avoid the predictable consequences 
of nuclear war; the pursuit of a nuclear armaments race 
joined with attempts to stop it; and the pursuit of an 
alliance policy which the availability of nuclear weapons 
has rendered obsolete".'-,
This does not mean that we should abandon deter­
rence strategy; only that we should consider realistically 
the use of force and power when such correct and effective 
action serves our policy goals. The United States can­
not afford to find itself at the mercy of events. It 
must anticipate the danger and shape a firm and consistent
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policy to meet it. Fulfillment of threats and obliga­
tions is a matter of national honor and prestige. Power 
and influence are the means of facilitating deterrence, 
and ” . . .  they share the role of being the means par 
excellence of foreign policy."^
deterrence requires a combination of power, the 
will to use it, and the assessment of these by the poten­
tial aggressor. If force is necessary to avert a serious 
crisis to demonstrate our determination to apply our 
military superiority as may be necessary to protect our 
interests, and those of our allies, its use should<be con­
sidered. Since deterrence is a form of power relation—
the power to dissuade--the use of force may be necessary
to affirm compliance with one's own actions^
(A basic presumption of this thesis has been that 
the origins and possible avoidance of conflicts are not 
in final acts, but in decisions taken or not taken day 
by day over long periods of time. (^A crisis occurs as 
the result of failure of decision-making at much earlier 
stages
This thesis has attempted to verify the above 
presumption by examining the origins of the Cuban missile 
crisis. The successful mediation of the crisis during 
October 1962 does not free us from the need to understand
^See supra, p. 37, n. 42.
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how the U.S'. arrived at the point where such dramatic 
and risky action was necessary,, This writer has found 
the explanations of the events leading up to the crisis 
partially unclear and unanswered; and it is hoped that 
this research has at least brought some clarity and 
understanding to the problems involved,
(~The Cuban missile crisis was not an episodic 
event. The crisis was unique in the history of the Cold 
War. Ole Holsti best depicted its momentous character 
when he sals? "The Cuban crisis surpassed all previous 
cold war confrontations and, for that matter, any pre­
vious in histor
(We cannot dispute the fact that Khrushchev mis­
calculated American behavior and response during the 
actual crisis of October 1962. But the important question 
is: Why did he miscalculate? He miscalculated because
the credibility of American deterrence strategy had been 
so thoroughly weakened by Kennedy’s words and actions 
that the deployment of missiles not only seemed to involve 
few risks but also Khrushchev believed no response would 
be forthcoming. Khrushchev’s action was due in no small 
part from Kennedy’s failure to demonstrate effective 
executive leadership^
(If there is one distinguishing feature that
^Holsti, Brody, and North, as cited in Rosenau, 
op. cit. , p. 6&3«
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characterized the Kennedy Administration, it was the dis­
sociation of military power and national policy. In the 
Kennedy Administration, foreign policy was in a state of 
constant confusion. There was a discrepancy between what 
the Administration preached and what it practiced. Up 
until the Cuban crisis of October 1962, President Kennedy 
failed to utilize military power as a rational and effec­
tive instrument of national policy. The Kennedy Adminis­
tration not only hesitated and vacillated in the face of 
Soviet blandishments, but also before Soviet intransigence^ 
(The Soviet probes of American resolve that have 
been discussed in this study found the Kennedy Adminis­
tration debating their implications when quick counter­
measures were required. President Kennedyrs behavior and 
strategy in foreign affairs doomed the U.S. to an essen­
tially reactive policy that produced improvised counter 
moves. The result of these conditions is that American 
foreign policy tends to be defensive in nature. Such a 
policy leads to the depreciation of national powerr)
In order for the U.S. to employ power as a 
rational and effective instrument of national policy, it 
must first have a foreign policy that is defined in terms 
appropriate to power. The Kennedy Administration demon­
strated its reluctance to think in terms of power; the 
consequences were indeed costly (e.g., weakened deterrence
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strategy, inefficacious threats, Cuban missile crisis). * 
W e  Kennedy Administration was preoccupied with 
two extreme levels of objectives: (1) the level of
technical performance of deterrence strategy, and (2) the 
level of philosophical generalities concerning the 
highest levels of mankind. President Kennedy used power 
almost shamefacedly, as if it were inherently wicked.
Not only was deterrence strategy weakened by such be­
havior, but also the credibility factor and national 
power were greatly depreciated.''"^
As earlier discussed, deterrence strategy has a 
logical core. If we ask whom will deterrence strategy 
deter, the answer must be only £hose w^° play the game.
QXeterrence deters only so long as both aggressor and 
deterrer know the game thoroughly and act out their roles 
accordingly. It is questionable whether President Kennedy 
knew the game thoroughly or that he acted out his role in 
foreign policy leadership in the most effective fashion^
(if a President is going to administer foreign 
policy to protect and guard his personal power, he must 
understand"that power. He must thoroughly understand 
power relationships and how they affect his personal influ­
ence and power. He must always be aware of the risks 
involved in using power and how decisions and choices 
will affect his power. It is doubtful whether Kennedy
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in the Bay of Pigs disaster ever seriously weighed and 
considered the damaging effect the fiasco would have on 
his personal power and influence. He realized this 
after the incident. The President must always weigh the 
risks, both costs and gains, in pursuing a certain 
policy. The President protects his power, as best he 
can, when he appraises the effects of the present action 
on the sources of his power. To make decisions with in­
sight, the President must have learned to know himself 
and to master his identity. Perhaps one of the greatest 
failures of the Kennedy Administration was its inability 
to decide what it was doing and where it was going in the 
realm of foreign affairs. Such statements beget the next 
logical question: Was President Kennedy able to master
his own identity and principles of government in the White 
House? This study has revealed that he did not. ")
(Many writers have written that the Kennedy Admin­
istration, and particularly the President, finally ex­
hibited determination and direction by facing-down the 
Communist challenge in Cuba in October 1962. The success­
ful removal of the offensive missiles has been hailed as 
a Western victory and a defeat for the Soviet Union. I 
can hardly agree with such statements. Not only were the 
Communists handed a privileged sanctuary in the Western 
Hemisphere, but they also were given a mno invasion” pledge
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by the Kennedy Administration. I do not consider this a 
victory but a grave, tragic consequence of the total in­
eptness and bungling of U.S. foreign policy in the Carib­
bean. If the Sbviet leaders were surprised at U.S. firm­
ness in handling the Cuban missile crisis, they were 
further confused by the failure of the U.S. to take advan-. 
tage of its superior strategic position. The Kennedy 
Administration wanted only the return of the status quo; 
it did not even get that.
The modern liberalism of the Kennedy Administration 
favored discussion, negotiation, and compromise as the 
only rational and acceptable method of settling disputes.
It rejected the use of coercion and force,,
Cuba is indeed an American tragedy. Furthermore, 
it is a Kennedy tragedy.'^
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